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“This impressive volume, the result of IDRC’s and DFID’s Safe and Inclusive Cities 
initiative and undertaken with researchers from cities in the Global South, is unique 
in its presentation of in- depth original research results within a cross- regional, cross- 
discipline holistic framework. In this way, it fills a gap in knowledge of the urban 
violence–poverty–inequality nexus. The book brings together a remarkable range of 
individual case studies, focusing on such issues as social cohesion, exclusion, and 
gendered violence, with provocative—at times counter- intuitive—policy solutions. In 
demonstrating that the challenges of ubiquitous urban violence transcend borders 
and showing that resistance and resilience are fundamental local coping strategies, 
this path- breaking book is essential reading for academics, policymakers, and practi-
tioners alike.”
Caroline Moser, Emeritus Professor, University of Manchester, UK
“This second book based on research carried out under the Safe and Inclusive Cities 
initiative focuses its attention on interventions to address the extremely complex, 
diverse, layered, and often inter- connected forms of violence experienced in cities of 
the Global South. In a scenario where the state is often implicated as a perpetrator of 
violence and where social cohesion is frayed with groups pitched against each other, 
as the chapters illustrate, interventions are bound to be embedded in the complexity 
of the violence and hence ‘imperfect’. But, there is a lot to be learned from them as 
works in progress.
 One point that is clearly made is that safety and inclusion cannot be treated as 
independent arenas; they are linked. The sheer diversity of forms of interventions 
discussed here is amazing, ranging from grassroots interventions where the stakes 
and the roles of women and children in peace- keeping are asserted, to state interven-
tions such as livelihood and safety linking projects such as the Community Work 
Programme, community upgrading, and policing. Beyond the specifics of the inter-
ventions discussed, the value of the book is that it represents an analysis by research-
ers deeply engaged with their local contexts, and hence insights that are highly 
nuanced and appreciative of particularities, temporalities, and complexities. If the 
world must make a definitive movement towards attainment of the Sustainable 
Development Goals, listening to and reading these fascinating insights is a must for 
international, national, and local policymakers and all those interested in develop-
ment dynamics.”
Amita Bhide, Professor and Dean, School of Habitat Studies, 
Tata Institute of Social Sciences, India
“Reducing Urban Violence in the Global South: Towards Safe and Inclusive Cities, 
edited by Jennifer Erin Salahub, Markus Gottsbacher, John de Boer, and Mayssam 
D. Zaaroura, brings together nine chapters on problems and solutions to violence in
some cities of the so- called Global South to understand their many similarities, but
also their specific differences.
The world became urban in 2006 when, for the first time, more than half its popu-
lation was living in cities. However, while this trend was not new for the developed 
world where urbanisation has now plateaued, Asia and Africa are urbanising at an 
impressive rate, as is Latin America. In line with this phenomenon, violence has 
urbanised or, in other words, it has a tendency to concentrate in cities. Typical urban 
violence has emerged, expressed through: occurrence in shared spaces (public and 
private); unequal access to services, equipment, and infrastructure; discrimination 
based on ethnicity, gender, age, or status as a migrant; and illegal markets such as 
money laundering or trade in illicit substances, among others.
The proposal to build safe cities has arisen to confront urban violence in its 
duality: its concentration in cities and its urban specificity. This book helps address 
this double objective, examining the problem through case studies from Latin 
America, Asia, and Africa. Undoubtedly, this is a book that contributes to our know-
ledge of the problem of urban violence, but also to building urban coexistence 
through structural responses to inequalities, violence prevention policies, and com-
munity participation.”
Fernando Carrión, Research Professor, FLACSO Ecuador
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15-project research programme supported by Canada’s International Development 
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The twenty- first century belongs to the city. The planet has undergone 
unprecedented urbanisation over the past half century. Today, well over 
half of the world’s population is urban, compared to less than 1 per cent in 
the seventeenth century. There are currently 31 mega cities of ten million 
people or more compared to just three in the 1950s. What is more, urbani-
sation is set to continue its relentless growth over the coming two decades. 
Future urban population expansion will be unevenly distributed: more 
than 90 per cent is predicted to occur in the so- called Global South, espe-
cially Africa and Asia.
 The continued growth in the scale, number, and dispersion of cities is 
contributing to an “urban dilemma”. As I explained in a 2012 report for 
Canada’s International Development Research Centre (IDRC), the dilemma 
refers to the double- edged nature of rapid urbanisation. On the positive 
side of the ledger, urbanisation can be a powerful force for economic 
growth and pro- poor development. More negatively, urbanisation has the 
potential to increase protracted insecurity among the urban poor. This 
“darker side” of rapid and unregulated urbanisation could potentially 
disrupt its potential to stimulate growth, productivity, and wellbeing.
 Not surprisingly, there is growing apprehension about the causes and 
consequences of the urban dilemma in multilateral and bilateral policy 
circles. United Nations agencies, the World Bank, and organisations 
ranging from the European Union to the Organisation for Economic Co- 
operation and Development have issued a number of reports on the 
implications of rapid urbanisation for stability and development. Many 
humanitarian and development aid agencies have elaborated policies and 
procedures to mitigate harms and harness the dividends. Military planners 
have also prepared new manuals to guide operations in urban warfare—
considered by many to be the most likely battlefield of the future.
 From 2012 to 2017, IDRC and the United Kingdom’s Department for 
International Development funded research to examine the urban dilemma, 
particularly in the Global South. The focus on cities in low- income and 
emerging economies was intentional. Indeed, there is comparatively limited 
awareness of the dynamics of urbanisation in the world’s fastest- growing 
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cities. To begin filling this knowledge gap, the organisations commissioned 
dozens of researchers to undertake field- based and policy- oriented research 
on the intersections of urbanisation, poverty, inequality, and violence.
 A key impetus guiding IDRC’s work on the urban dilemma was the 
desire to test novel theoretical approaches to appraising the key drivers of 
urban violence. Rather than relying exclusively on criminological and soci-
ological models imported from the Global North—whether social dis-
organisation, institutional anomie, broken windows, or otherwise—IDRC 
sought to leverage new and alternative research methods to better under-
stand the characteristics and dynamics of violence in cities of the Global 
South.
 This ambitious edited volume by Jennifer Erin Salahub, Markus 
Gottsbacher, John de Boer, and Mayssam D. Zaaroura synthesises the out-
comes of this IDRC- led process. It curates findings on the causes and con-
sequences of urban dilemmas across more than 40 cities. It highlights the 
theoretical and methodological approaches adopted by a group of talented 
inter- disciplinary scholars heralding from universities and research insti-
tutes in the Americas, Africa, and Asia. Taken together, the collection lays 
out an innovative framework for scholars and, just as importantly, practi-
tioners, to rethink how they conceive, diagnose, and respond to violence in 
cities of the South.
 The edited volume adds to a growing body of scholarship produced by 
scholars and applied researchers in the Global South—especially Latin 
America. Indeed, there is a growing consensus on the core risks that give 
rise to urban violence, much of it based on quantitative and qualitative 
research pursued over the past decade. High on the list are social and 
income inequalities and concentrated poverty. Indeed, Latin America is 
home to ten of the world’s 15 most unequal countries (measured by their 
Gini scores) and 43 of the 50 most lethally violent cities in 2016. A group 
of Latin Amer ican researchers affiliated with the World Bank recently 
determined that a 1 per cent increase in teen pregnancies in the region is 
associated with at least 0.5 additional murders per 100,000 people.
 Across Latin America, a context with which I am particularly familiar, 
scholars have also detected complex relationships between rapid and 
unregulated urbanisation and urban violence. Roughly 85 per cent of Latin 
Amer icans already live in cities, suburbs, and slums, some of them experi-
encing among the highest reported levels of criminal violence in the world. 
In Latin America, as in most places, homicidal violence tends to be hyper- 
concentrated spatially in peripheral urban areas that suffer from concen-
trated disadvantage. Cities, especially fast- growing ones, offer certain 
intrinsic opportunities for criminal activity (for instance, anonymity, pro-
spective victims, and dilapidated infrastructure), compounded by economic 
neglect and scarce basic services.
 In Latin Amer ican cities, violence can also be compounded by a higher 
density of actual and would- be offenders—particularly unemployed young 
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men. At least 13 per cent of Latin America’s 108 million 15–24-year- olds 
are unemployed, which has encouraged a small number of them to commit 
“aspirational crime”. The available evidence, including that set out in this 
IDRC volume, suggests that Latin America’s murderers are, by and large, 
young, out of work, out of school, and out of options. In Brazil, for 
example, studies reveal that a 1 per cent rise in unemployment rates for 
men results in a 2.1 per cent spike in homicides.
 Latin America’s alternately over- bearing and under- capacitated security 
and justice institutions are also responsible for aggravating urban violence. 
Law enforcement officers are frequently implicated in criminal activity, 
judicial systems are corrupt and over- burdened, and prisons are literally 
administered by gangs across parts of the northern triangle countries of El 
Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras but also from Brazil and Colombia to 
Mexico and Venezuela. The mistrust in criminal justice institutions is pro-
found, often in contrast to the perceived legitimacy of military entities and 
growing faith in authoritarian political figures.
 The good news is that high- quality research—including the studies in 
this edited volume—can help identify entry- points to redress the urban 
dilemma and experiment with urban violence reduction. There are real and 
meaningful opportunities for South–South–North exchange and learning, 
particularly in relation to the common causes and consequences of violence 
in the city. The book foregrounds a range of exciting and intersectoral 
opportunities to improve safety and security in fragile cities. It is not so 
much a road map or prescriptive guide as a compendium of innovative and 
frequently counter- intuitive signposts.
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Introduction
A fast- moving and dynamic urban 
landscape
John de Boer and Markus Gottsbacher
Over three million people are moving into cities every week and municipal 
governments are underprepared for the coming population boom (World 
Bank 2018). The fastest growing metropolitan areas are in Asia and Africa. 
In fact, 90 per cent of all future population growth will occur in sprawling 
metropolises and small and medium- sized cities (Muggah 2017). Accord-
ing to the World Bank (2015), 60 per cent of the areas that are expected to 
be urban by 2030 have yet to be built and, by 2060, one billion new 
housing units will be needed to house the world’s growing population. By 
2050, an estimated 86 of the world’s largest 100 megacities will be in Asia 
and Africa (Vidal 2018).
 The sheer speed of urbanisation is outpacing the capacity of govern-
ments to keep up (Muggah 2017). Urbanisation is particularly rapid in 
fragile and conflict- affected countries. Over the past 40 years, the total 
urban population in fragile states has increased significantly (Bosetti, 
Cooper, and de Boer 2016). What were predominantly rural countries will 
become urban over the next 15 years—as illustrated in Figure I.1—and this 
has profound implications for development and security (see United 
Nations 2018a).
 Cities such as Abidjan, Juba, Kabul, Kinshasa, Mogadishu, and Port au 
Prince are growing at unprecedented and unmanageable rates for what are 
already fragile settings. Experts fear that pressure from rapid urbanisation 
in these already stressed environments will severely destabilise countries, 
undermine state- building and reform efforts, and throw countries back 
into a spiral of violence (von Einsiedel 2017).
Risks facing twenty- first-century cities
What makes twenty- first-century cities unique compared with those of the 
past is that they are increasingly sites of converging opportunities and 
risks. Their hyperconnected and integrated systems enable new forms of 
finance, mobility, employment, and retail, health, and education services 
that open up the possibility of tackling some of our most pressing chal-
lenges. Yet, the interconnected and interdependent nature of our cities and 
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their global reach also exposes them to a range of risks including cyber 
attacks, health pandemics, climate risks and natural disasters, extreme pol-
lution, crime, and terrorist threats (Muggah 2016a, 2016b).
 Cities face a myriad of risks, with most of them combining both exo-
genous and endogenous characteristics (de Boer, Muggah, and Patel 2016). 
Internal risks include being situated in a floodplain or having access only 
to extremely poor or non- existent infrastructure. External risks include 
cyclones or conflict in neighbouring areas that can spill over in the form of 
unregulated migration and the associated political and social backlash. 
Importantly, city fragility is seldom the result of a monolithic root cause. 
Rather, the evidence suggests that the cumulative effects of overlapping 
political, social, economic, and environmental risks drive violence and vic-
timisation in cities (Ambraseys and Bilham 2011). Moreover, recent 
research has demonstrated the importance of understanding how formal 
and informal institutions that govern decision- making in urban contexts 
influence the development trajectories of cities (Goodfellow 2014). Purely 
technical approaches that fail to take into account the political arrange-
ments that determine who is able to access services, exercise their basic 
rights, benefit from the application of fundamental social norms, and 
prosper in a city will likely reinforce existing forms of exclusion and even 
exacerbate vulnerability.
 Cities account for at least 70 per cent of total worldwide greenhouse gas 
emissions, are home to the majority of the world’s poor, and register 
Figure I.1 Urban populations in selected fragile countries, 1965–2030.
Source: Bosetti, Cooper, and de Boer (2016).
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higher homicide rates than rural areas. The ability of nation- states to 
tackle diverse global problems such as climate change, poverty, and fragil-
ity will depend on how cities are equipped to meet these challenges. Many 
mayors already recognise this reality and are teaming up to share innov-
ative and data- driven solutions. Sustainable Development Goal 11—“Make 
cities and human settlements inclusive, safe, resilient and sustainable”—is 
emboldening city leaders to develop practical solutions to problems that so 
often divide and paralyse their federal counterparts (de Boer 2015).
 One emerging risk is climate change, which is expected to drive human 
displacement to an unknown and unprecedented scale. Even the minimum 
projections in sea level rise put an estimated one billion people in Asia and 
Africa at risk. By some estimates, climate change will force up to 77 
million urban residents into poverty over the next decade, reversing a long, 
hard- fought trend of global poverty reduction (de Boer and Patel 2016).
 The rise in temperatures will also increase the habitable range of the 
disease- carrying Anopheles mosquito, creating greater risk that malaria 
and the Zika virus will spread to new regions. By 2050, the International 
Organization for Migration expects to see up to one billion people dis-
placed from their homes by climate change. Complicating this further is 
the risk of pandemics, where cities could become centres of major out-
breaks. We only need turn to the Zika and Ebola crises to see glimpses of 
what the future could hold, particularly when infrastructure and services 
are ill- equipped to cope with such outbreaks (de Boer and Patel 2016).
 In cities affected by violence, fear has emerged as a key concern for 
many residents. Crime avoidance has become an important characteristic 
driving the behaviour of many individuals and communities in these cities. 
This has caused urban residents to modify how and when they move in the 
city: children have been prevented from attending school, those that can 
afford private security have built up veritable fortresses, and those who 
cannot afford to do so have developed coping strategies that include vigi-
lantism and joining gangs or self- help community groups. Millions have 
also chosen, or been forced, to migrate elsewhere. The ultimate effect is the 
erosion of human capital and, in many cases, the decay of social cohesion 
within those cities.
 The situation in some of the world’s most violent cities is stark. In Latin 
America, for example, levels of trust in one’s neighbours and institutions 
are shockingly low. Interpersonal trust averages just 17 per cent across the 
region and is as low as 3 per cent in Brazil (Latinobarometro 2016). Only 
two in ten Latin Amer icans have high levels of faith in their government. 
For Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Paraguay, and Peru, the number 
is closer to one in ten (Latinobarometro 2016). Public opinion surveys con-
sistently rank the capacity and integrity of judicial institutions, police, and 
public servants (municipal and national) as exceptionally low. Some 44 per 
cent of Latin Amer icans believe that the police are involved in crime 
(Muggah and Aguirre 2018). In Buenos Aires, less than 20 per cent of the 
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population trust the police. In Lima and La Paz, that figure is less than 10 
per cent and in Caracas it is 15 per cent (Ortega 2016).
 A diverse array of structural, institutional, and proximate risk factors 
give rise to crime and victimisation in cities across the world. These factors 
can range from the abuse of alcohol to the availability of firearms and the 
abundance of drug trafficking networks, as well as systemic corruption and 
widespread inequality. They also include factors related to youth unem-
ployment, gender discrimination and patriarchy, and the historical legacies 
of war and colonialism.
 What makes cities unique is how the risks of violence and victimisa-
tion that they face tend to aggregate and converge, often with increasing 
intensity. Preventing risk aggregation requires a careful diagnostic of the 
particular factors that exacerbate insecurity and violence in a particular 
context combined with a plan to reduce these risks. Adopting a public 
health approach to understanding and preventing violence can often help. 
Whereas criminology tends to focus on the offender’s behaviour after a 
crime has been committed, public health approaches stress prevention 
and seek to minimise the mental and physical injuries that may result 
from a violent event. This means working with youth and other indi-
viduals at risk. It also requires focusing resources to address challenges in 
neighbourhoods where disadvantage is concentrated. Ultimately, it means 
identifying the risk factors facing residents in cities and working compre-
hensively with residents and authorities to take advantage of opportun-
ities to address them.
 Yet, if there is one central theme in this book, it is the importance of 
building social cohesion and trust within and between neighbourhoods. 
This finding adds to a chorus of recent research that stresses the same 
point: “social cohesion, trust, and a shared commitment to the com-
munity” are critical to violence reduction and social development in crime-
ridden neighbourhoods, as experts such as Patrick Sharkey (2018) have 
documented with respect to violence reduction in New York City (cited in 
Gopnik 2018). Sharkey’s (2018) work demonstrates how “violence almost 
vanishes” in communities with high levels of social cohesion and trust. On 
the other hand, where there is concentrated poverty in addition to low 
levels of interpersonal and inter- communal trust, violent crime tends to be 
more rampant. Constructing and/or restoring the social fabric of a com-
munity is essential to reducing crime and violence. For this to happen, 
investments need to be made that enhance the ability of urban residents to 
build and rebuild the social support networks of their communities block 
by block.
Why is this book important?
Violence- reduction programmes in urban contexts are often imported from 
other contexts and implanted as one- size-fits- all models at the local level. 
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Worse, this is done without taking into consideration the specificities of 
each host community. This book focuses on urban residents’ experience of 
initiatives designed and implemented in the Global South. Not only does it 
reflect on the importance of taking into account the local strategies of some 
of the people most vulnerable to multiple forms of violence in urban set-
tings, it also highlights the importance of agency in contexts of vulner-
ability. Local residents are not passive victims; they are active participants 
in responding to violence. Resilience to urban violence can only be 
achieved when affected populations determine the policy agenda and inter-
ventions to be implemented in their communities. This volume offers a 
nuanced and deep understanding of local agency and why it is critical to 
sustained violence reduction.
 As we noted earlier, cities have emerged as key economic, social, and 
cultural actors, yet continue to be mired in social segregation, inequality, 
and violence. Existing governance institutions are not always up to the task 
of delivering on their end of the social contract and, in many cases, lack 
the capacity and resources to plan over the long term or invest in pro-
grammes and infrastructure that build resilience. In many instances, 
decision- makers lack the political will to tackle the underlying structural 
causes of exclusion and violence.
 In these circumstances, this book aims to provide answers to questions 
such as:
•  What alternative and innovative approaches to creating safe and inclu-
sive cities in the Global South are policymakers experimenting with?
•  How are these new approaches altering the relationship between urban 
violence, poverty, and economic and gender inequality?
•  What strategies and initiatives to tackle these challenges are yielding 
results?
•  Are there lessons that can be learned for other contexts?
Answering these questions is particularly important in light of the Sustain-
able Development Goals (United Nations 2018b). As decision- makers 
move to implement these goals, they must be mindful of which policies and 
interventions work and which do not. The impact on the safety and 
security of large- scale programmes intended to create housing, improve 
access to services, and upgrade slums is not straightforward. In some cases, 
efforts to improve public housing and basic services in low- income settings 
have been captured by criminal markets. Gangs and militia have routinely 
influenced the management and delivery of such services, especially in 
informal settlements in Latin America and South Asia (Felbab- Brown 
2013).
 Nevertheless, there are also examples of how improvements in city 
housing, service delivery, and slum conditions yielded enhanced public 
security and urban safety (see Bauer 2010; USAID 2014; UNODC n.d.). 
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Examples include Brazil’s celebrated public housing programme—Minha 
Casa Minha Vida (My Home My Life)—which aims to reach 6.75 million 
households, or 27 million people, by 2018.1 Mexico’s conditional cash 
transfer programme—Oportunidades—has generated important violence 
prevention effects, especially among intimate partners.2
 The case of Medellin (Colombia) is another often cited example of 
urban upgrading leading to improvements in violence prevention and 
social cohesion. Under the rubric of “social urbanism”, Medellin’s plan 
integrated the poorest areas of the city with the centre and outlying areas. 
The city introduced a cable car and subway system, high- quality libraries 
and schools, and more participatory forms of engagement for the city’s 2.2 
million residents. While replication of the Medellin experience in other 
cities is challenging, it does offer important and aspirational lessons to 
mayors, business people, and civil society leaders around the world.
 Lessons from the failure of past policies have also been documented and 
need to be learned. This includes a continued tendency to implement mano 
dura policies, which, despite having produced little evidence of achieving 
their objectives (Muggah, Garzón, and Suárez 2018), are still being applied 
and reinforced. Part of this has to do with the fact that the majority of 
Latin Amer icans—61 per cent—favour a mano dura approach to public 
security.3 This viewpoint is consistent across the entire region regardless of 
whether the country suffers from high or low crime rates. This sentiment 
has been accompanied by a tendency toward the militarisation of police 
functions and repressive tactics across the region to restore public order. 
Honduras, El Salvador, Nicaragua, Colombia, and even Brazil have 
witnessed this first hand.
 In El Salvador, the number of military personnel deployed in cities has 
increased from 876 to 13,827 over the past two decades. In El Salvador 
and other countries facing similar challenges relating to urban violence, the 
increasing militarisation of police functions has also led to a dramatic 
increase in the number of murders allegedly attributed to the police. Of the 
4,004 homicides in El Salvador in 2010, 1 per cent (121) were alleged to 
have been committed by police officers; in 2017, that figure had risen to 10 
per cent (412 of 3,954) (UNHRC 2018). In Brazil, police killings are also a 
significant problem with over 5,000 people killed by the police in 2017, up 
from approximately 4,000 in 2016 (Forum Brasileiro de Segurança Pública 
2018).
 Other important lessons include the failure of policies and programmes 
that apply a one- size-fits- all approach to crime and violence prevention. A 
key finding here is the importance of localising solutions in a way that is 
appropriate to the context and takes into account the political economy of 
violence. Initiatives are required that invite meaningful citizen participation 
in the design and implementation of violence reduction strategies. 
Additionally, the gendered dimensions of violence need to be considered 
fully. This book helps document these policy and practice failures and 
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provides options for how societies and cities can escape the violence trap 
and build more inclusive cities that can prosper in the twenty- first century.
The origins and history of this book
From 2013 to 2017, 15 multidisciplinary teams of researchers in Latin 
America, South Asia, and sub- Saharan Africa worked in 16 countries and 
more than 40 cities as part of the Safe and Inclusive Cities (SAIC) initi-
ative. Their common objective was to understand the drivers of urban viol-
ence, poverty, and inequalities as well as what works—and what 
doesn’t—in preventing violence in urban centres. With their research now 
complete, these teams have findings and recommendations that are relevant 
to cities of the Global North and the Global South, which include a variety 
of approaches to reducing violence. They share perspectives that emphasise 
public health, sociology, urban planning, and other approaches that aim to 
tackle structural and interpersonal violence and exclusion. In doing so, this 
book brings multiple perspectives and disciplines to bear in addressing a 
complex problem linked to a myriad of risk factors.
 This book is the second and final volume resulting from a joint research 
programme funded by the Department for International Development 
(United Kingdom) and the International Development Research Centre 
(Canada). The first of the pair of books, Social Theories of Urban Violence 
in the Global South: Towards Safe and Inclusive Cities (Salahub, 
Gottsbacher, and de Boer 2018), sought to fill a theoretical and conceptual 
gap in the current literature on urban violence, which all but ignored con-
tributions being made in the Global South.
 This second volume focuses on practice. It describes and analyses the 
experience of researchers and practitioners applying these frameworks and 
approaches to better understand and respond to violence on the ground in 
their cities. In doing so, the book conveys new insights on the complexities 
of the linkages between inequality, exclusion, and violence, and represents 
an important addition to the contemporary literature on violence 
reduction.
 Together, the two books serve to document and magnify the results of 
this global research programme. They aim to answer the following groups 
of questions:
1. On drivers of violence: What are the most important drivers of urban 
violence (social, cultural, political, economic, gender- based, etc.), and 
how are these both a cause and a consequence of poverty and inequal-
ities? Why do communities that are comparable in terms of social and 
economic inequality and exclusion suffer different levels of violence?
2. On “what works and what doesn’t”: What are the most effective 
 interventions—both formal and informal—for tackling the problems 
of urban violence, poverty, and inequalities, and why? How have these 
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strategies improved the livelihoods and security of the most vulnerable 
and marginalised individuals and groups, in particular those of 
women, girls, and minorities? How have these strategies and interven-
tions affected the legitimacy and accountability of public authorities?
3. On improving policy and practice: What conditions facilitate the 
development of effective policies and practices (both formal and 
informal) that promote security and protect the livelihoods of the most 
poor and vulnerable individuals and groups? How can incentives be 
framed to facilitate the development of effective policies and practices 
and to what extent—if at all—can these be replicated in other 
contexts?
In responding to these lines of inquiry, this book helps readers and 
researchers better understand key drivers of urban violence and how those 
drivers differ across continents and in cities as diverse as Rio de Janeiro 
and Jaffna. It also highlights promising interventions that can address 
everyday violence being experienced in Caracas, Colombo, and Cape 
Town. Finally, the book provides policymakers searching for ways to 
tackle some of their most pressing urban problems with a pathway towards 
more safe and inclusive cities.
What is the book about?
The chapters in this book contain both descriptive and analytical elements 
and examine what the authors’ analyses mean for understanding different 
manifestations of urban violence in the city and the specific cities studied. 
They provide new knowledge and insights on the types, drivers, and 
dynamics of urban violence, poverty, and inequalities within their research 
sites. In some cases, such as in Chapter 1 on Côte d’Ivoire, our co- authors 
investigate the links between these drivers for the first time. In this way, 
the book outlines critical policy and practice challenges that have world-
wide implications. As the authors of the substantive chapters are based in 
the Global South, this represents a rare contribution to policy, practice, 
and academic discourse on urban violence.
 The thematic scope of this book is far reaching. Without claiming to be 
exhaustive, we identify and tackle six major topics. They are:
•  the link between poverty, social inequality, and violence
•  the role of social programmes and urban upgrading in violence 
prevention
•  the link between the formal (official) and the informal (unofficial) in 
the city, giving particular weight to the role of the informal in reducing 
violence
•  the connection between social cohesion and violence prevention
•  a gendered perspective on the impact of policy and practice
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•  the responses and agency of the most vulnerable populations affected 
by violence and exclusion.
In these ways, the research presented in this book places particular 
emphasis on approaches that: strengthen security and inclusion for the 
poorest groups; promote social empowerment at different life phases 
(youth, elderly persons, etc.); document the principal connections 
between violence, poverty, and inequality reduction; and, determine the 
varying impacts of violence on women and girls, not only as victims but 
also as agents for change. This new knowledge improves our under-
standing of the connections between violence, poverty, and inequalities 
and of efforts to reduce them in urban areas, in addition to helping to 
ensure that investments in development and security focus on, and are 
underpinned by, empirical evidence. Every chapter confronts several, if 
not all, of these elements.
Links between poverty, social inequality, and violence
In Chapter 2, Adobea Yaa Owusu, Martin Oteng- Ababio, George Owusu, 
Charlotte Wrigley- Asante, and Martin Wiredu Agyekum shed light on the 
important relationship between crime and poverty, using the examples of 
Ghana’s four largest cities. They question the universal applicability of pol-
icies and practices founded on studies of cities in the Global North that 
suggest neighbourhoods with higher levels of poverty experience more 
crime. Their research contributes to a more nuanced understanding of this 
relationship in the case of four major cities in Ghana: Accra, Kumasi, 
Sekondi- Takoradi, and Tamale.
 In Chapter 6, drawing on research on municipalities in Costa Rica and 
El Salvador, Juan Pablo Pérez Sáinz, Mario Zetino Duarte, and Florencio 
Ceballos Schaulsohn criticise the somewhat homogeneous thinking that 
shapes national public policies as well as international practices and guide-
lines pursued by aid agencies. They discuss the need for a deeper under-
standing and characterisation of collective action, violence, and organised 
crime, along with differentiated interpretations of, and approaches to, 
overcoming the latter two.
Social programmes, urban upgrading, and violence prevention 
interventions
In Chapter 4, Malose Langa, Themba Masuku, and Hugo van der Merwe 
bring to our attention the ways in which criminal justice responses are 
insufficient in reducing violent crime. In so doing, they emphasise the 
importance of considering social violence prevention strategies. Their study 
of South Africa’s Community Work Programme brings important insights 
on the crucial role of such strategies, which have been underestimated with 
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regard to their potential to curb urban violence and make communities 
safer.
 In Chapter 3, Richard Matzopoulos, Kim Bloch, Sam Lloyd, Chris 
Berens, Jonny Myers, and Mary Lou Thompson focus on a well- known 
experience of urban upgrading in South Africa’s Cape Town, namely the 
Violence Prevention through Urban Upgrading (VPUU) initiative. The 
study finds that not only do interventions that build social and structural 
inclusion help to decrease crime and violence, but they also have desirable 
unintended outcomes such as improvements in mental health.
Connections between social cohesion and violence prevention
The authors of Chapter 5, Vanessa Barolsky and Doriam Borges, also 
examine the VPUU intervention and pair it with an initiative in Brazil to 
compare the influence of two major violence prevention interventions—in 
contexts of high levels of violence and inequality—on social cohesion and 
collective efficacy. Their research is based on long- term ethnographic 
studies of VPUU in two neighbourhoods of Khayelitsha township (Cape 
Town) and the Pacifying Police Units intervention in two favelas in Rio de 
Janeiro. Their findings suggest that, despite their successes in violence 
reduction, in some places or with some groups both interventions destabil-
ised existing (informal) social networks that contribute to social cohesion, 
with negative results.
 In Chapter 7, Roberto Briceño-León stresses the importance of informal 
institutionality as a way to curb violence. His findings, based on research 
in several Venezuelan cities, reveal the existence of a duality of norms 
resulting from formal and informal institutionality in zones of urbanisa-
tion. He argues that exclusion is not only spatial and territorial, but also 
social and regulatory. Informal institutionality is the practical response of 
urban communities to a lack of formal law and it can help to prevent or 
resolve conflicts outside the law.
Informal approaches to reducing violence and links to formality
Several chapters engage with the link between the formal and the informal 
in the city, placing particular emphasis on the role of the informal to 
reduce violence. For instance, Kouamé Walter Kra, the author of Chapter 
1, highlights individual and collective solutions to overcome exclusion 
from the formal sector in the city. He looks at the role of the informal 
economy using the example of the life trajectory of a young man whose 
limited formal employment opportunities push him into a life of increasing 
violence centred on informal transportation hubs in Côte d’Ivoire. Kra thus 
sheds light on the links between the formal and the informal in urban con-
texts where a vast majority of urban dwellers are excluded from main-
stream society. He also raises the important issue of criminalisation of 
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informal strategies used by communities to cope with the daily challenges 
of poverty, exclusion, and violence.
Gendered perspectives
Many of our co- authors investigate the gendered dimensions of the impacts 
of urban policies and practices, in addition to the responses of the most 
vulnerable populations affected by violence and exclusion. In Chapter 8, 
Darshini Mahadevia and Renu Desai reflect on the impacts of urbanisation 
in India over the last two decades and how it has contributed to increasing 
marginalisation, conflict, and everyday violence. They describe the intrinsic 
competition for spaces in which the vulnerable—in particular, often- 
neglected women and girls—and the powerful negotiate their different 
needs and interests. Their chapter illustrates the challenges these popula-
tions face in their everyday lives, and the silence of policymakers vis- à-vis 
their rights to the city.4
 Finally, in Chapter 9, Rajith W. D. Lakshman and S. Irudaya Rajan 
discuss the gendered impacts of forced relocation in cities. They study the 
relocation of residents of informal settlements in Colombo (Sri Lanka) and 
Kochi (India). While they show that improved housing is an important 
measure of an increased quality of life upon relocation, they argue that, on 
its own, it is not sufficient to address the negative consequences of 
development- forced displacement and relocation (DFDR).
What is the way forward?
The research findings from the multiple cities presented in this book make 
a crucial contribution to current debates on how to “make cities and 
human settlements inclusive, safe, resilient, and sustainable”, as articulated 
in Sustainable Development Goal 11 (United Nations 2018b). However, 
they are by no means all encompassing with regard to topics, territories, 
and populations.
 There are several areas where deeper policy- and practice- relevant 
research would complement and strengthen the results presented here. We 
identify the following:
• continuing  to  document  and  highlight  the  ever- changing  needs,
impacts, and responses of the most vulnerable vis- à-vis violence, exclu-
sion, and poverty
• defining innovative ways to link the so- called informal (based in com-
munity and society) to the formal (based in—mainly government—
institutions) to create more inclusive cities
• deepening research on the positive manifestations of social cohesion in
urban contexts, and its relevance particularly for violence reduction
and inclusion
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• supporting cutting- edge  research- to-policy and  -practice  initiatives  that
contribute to the empowerment of the most vulnerable, especially on
topics such as the gender transformative potential of cities (Moser 2016)
• continuing  to  foster  theoretical,  conceptual,  and  methodological
debates from and across the Global South and/or with the Global
North on these topics.
We need to maintain strategies that reduce violence and inequalities. We 
need these strategies to complement each other, to take into account so- 
called formal and informal dimensions, and to take advantage of the best 
of both. We also need to heighten the global profile of existing and new 
ways to engage both formal and informal approaches to foster positive 
manifestations of social cohesion and enhance systemic approaches to 
tackle the manifold complexities of contemporary urban spaces.
 This book brings together a global perspective and insights from research-
ers grounded in local urban contexts. It seeks to address key challenges to 
build safe and inclusive cities in practical ways. In so doing, it aims to over-
come reliance on an abstract system of ideas that are admirable on paper, 
but found wanting when applied to the real- world challenges of cities faced 




3 A majority of the population in the following countries supports a mano dura 
approach: Costa Rica (78 per cent); Panama (77 per cent); Peru (77 per cent); 
Chile (75 per cent); Honduras (73 per cent); El Salvador (73 per cent); Uruguay 
(71 per cent); Guatemala (63 per cent). See Latinobarometro (2016) and 
UNHRC (2018).
4 For a detailed discussion on the “Right to the City”, see Carrión and Erazo 
(2016).
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The results of the 2012 Agence d’Études et de Promotion de l’Emploi 
[Agency for the Study and Promotion of Employment] (AGEPE) employ-
ment survey estimate the employed population of Côte d’Ivoire at 
9,492,150 persons or 65 per cent of the working- age population of 
14,607,741, yielding an overall unemployment rate of 35 per cent. The 
unemployment rates for youth aged 14–24 and 14–35 are 13.8 per cent 
and 12.2 per cent, respectively. In addition, discouraged unemployed 
people1 represent 40.3 per cent of the total unemployed population. These 
figures demonstrate that unemployment—combined with the last two 
decades of sociopolitical instability (1990–2000, 2002–2011) and persist-
ent poverty2 (INS 2015)—has become a complex reality and a structural 
problem for which employment policies have not been able to find a lasting 
solution. This may be because these policies only favour technocratic 
answers, such as the National Youth Fund, labour intensive works, etc., 
that are not based on a detailed analysis of socioeconomic integration for 
the unemployed.
 In developing countries in general, and in West Africa in particular, the 
response to unemployment has been the subject of a literature structured 
around three axes:
1. the institutional response of governments to create the conditions for 
rapid growth, frequently with a strong focus on unskilled labour—a 
compromise that is only sometimes successful in the face of the scale 
and complexity of unemployment, as is the case in sub- Saharan Africa 
(Turnham 1993)—or the integration of the informal sector into the 
formal economy.
2. the collective response of the actors mobilising social, ethnic, and reli-
gious networks (e.g. the Yorubas of Benin/Nigeria and the Mourides 
of Senegal/Gambia) to conduct informal economic activities that gen-
erate employment (INS 2009a; Casson, Della Guista, and Kambham-
pati 2010; Benjamin et al. 2012).
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3. the individual response: the work of individual actors who either leave 
the formal sector to create their own jobs—particularly in the informal 
sector where they are better off—or integrate into the informal 
economy (Maloney 2004).
 Whether they take action individually or together, the actors experi-
menting with their own solutions to employment precarity or unemploy-
ment integrate into the informal sector in four main ways, particularly 
through the informal economy.
1. Some integrate themselves using informal financial borrowing from 
friends, relatives, or the tontine system, since bank loans are virtually 
inaccessible (Johnson 2004; Akoten, Sawada, and Otsuka 2006).
2. Some enter the informal sector through a mobile activity (street vendors 
and peddlers) or small trades (mechanics, carpenters, cabinet makers, sheet 
metal workers, etc.) practised mainly at home (Benjamin et al. 2012).
3. Some rely on the existence of social, ethnic and religious networks to 
acquire and exercise an economic activity (Benjamin et al. 2012).
4. Some refrain from registering with a state organisation, the tax adminis-
tration, or other regulators or conceal part of their output although they 
are recognised by the administration (La Porta and Shleifer 2008).
 The literature on methods of integration into the informal economy as 
an individual or collective response to unemployment or employment pre-
carity has mainly focused on four forms of resources: borrowed financial 
resources, resources that stem from the nature of the activities in which 
they engage, sociocultural resources in terms of social and cultural capital, 
and diverted administrative resources. These resources have the common 
denominator of being external to the individual, who seizes them as oppor-
tunities for integration. The intrinsic means of the individual, not as an 
opportunity, but as autonomous resources mobilised as an individual 
response to the issue of unemployment or employment precarity, remain 
poorly documented. Research in this area could help in understanding indi-
viduals who enter the informal sector in response to unemployment as 
rational actors capable of invention or reinvention based on the auto-
nomous resources at their disposal (Boudon 1979; Weber 2003). I seek to 
deepen this question by deciphering a new form of response to the endemic 
unemployment that Côte d’Ivoire is experiencing. In this chapter, I analyse 
violence as an economic integration skill through the experience of highly 
violent youth in the informal transport sector.
 The concept of skill has been the subject of various approaches in the 
field of the sociology of work. Authors have analysed the relationship 
between skill and qualifications (Dubar 1996) and between skill and a job 
(Zarifian 1997). Others have critically questioned a sociological model of 
skill (Merchiers and Pharo 1992) or the widespread use of the concept 
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(Dugué 1994). Although this analysis is inspired by the sociology of devel-
opment, it tends to present skill as a catalyst for the formation—on a 
foundation of violence—of relationships of power or of intra- or inter- 
group domination for the control and management of an economic stake: 
informal transport hubs.3 From this point of view, I do not consider skill 
in the classical sense of a professional aptitude acquired through a process 
of instruction or qualifying training, which can be mobilised in the context 
of work in a company. Instead, I see it as a historically and socially con-
structed ability that the holder can use to respond to an individual or col-
lective concern. This definition of skill leads us to the following question: 
how is violence established as a skill for these youth and how do they 
mobilise it to integrate into the informal transport sector?
Methods
The study was conducted in Abidjan, both the economic capital and largest 
city of Côte d’Ivoire, where the informal sector’s share of the local eco-
nomic system was estimated at 76.7 per cent in 2002 (INS 2009b). The 
mobilisation of violence as an economic integration skill in this sector is 
observed mainly in greater Abidjan’s informal transport hubs. The city’s 
main informal transport hubs, shown in Figure 1.1, are:
•  Koumassi Grand Crossroads station
•  Siporex station in Yopougon
•  Abobo Roundabout station
•  Adjamé Liberté station
•  Bassam de Treichville station
•  Saint Jean de Cocody station.
Among these hubs, the Abobo Roundabout station was chosen as the 
primary study site because of the recurrence of violent clashes, character-
ised by higher intensity, compared to the brawls that take place at the 
other stations. Located north of Abidjan, about ten kilometres from the 
city centre, Abobo has more than a dozen precarious neighbourhoods and 
a shantytown that shelters about 60 per cent of the town’s population. 
Abobo is also a municipality subject to urban crime caused mainly by 
unemployment, poverty, lack of training for police personnel, proliferation 
of small arms, lack of material and financial means, and an insufficient 
number of law enforcement personnel, with only approximately 404 police 
officers for the entire municipality (UN- Habitat 2012). Finally, Abobo was 
one of the most violent social arenas noted during the post- electoral crisis 
of 2010–2011, being the site of both assassinations and massacres, in 
which youth took an active part (Varenne 2012).
 The research team, of which I was part, used the biographical approach, 
scrutinising the trajectory of “Z” (the first letter of his nickname), a 
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unionist4 chosen for his chaotic journey and his singular experience of 
crime in the informal transport hubs. Through lengthy non- directive inter-
views, the life story was used as a study technique to probe the different 
compartments of his life, focusing on the experiences of violence that 
marked his career. We also used the technique of the “commented photo 
album”. This consisted of making another appointment after the last inter-
view, this time to go through his personal photo albums together and 
comment on them, emphasising images that may have a significant link 
with his economic integration through violence. For the purpose of trian-
gulation, a snowball sampling approach was used to identify and interview 
other resources who had a good knowledge either of Z’s journey or 
the phenomenon of the criminalisation of informal transport hubs. The 
Figure 1.1 Map of the main informal transport hubs of Abidjan.
Source: Centre de cartographie et de télédetection/Bureau national d’études techniques et de 
développement [Centre for Cartography and Remote Sensing/National Bureau of Technical 
Studies and Development], 1996 and the research team’s own investigation, 2015. Design and 
Production Kouadio R. Oura and Kouadio A. Alla, 2015.
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interviews were preceded by a session to provide information and an 
explanation of the research’s purpose and of the ethical precautions to pre-
serve the anonymity and confidentiality of the informants, as the phenom-
enon being studied is particularly sensitive. For the data analysis, we used 
Tom Wengraf ’s5 (Wengraf 2006) biographical narrative interpretative 
method, supplemented by an examination of the biographical logic and its 
modifications (Veith 2004) and by an understanding of the biographical 
course (Bertaux- Wiame 1991).
 The results of our investigations are presented in this chapter in six sec-
tions. The first deals with Z’s social trajectory, emphasising the main stages 
that nourished his skill of violence. The second shows, through Z’s experi-
ence, the different forms of violence in informal transport hubs as well as 
the actors who perpetrate them. In the third section, I analyse how the 
context of unemployment and increasing poverty has favoured the use of 
violence as a means of economic integration, particularly among youth. 
The fourth section discusses the evolution of gnambro6 and unionist activ-
ities, showing how they have been criminalised through the emergence of a 
highly competitive game around the exclusive control of informal trans-
port hubs. The fifth section analyses violence in the hubs, both as a source 
of fuel for other forms of violence building up in Ivoirian society and as an 
indicator of the reinvention of solidarity in the search for employment. 
Finally, the sixth section analyses the dynamics of perpetuation of the 
criminal economy at work in Abidjan’s informal transport hubs.
“Z”: from violence to integration in an informal 
transport hub
Born in Abobo, a working- class district of Abidjan, Z grew up with his 
parents in modest conditions. At the age of ten, he went to live with his 
uncle in a village in the sub- prefecture of Dabakala, in northern Côte 
d’Ivoire, where he carried out rough agricultural work. At the same time, 
he joined a group of peers, which he led and with whom he occasionally 
engaged in physical violence related to petty crime. But this propensity to 
violence increased, showing up in increasingly frequent fights with Z on 
the front line. This violence continued to the point where community 
members in his village discouraged their children from associating with 
him. The desire to earn money in order to acquire mystical powers and “to 
become even stronger” led Z, at the age of 25, to join the mass transport 
workforce, where he was hired and worked as a balanceur7 for eight years.
 After this initiation stage, there were three high points in the dynamics 
of Z building his violence as a skill. The first concerns the acquisition of 
mystical resources (which he calls the code of “knowledge”) that granted 
him, and continue to grant him, a sense of power and invincibility. In this 
way, he acquired three types of “knowledge”: the mystical resources of 
protection against edged weapons (commonly called “anti- iron”), the 
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 mystical resources of protection against firearms (“anti- gun”), and the 
resources to defeat opponents in fist fights. He acquired them from his 
uncle in Dabakala, but also in Burkina Faso and Mali from other 
marabouts (Muslim hermits, or monks, known locally as the bouroula 
bara) to protect himself from the bandits who ruled in Abobo in the 1980s.
 A second influential point relates to Z’s learning and practices of legal 
violence, through his experience as a security officer in a private security 
company in 1996. Among other topics, the training covered the handling 
of weapons (pump- action shotguns, revolvers firing rubber bullets, electric 
batons), the handling of edged weapons, techniques for combat, and activ-
ities such as guarding, bodyguarding, escorting, cash transportation, event 
security, etc. He then worked as a private security officer in Bouaké, the 
country’s second largest city, in a brewery and a cotton company.
 But before reaching his position as a private security officer in Bouaké, Z 
joined the Black Tiger gang of Adjamé, a municipality of Abidjan, and, for 
seven months, had new experiences of criminal violence. These seven months 
corresponded to a period of unemployment preceding his new position in 
Bouaké. Joining the Black Tiger gang was the beginning of the third influen-
tial point in his trajectory. The gang’s mission was to regulate the loading 
and unloading of merchandise at the Gouro Market in Adjamé, a large com-
mercial centre, mainly for the wholesale trade of food products from the 
interior of the country. The gang performed this activity for financial bene-
fits, based on criminal violence. On this subject, Z told of a punitive expedi-
tion that the Black Tigers launched against the Abrassiens, a rival gang 
known to be violent, in retaliation for an attack against one of their own.
One day, the Abrassiens fell upon a friend like that, in Adjamé under 
the bridge. But when he escaped, he came and told us that they had 
attacked him there and he could not defend himself. At night, we 
robbed all the maquis [restaurant- bars] in Abrasse. We closed them all 
that day and emptied their cash boxes. Three of us entered a maquis, 
and one person remained at the door while the other two carried out 
the operation. We had no business with the ordinary customers; we 
were dealing with the Abrassiens. We made the Abrassiens leave the 
maquis. If they refused, we broke a bottle, slit their throat with it, and 
that was that.
 Still during this third influential point, Z’s experience and acquisition of 
experiences of criminal violence with the Black Tigers were reinforced 
when he was recruited into the Forces Nouvelles rebellion in 2002. As part 
of this armed movement attempting to overthrow the regime in power, he 
said he participated in military operations in Abidjan, attacking military 
camps where he “slaughtered enemies” and took their weapons to 
strengthen the arsenal of his brothers- in-arms. Later in 2010, in the wake 
of the post- election crisis that turned into an armed conflict between 
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 pro- Ouattara and pro- Gbagbo forces, he was recruited once more as a 
member of the Invisible Commandos.8 During the post- electoral crisis, he 
also acted as a bodyguard for certain political figures and was mobilised 
from time to time to take part in strike attacks or counterattacks “spon-
sored by politicians”.
 Z shifted into the activity of informal transport because of the precari-
ousness of his guard work in Bouaké. He began his activities at the Abobo 
Roundabout station as a “trainee”, a kind of observer who came every day 
to immerse himself in the management and operation of the station. Then, 
one day, his skills in violence earned him the recognition of his union and 
allowed him to rise in rank to become an “element manager” with a “col-
lection day” each week. Unions are mostly informal organisations that 
 illegally control and exploit informal transport hubs (see Figure 1.2). Their 
members are called syndicats or syndicalistes [“unionists”] in the local 
slang. Z is a “route manager”, responsible for recovering from the 
“element manager” the illegal taxes taken from the drivers every evening. 
His ability to cause harm also led him to become a recruiter of fighters and 
leader of the theatre of operations during the attacks/counterattacks 
launched for the control of the hubs. He tells how he rose in the union:
At first, I observed the collection of taxes, until I earned my own col-
lection day. It was during a clash between my group and another 
group of unionists. This enemy group wanted to coerce us. They came 
and told us, “You will not work!”. Yet we had occupied the space 
before them. They came and wanted to take this territory back from 
us. When I got the information, I told the children [alluding to the 
gnambros], “Tomorrow at this time of night, we must regroup at this 
place”. I employed my knowledge [mystical preparation] to give to the 
members of my group with whom I had to go to the site. I made them 
a potion in a small container, and everyone washed themselves with it. 
Guns will not penetrate that! You can carry your rifle, but we’ll tear it 
from you. We went to fight, and it was clean! [We were victorious]. 
When the leaders of my group saw me at work, they quickly gave me a 
day in the week for collection.
 Between 2002 and 2011, many ex- combatants and fugitives from justice 
followed a trajectory closely similar to Z’s. Their presence and action in 
the informal transport hubs have made these places arenas for the produc-
tion of criminal violence, the main manifestations of which are explained 
in the next section.
Demonstrations of violence in informal transport hubs
Z’s experience is indicative of a phenomenon that involves two categories of 
youth (unionists and gnambros) mobilising violence as a skill to integrate 
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into and remain in the urban economic fabric. This is a recurring phenom-
enon that reflects the criminalisation of informal transport hubs in the city 
of Abidjan. During each episode of violence, control of these spaces or some 
of their sectors is the main reason for the clashes. Victory opens the way to 
capturing significant financial windfalls generated by the exploitation of the 
hubs. In the absence of official statistics and given the hidden nature of the 
management of this windfall and the discretion surrounding it, it is difficult 
to measure, even for only one hub.
 In the informal transport hubs, three main actors interact on a daily 
basis: the gnambros, in charge of finding customers; the drivers, charged 
with driving the customers; and the unionists, who ensure that the drivers’ 
rights are respected. But the eruptions of violence generally pit the gnam-
bros against one another, the unionists against one another, or both cat-
egories of actors against other joint forces of gnambros and unionists. In 
the management hierarchy of an informal transport hub, unionists are 
above gnambros (Figure 1.2). Thus, there is a union president responsible 
for dealing with public authorities in case of disputes, in order to maintain 
good relations for the survival of the organisation. Below the President is 
the boss or union manager who supervises the activities and serves as a 
link between the President and the General and the generals. The General 
is responsible for protecting the hub and organising its activities. He 
ensures that information is passed up and plans attacks to control new 
spaces or other hubs. The generals closely guard the General but have no 
decision- making power in the union organisation. Below the generals, are 
the route managers charged with recovering the funds collected in the ter-
ritory each evening. The element managers are chosen by the route 
manager and have one day a week when they supervise the collection of 
the “taxes” and turn them over to the route manager. The elements and 
winzins, grouped under the name gnambros, along with the element man-
agers, are not part of the union organisation. But, the gnambros are in 
charge of looking for customers and collecting “taxes” from drivers and 
giving them to the element managers. The generals mobilise them to lead 
raids of conquest, reconquest, or counterattack on other hubs.
 It should be noted that women are not included in the groups of gnam-
bros and unionists. Informal transport hubs are highly masculine arenas 
where men are able to control power through violence. Women in or 
around hubs are, as a rule, traders who suffer the effects of clashes (assault, 
theft, etc.). They are not directly involved in managing the hubs and even 
less in episodes of violence.
 The main perpetrators of violence, gnambros and unionists, mainly 
consist of demobilised former combatants, fugitives from justice, former 
gang members, and homeless individuals commonly called bacrôman. 
Increasingly, elementary and high school students are joining these unions. 
To become a gnambro, one must fulfill basic criteria, the most important 
of which is the ability to be aggressive or warlike. With regard to the union 
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organisation, membership is based on possessing a reputation for criminal 
exploits and an ability to mobilise combatants or lead expeditions for mass 
violence.
 Violence in informal transport hubs usually manifests in two forms. The 
first concerns one- on-one fights between a unionist and a gnambro, or 
between two gnambros, usually with edged weapons (knives, machetes, 
etc.), which, in many cases, cause serious injuries. These fights often occur 
in the quest for customers (informal transport users), with each of the bel-
ligerents claiming “paternity” or ownership of the customer. In general, 
this type of violence lasts only a few minutes and ends with one of the 
fighters being victorious. However, it can sometimes degenerate into mass 
violence.
 The second form of violence, the most significant, takes on a collective 
character and occurs either when one- on-one fights degenerate or are 
poorly controlled, or when a group of gnambros or unionists launch an 
attack on a hub to conquer or reconquer it. This second form of violence 
often pits groups of gnambros and/or groups of unionists against one other 
and is part of a dynamic of attack/counterattack. The attacks are aimed at 
specific targets, are organised, and revolve around four stages:
Boss or union manager  
Route manager  Route manager  Route manager  
Head of station  
Figure 1.2 Organisational chart of an informal transport hub.
Source: Safe and Inclusive Cities programme survey data, 2015.
Notes
■ Those who have decision-making power.
■ Those who execute the orders of the decision-makers.
26  Kra
1. the recruitment of several fighters (gnambros and other categories of 
actors such as the “Microbes”9)
2. the grouping of combatants
3. the arming of the fighters
4. the raid.
The fighting can last for several days, alternating between continuous and 
sporadic clashes that ultimately result in very serious injuries and deaths. 
Mass fights are known for their extreme violence, which often results in 
heavy loss of life in the belligerent camps. In their dynamics, these clashes 
migrate from central hubs, which are the most economically profitable, to 
the less- profitable secondary hubs, while decreasing in intensity. But, it is 
the resistance capacity of the attacked group that ultimately determines the 
duration of the fighting.
 In both one- on-one and mass conflicts, the belligerent actors mobilise four 
types of resources. First, there are the edged weapons, composed of forks 
(with sharpened and twisted teeth), clubs with spikes, knives, machetes 
(double- edged), babylones (heavy steel chain), small axes, grés (animal horns), 
brass knuckles, slingshots, and caiman teeth (a kind of stake). Then there are 
the firearms: Kalashnikovs, sawed- off shotguns, and automatic guns. They 
also use mystical weapons: rings, amulets, necklaces, bracelets, etc., that make 
them feel invulnerable to firearms, machetes, and knives, and as though they 
have an exceptional capacity to harm. Finally, they mobilise, either as merce-
naries or in a spirit of solidarity, human resources outside the group of com-
batants who are designated in the community as reinforcements.10
 By acting as the perpetrators of violence in informal transit hubs, union-
ists like Z create power and influence (De Latour 2001) which, in turn, 
maintain this violence. Their selection of gnambros to collect illegal taxes 
and enlist combatants for clashes maintains networks of actors engaged in 
the control of these disputed spaces. The union hierarchy strategically 
manipulates these networks of actors while channelling potential disputes, 
a prerequisite for keeping control of the spaces already conquered and 
potentially conquering others (Clegg 1989). Violence thus appears as a 
resource for the collective or individual acquisition of market share in 
Abidjan’s informal transport hubs. It also appears to be a necessity to pre-
serve, maintain, and even increase their share of the market that generates 
substantial revenues for the actors involved in the conflicting game of 
organising and controlling the hubs. Ultimately, this violence is a sort of 
“employment insurance” that guarantees economic activity for everyone in 
a country where unemployment and poverty persist.
Violence as a guarantee of employment in an anomic context
The violent competitive game of the informal transit hubs, a source of eco-
nomic integration and of substantial revenue, has emerged in a three- fold 
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context of sociopolitical crisis, a drained economy, and deep poverty. On 
the political front, the decade of politico–military crisis (2002–2011) was 
marked by the use of auxiliaries by the belligerent military forces: the 
Forces Nouvelles, as the armed rebellion is known, and government forces 
for the 2002–2007 period, as well as the pro- Gbagbo forces and pro- 
Ouattara forces for the 2010–2011 period. However, the end of the hostil-
ities and the economic recovery that followed11 did not offer real 
opportunities for economic integration for these ex- combatants. The mixed 
results of the various disarmament, demobilisation, and reintegration pro-
grammes confirm these findings. These ex- combatants have logically 
increased the size of the unemployed population with a particular exper-
tise: the control of violence. Many of the unionists and gnambros, like Z, 
are ex- combatants from this decade of armed crisis. Faced with a labour 
market that offers this category of actors little or no real opportunity for 
integration, as well as the limits of the government’s ex- combatant reinte-
gration policy, many of them have found an alternative to unemployment 
in the informal transport hubs. They seized this opportunity with a single 
essential skill: violence.
 Economically, the decade from 2002 to 2010 exacerbated unemploy-
ment and poverty. Côte d’Ivoire experienced an energy crisis in the form of 
rolling blackouts and the decline of the production of petroleum products. 
The growth of the national economy slowed because of the post- election 
crisis of 2010. GDP decreased by 0.4 percentage points to 2.4 per cent at 
the end of 2010, compared to 3.8 per cent in 2009 (AfDB 2011). The main 
primary, secondary, and tertiary sectors have been affected by this crisis. 
In addition, insecurity in production areas, as well as dysfunctional distri-
bution and marketing channels, have reduced all the gains accumulated 
since the signing of the 2007 Ouagadougou Political Agreement12 (AfDB 
2011). At the end of February 2011, inflation had increased to 5.1 per cent 
(compared to –0.4 per cent in 2010), prices of major food products had 
increased by more than 25 per cent in some cases (fish by 26.5 per cent, 
oils and fats by 25.3 per cent) and government revenues decreased signifi-
cantly, notably due to the ban on coffee and cocoa exports in the first four 
months of 2011 (AfDB 2011).
 At the social level, the results of the Survey on Household Standard of 
Living (ENV2008) conducted by the Institut national de la statistique 
(INS) show an increase in income poverty from 38.4 per cent in 2002 to 
48.9 per cent in 2008 (INS 2009a). Although the poverty rate at the 
national level dropped to 46.3 per cent in 2015 (INS 2015), it still 
remains high. This reflects the fact that nearly one in two inhabitants of 
Côte d’Ivoire is poor. These results also indicate that 10 per cent of these 
poor people are considered to be the poorest, with an extreme poverty 
line of FCFA101,826 per capita per year (or about US$171). The average 
household size is 4.7 people, with an average of six people in poor house-
holds. The city of Abidjan is by far the area where poverty has increased 
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the most, with 21.0 per cent living in poverty in 2008 compared to 14.9 
per cent in 2002, an increase of 6.1 percentage points. Abidjan greatly 
contributes to a national poverty rate of 8.9 per cent.
 In this worrying context, informal transport hubs offered ex- combatants 
like Z a social arena for reinventing the activities of gnambros and union-
ists by giving them a more violent, and especially criminal, character. This 
is an alienating situation in which these actors innovate to meet a need for 
economic integration through the use of illicit means (Merton 1997). 
Unemployment in Côte d’Ivoire has led these categories of actors to enter 
the informal transport market, where they have mobilised their ability to 
commit crimes as a skill to ensure and sustain their integration. The viol-
ence produced to guarantee employment in these economic spaces in con-
flict is therefore not a spontaneous phenomenon. It was built on the 
framework of the history of unions in this sector of activity. One of the 
key steps in this story is the multiplication of unions, which opened the era 
of confrontational and violent competition for control of the hubs.
From the plurality of unions to the advent of bloody 
competition
The phenomenon of gnambros and unions emerged in the 1990s, in a 
context of sociopolitical change characterised by the birth of the multi- 
party system that led to union liberalisation. Alongside the single transport 
union, the Syndicat national des transporteurs de marchandises en Côte 
d’Ivoire (SNTM- CI, National Union of Merchandise Transporters in Côte 
d’Ivoire), new unions emerged giving rise to a competitive game centred on 
the collection of daily boarding taxes in the informal transport hubs. The 
gnambros and unionists were then mobilised by these organisations to 
collect and guarantee their share of taxes, with each union organisation 
having its own “collection day” at a given hub. At that time, up to the 
beginning of the 2000s, violence already existed in the informal transport 
hubs. But it was expressed mainly in the form of social tensions between 
the actors exploiting them (Steck 2004) and focused on the issue of negoti-
ating or renegotiating the spaces. It also manifested through acts of verbal 
violence and petty crime: pickpocketing of transport users, small fights 
between balanceurs targeting the same passengers, etc.
 However, the desire for more “collection days” introduced a logic of 
power relations into the competitive game. These power relations resulted 
in recurring clashes between gnambros and/or unionists, no longer just idle 
or delinquent youth, but including new actors: ex- combatants, habitual 
offenders, and ex- gang members. The expression of these clashes has thus 
shifted over the years, from simple fights to particularly bloody brawls 
resulting in serious injuries and deaths. These criminal clashes are guided 
by a new issue: control of the informal transport hubs and the financial 
income generated by their exploitation (see Figure 1.3).
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 This shift from “simple violence” to criminal violence in the hubs 
occurred in the favourable context of the decade of armed crisis. This 
period generated non- reintegrated ex- combatants and promoted the escape 
of many inmates from several prisons, while also aggravating the country’s 
economic situation—already bleak in the aftermath of the 1999 coup 
d’état—and accentuating youth unemployment and poverty among the 
population. Z’s experience is indicative of this criminalisation of the 
informal transport hubs, which has spread over the years to several muni-
cipalities in the city of Abidjan (see Figure 1.1).
 The role of unionists and gnambros like Z as social actors bringing 
about change has been instrumental in this evolution. The contextual ele-
ments described above are similar to social forces that have altered the life 
trajectories and behaviours of these two categories of actors. Directly or 
indirectly, their everyday experiences and perceptions have been shaped 
(Scott 2008), eventually leading them to define criminal violence as a 
response to unemployment. In other words, unionists and gnambros are 
social actors who, like hundreds of thousands of other young Ivoirians, are 
confronted with structural unemployment. But they processed the informa-
tion received from the sluggish socioeconomic context differently and, con-
sequently, favoured a response based on the use of violence, their only 
skill. They challenge, from below, the Ivoirian system of employment.
 Moreover, in a context of habitus (Bourdieu 1980), resorting to crime 
in response to unemployment reflects the dispositions instilled in these 
youth (i.e. unionists and gnambros) through their experiences of violence. 
For example, Z had these experiences as a part of the Black Tiger gang, the 
2002 armed rebellion, and the Invisible Commandos in 2010. Through a 
specific process of desocialisation/resocialisation to which they were 
exposed during these experiences, they internalised violence as a form of 
preferred response, which they tend to reproduce by adapting it to their 
Figure 1.3 Evolution of violence in informal transport hubs.
Source: Safe and Inclusive Cities programme survey data, 2015.
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unemployed status. Here, violence is the result of a model of behaviour 
transposed to the field of informal transport. It is a model, moreover, that 
shows these youth to be competent and capable social actors (Giddens 
1986). They are, in short, individual or collective actors endowed with 
expertise in violence and possessing the capacity to embody their experi-
ences to solve the problem of economic integration that they face.
 The evolution of the competitive game between gnambros, between 
unionists, and between the two categories of actors, from a stage of simple 
tension to one of criminalisation in the span of a decade, also took place in 
a context of strong, uncontrolled urbanisation. The socioeconomic infra-
structure construction process and urban development actions in the city 
of Abidjan were accompanied by the “abandonment” of several spaces 
that initially remained “empty” and were later privatised to serve as 
informal transport hubs. Z, like many other youth with the same profile, 
seized the opportunity offered by the lawlessness of these spaces that had 
become residues of uncontrolled urbanisation to achieve his economic inte-
gration. This dynamic reveals, moreover, another facet of these hubs: pri-
vatised and coveted public spaces that, through the violence occurring 
there, have not only become arenas of reinvention for the social codes of 
informal transport and employment, but also laboratories for the reinforce-
ment of other forms of violence that are shaking Ivoirian society.
Informal transport hubs: a breeding ground for  
multi- faceted violence and social reinvention
The criminalisation of informal transport hubs has created a breeding 
ground for multi- faceted violence. In other words, it serves as a spring-
board for other forms of violence in Ivoirian society. These acts of violence 
include political violence, a form of violence perpetrated in the political 
arena centred on victory in municipal, legislative, regional, or presidential 
elections or, more broadly, in power relations between opposing sides, to 
conquer a political power (Crettiez 2008). According to our interviews 
with several sources, candidates in the 2011 legislative elections and the 
2012 municipal elections mobilised groups of gnambros or unionists to 
wreak havoc at their opponents’ campaign headquarters. In addition 
to paying those involved in such expeditions, the candidates promised to 
repay them with direct support to ensure the continuation of their activ-
ities in the mass transport hubs. In some parts of his life story, Z claims to 
have been repeatedly asked to engage “his men” in this type of political 
violence.
 The second form of violence fuelled by the criminalisation of informal 
transport hubs is the phenomenon of the Microbes. Field data show that 
clashes between gnambros, between unionists, or between the two cat-
egories of actors constitute opportunities for these youth to acquire new 
experiences of crime and reinforce their violent skills. Recruited at times as 
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reinforcements, the Microbes participate actively in bloody clashes and 
“pay themselves on the ground” by taking advantage of the chaos to phys-
ically attack and rob users, residents, or drivers of mass transport vehicles. 
These experiences, renewed during the frequent clashes between groups at 
the hubs, contribute to increasing the capacity for harm of the Microbes 
and thus perpetuate this phenomenon, which persists in Abidjan.
 Beyond multi- faceted violence, the reinvention of the response to the 
issue of unemployment has generated a new form of social organisation in 
the informal transport hubs. The regulation of the transport activity is sup-
ported and supervised, not by legal structures, but by actors with a high 
capacity to cause harm. Abidjan’s informal transport hubs are now regu-
lated by criminal violence, through which the strongest or most harmful 
conquers the hub, dictates its rules, and controls its management. This 
form of social organisation—a source of insecurity for the general public— 
perpetuates itself by feeding on this regulatory violence, the incapacity of 
public authorities (the Ministries of Transport and Interior and municipal-
ities) to stem it sustainably, and, especially, the income captured daily by 
the actors involved. Although it generates significant resources for the 
state, this entire sector of the informal economy escapes its control through 
the phenomenon of gnambros. Ultimately, the action of unionists and 
gnambros to solve their unemployment problem has paradoxically brought 
about another phenomenon detrimental to society: the insecurity of users, 
residents, and drivers of transport vehicles in mass transport hubs, who are 
often victims of bloody clashes.
 In addition, with the phenomenon of mobilising reinforcements, the 
criminalisation of informal transport hubs has become an indicator of the 
reinvention of solidarity in the process of economic integration of youth. 
Traditionally, in the Ivoirian context, this solidarity consisted of elders 
(father, mother, sister, brother, aunt, or uncle) using their network in the 
public or private sector to place their son, daughter, brother, sister, niece, 
or nephew in a job. But alongside this family/community solidarity mani-
fested by means of relational resources, another form of solidarity has 
developed, guided by the principle of mutual aid in and through violence. 
In the process of looking for work, solidarity in its traditional sense was 
already symptomatic of a reversal of value. Getting a job for an unem-
ployed person was more a matter of relational capacity than of merit, 
hence the concepts of “séphonisme” or more recently “rattrapage” (both 
Ivoirian slang for finding work or appointing people from one’s family, 
community, village, or ethnic group). With solidarity in and through viol-
ence as practised in mass transit hubs, there is another facet of this reversal 
of value. In such a social arena, obtaining a job is not about relational 
capacity, let alone merit, but rather about the capacity for collective harm, 
the aggregated criminal potential.
 Thus, employment in this industry is regulated by violence. It offers 
itself to actors capable of imposing themselves by force, to those with a 
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greater capacity for harm than other actors in search of economic integra-
tion. Once conquered, employment is also maintained by force, giving rise 
to a reinvention of the response to unemployment. In this respect, our 
results differ from those of our predecessors on the question of strategies 
or policies for the integration of youth in general, and troubled youth in 
particular. For youth in general, their economic integration is made pos-
sible through a personal downgrading process (having an a priori level of 
training higher than that required for the job held) that gives them access 
to employment and mobility in the labour market (Forgeot and Gautié 
1997), through associative programmes based on the principle of mutual 
aid (Comeau 2000) or an intermediate strategy of institutional arrange-
ments put in place by public authorities (Lefresne 2003). For troubled 
youth, including migrants, delinquents, and youth in conflict with the law, 
there are two approaches. The first approach specifically affects migrants 
who can use their ability to adapt over time (Renaud, Piché, and Godin 
2003) or family, ethnic, or national social links as strategies/resources to 
access employment (Öztürk 2006). In the second approach, that relating to 
youth in conflict with the law, economic integration can be achieved with 
the help of a constructive pedagogy that allows youth to build a life project 
and take control of their destiny (Association jeunesse et droit 2002), or a 
sponsorship system that involves entrepreneurs and elites in the integration 
process (Clément and des Sceaux 2006).
 Cullen, Williams, and Wright (1997) cautioned against any action pro-
gramme that sees employment as a panacea for delinquency. I join them in 
stating that employment can even be a source of violence in some cases. 
This is reflected in the criminalisation, through the game of conflictual eco-
nomic integration, of the informal transport hubs and the social transfor-
mations it has brought about in Côte d’Ivoire. We are now faced with a 
dynamic and complex phenomenon, which also seems to be establishing 
itself for the long term.
Towards the sustainability of the criminal economy in 
informal transport hubs
The phenomenon of the criminalisation of Abidjan’s informal transport 
hubs shows a mobilisation of violence as a guarantee of employment and 
an instrumentalisation of this violence in the political game, all of which 
contribute to its perpetuation.
 Indeed, since the two categories of actors (gnambros and unionists) suc-
cessfully mobilise violence, a bid for economic integration, they will tend 
to maintain this violence by acting on the factors that can promote its 
expression. The practice of paying bribes (“contributions” in the jargon of 
the informal transport hubs) to the police to avoid or delay their interposi-
tion between belligerents during a confrontation is one of the factors. 
These also include the use of reinforcements and the recruitment of the 
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Microbes, a growing criminal category, to amplify each side’s capacity for 
harm. To maintain violence in hubs, gnambros and unionists will also tend 
to act on material or immaterial resources that contribute to this capacity 
for harm. Z and the other gnambros and unionists we spoke to place great 
importance on these resources in the informal transport environment. 
Above all others are the mystical resources that these actors use, both in 
Côte d’Ivoire and in the countries of the sub- region (Burkina Faso, Mali, 
Niger, etc.). These resources also consist of the invention of edged 
weapons, often “with supernatural powers” or a “rare or non- existent 
antidote”. Several examples were discussed earlier, but there is another, 
recently discovered and known to be easily accessible, particularly effective, 
and without antidote: the broken tonic bottle (named after a refreshing 
drink), which can be acquired for FCFA200 (less than one dollar).
 The analysis also shows that political actors are exploiting the criminal 
potential of Abidjan’s informal transport hubs for electoral purposes or in 
power struggles. Logically, these political actors, or political leaders in 
general, will seek to accommodate the status quo by avoiding attempts to 
permanently stem the phenomenon of the criminalisation of informal 
transport hubs. Here, the notion of status quo integrates the permanent 
tension prevailing in the hubs with a high risk of confrontation versus the 
absence of a real policy to stop this phenomenon. But it also incorporates 
occasional interventions by the police between the belligerents in the case 
of clashes, the purpose of which seems to be closer to political marketing 
than a real desire to stem the phenomenon. This accommodation embraces 
a form of paradox. Leaders or public authorities give a speech on resolving 
the phenomenon without force, for which they claim not to have the 
means: “It is not by force that we will solve this problem. We are not ready 
to go after the gnambros”, as the Minister of Transport told the National 
Union of Journalists of Côte d’Ivoire (30 April 2015). Instead, they favour 
a reintegration policy for gnambros and unionists to “gradually eliminate” 
the phenomenon. Paradoxically, it persists to the point that almost not a 
month goes by without deadly clashes erupting in informal transport hubs. 
For example, a series of clashes that resulted in injuries, and sometimes 
deaths, broke out between gnambros and/or unionists after the Minister’s 
media appearance. These attacks were followed by major clashes: 30 Sep-
tember 2015, in Treichville; 4 November 2015, in Koumassi; 2 September 
2016, in Adjamé; 8 November 2016, in Abobo; and 2 December and 24 
December 2016, in Treichville again.
 The logical consequence of the mobilisation of violence as a guarantee 
of employment and the instrumentalisation of this violence in politics is the 
perpetuation of the phenomenon of the criminalisation of informal trans-
port hubs. This perpetuation is inexorably accompanied by two major 
problems: the insecurity of the vast majority of mass transport users and 
the recurrent compromise of their mobility. Informal mass transport serves 
the majority of mass transport users in Abidjan, far ahead of SOTRA, a 
34  Kra
state- owned urban transport company which is finding it increasingly diffi-
cult to meet the demand for collective mobility. The weakness of its fleet of 
buses and water taxis has considerably reduced its public transport capa-
city over the years, due to a lack of renewal and insufficient maintenance. 
In addition, SOTRA is often criticised for the irregularity and overloading 
of its vehicles, recurring accidents, and breakdowns in transit. This public 
transport supply deficit has legitimised the alternative mobility offering 
structured around informal transport hubs. Informal modes of transport, 
relatively accessible to the less affluent populations, grew from 6 per cent 
to 17 per cent of the urban transport market share between 1988 and 2002 
(Kassi 2007: 3). If crime in the hubs is perpetual, then the physical integ-
rity of the users and even of local residents will be constantly threatened 
by thefts, rapes, and assaults, of which they are often the victims or “col-
lateral damage”. Similarly, each outbreak of violence would result in com-
plete or partial paralysis of mass transport in Abidjan, as is often already 
the case.
Conclusion
This study aimed to analyse the violence mobilised by Z—a unionist 
working in an informal transport hub in Abobo—as a skill to achieve eco-
nomic integration in the face of endemic unemployment in Ivoirian society. 
A biographical approach based on the life story allowed us to scrutinise 
the trajectory of Z, whose skill in violence was built through lived experi-
ences, particularly his membership in Adjamé’s Black Tiger gang, his inte-
gration into the armed rebellion of 2002, and his participation in the urban 
guerrilla activities of the Invisible Commandos in the post- election crisis 
of 2010.
 Z’s experience shows that actors in search of work resort to differential 
responses in a country where unemployment remains a structural problem. 
This unemployment is characterised by both a persistent mismatch between 
supply and demand for work and the absence of a real policy designed to 
absorb graduates, dropouts, or people without education and, most impor-
tantly, ex- combatants and habitual criminals who aspire to integrate into 
the economic fabric. Above all, Z’s experience shows that he and many 
other unionists and gnambros have come to define violence as a response 
to unemployment. This has led to the criminalisation of informal transport 
hubs across Abidjan. In its dynamics, this criminalisation has generated 
social transformations in the management of these disputed spaces, paving 
the way for a possible perpetuation of the phenomenon.
 Previous research on the means of economic integration of youth high-
light four types of resources: institutional resources (public integration pol-
icies); associative, community, family, or ethnic resources; pedagogical or 
educational resources; and personal or intrinsic resources in terms of the 
adaptability of the actor searching for economic integration. Our results 
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differ from the first three types of resources. They are similar to the fourth 
(personal or intrinsic resources), but are distinguished by the form of the 
economic integration resource analysed: violence as an integration skill. 
This result reflects the emergence of another finding on the issue of the eco-
nomic integration of the unemployed. It reveals that in addition to conven-
tionally known resources, there is another form of intrinsic, self- generated 
resources that allows this category of actors to integrate into the economic 
fabric: the capacity for harm and the violence acquired as a skill for access-
ing employment.
 Under these conditions, it can be assumed that, in the long term, the 
informal transport sector will become the preserve of one or a few groups 
made up of actors with a profile or trajectory similar to that of Z. This law 
of the strongest or the most violent would paradoxically make this sector 
not an economic space for the absorption of youth in search of an income- 
generating activity, but an arena where a natural selection takes place that 
limits access to employment. These groups could, moreover, become an 
obstacle to modernisation of the informal transport sector if this moderni-
sation puts their interests at risk. Therefore, further research may be 
needed to deepen the analysis of the potential risks associated with the 
modernisation of informal transport, with the understanding that the 
actors or groups of actors who—like Z—are flourishing economically will 
likely have interests that are incompatible with the concept of 
modernisation.
 Union organisations that are illegally constituted, and legitimised by 
violence and their ability to force themselves on disputed spaces that are 
economically profitable, raise the problem of insecurity in the informal 
transport sector in Abidjan. Whether experienced or felt, insecurity is a 
real challenge to ensuring the long- term mobility of users. To meet this 
challenge, we recommend that decision- makers delegitimise, above all, 
these groupings of unions and gnambros. This delegitimisation will have to 
occur in three main stages. First, the authorities must regain control of the 
hubs, based on the absolute need to no longer make this sector an issue of 
political power. This requires the public authorities to abandon the laissez- 
faire attitude that they seem to have adopted so far in the face of the phe-
nomenon and bring, instead, an adequate and lasting response. Second, 
there must be a movement toward the necessary modernisation of the 
urban informal transport sector. The idea is to restructure mass transit 
hubs into economic assets that are free of violence and provide jobs. This 
modernisation will have to be done in a balanced way, preserving the gains 
in terms of the cost of transport access for the less well- off, the safety of 
the users, and—to the extent possible—the security of the pool of youth 
who live on the income from this sector. Finally, the public transport 
service offered by the state must be developed to make it both a factor in 
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Notes
 1 The discouraged unemployed are those who wish to work and are available to 
do so but who report that they are no longer looking for work because the pro-
spects of finding it seem too low.
 2 According to the results of the Enquête sur le niveau de vie des ménages en Côte 
d’Ivoire (ENV 2015)—Profil de la pauvreté [Survey on the standard of living of 
households in Côte d’Ivoire (ENV 2015)—Poverty profile] conducted by the 
Institut national de la statistique (INS 2015), the poverty rate is estimated at 46.3 
per cent, compared to 48.9 per cent in 2008. This shows that although poverty is 
certainly declining, it does persist. Abidjan is the leading contributor to poverty 
with 9.3 per cent of poor people, compared with 7.5 per cent for Haut Sassandra, 
5.7 per cent for Tonkpi, and 5.3 per cent for Gbêkê. The analysis of employment 
in relation to poverty status indicates that more than a third of the employed 
population is poor (35.5 per cent). These data are as recent as possible in a 
country where national statistics on socioeconomic sectors (poverty, unemploy-
ment, employment, health, etc.) are not systematically updated every year, or 
even every two or three years. See www.ins.ci/n/templates/docss/env2015.pdf.
 3 These are physical spaces that, in most cases, are in the public domain, but that 
are forcibly occupied by groups of youth to turn them into economic hubs 
where private mass transport vehicles load and unload users in an informal 
transport system.
 4 In their own parlance, unionists are those in charge of the management and 
illegal control of informal transport hubs.
 5 See Tom Wengraf (2004). The Biographic- Narrative Interpretive Method—Short-
guide. NCRM Working Paper (unpublished). http://eprints.ncrm.ac.uk/30/.
 6 At informal transport hubs, gnambros are responsible for illegally collecting 
loading fees from the drivers and handing them over to the managers. They are 
also mobilised for clashes between unions where, taking advantage of the dis-
order, they assault and rob users.
 7 A balanceur is a young man who escorts passengers on a mass transport bus, 
under the authority of the driver. His role is to search for passengers, get them 
aboard, and collect transit fees.
 8 An armed group that harassed pro- Gbagbo forces in Abobo and gradually 
deployed to other municipalities to take part in the “Battle of Abidjan”, which 
led to the arrest of Laurent Gbagbo on 11 April 2011.
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 9 “Microbes” are children and youth between the ages of ten and 20 who, in 
groups of four to more than 20, commit acts of physical aggression, often fatal, 
on ordinary people on the streets or in homes for the purpose of stealing money 
or material goods (smartphones, cell phones, jewellery, etc.). See Akindès 
(2018).
10 Reinforcements are recruited from among ex- gangsters or ex- combatants from 
the various armed crises that the country has experienced. They are endowed 
with dexterity in combat, a capacity for handling weapons, and mystical 
powers. They are financially supported by the category of actors (gnambros or 
unionists) soliciting them in case of clashes. They are mobilised among groups 
of gnambros or unionists operating in a hub other than that which is the object 
of the clashes. In this case, they come to assist their “friends” in danger. At 
times, the Microbes are found among them.
11 The economy improved considerably after each period of crisis with growth 
rates between 2 and 3 per cent from 2008 to 2010 and between 8 and 9 per 
cent from 2012 to 2014 (World Bank 2015).
12 The peace agreement signed between the Ivoirian Government and the rebel 
Forces Nouvelles to end the 2002 military–political crisis.
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2 Opening up or closing off
Urbanisation, violent crime, and the 
“poverty penalty” in Ghana’s four 
largest cities
Adobea Yaa Owusu, Martin Oteng- Ababio, 
George Owusu, Charlotte Wrigley- Asante, and 
Martin Wiredu Agyekum
Introduction
Ghana has experienced unprecedented levels of urbanisation over the last 
half century. Between 1960 and 2010, the country’s urban population 
more than doubled, from 23.1 per cent to 50.9 per cent (GSS 2012; World 
Bank 2014). This urban population growth is estimated to increase to 65 
per cent by 2030 (World Bank 2014). Crossing the 50.0 per cent urban 
population growth mark in 2010 was unprecedented, presenting several 
socioeconomic implications (Songsore 2009; Obeng- Odoom 2013; 
 Songsore et al. 2014). Among these, crime is rising in tandem with urbani-
sation (Oteng- Ababio et al. 2016a), without the governmental apparatus 
having the commensurate ability to adequately provide the necessary pro-
tection for citizens and property. As a result, an intense fear of criminal 
victimisation has arisen in urban Ghana (GSS 2010; Songsore et al. 2014; 
Frimpong 2016). On the other hand, the World Bank (2014) has high-
lighted a positive aspect of rapid urbanisation in Ghana—the reduction of 
poverty. Unfortunately, this urbanisation- driven poverty reduction also 
shows a trend of continuing the sharply skewed income disparities/inequi-
ties sociospatially—between households, neighbourhoods, and rural and 
urban areas (UNDP 2007; Aryeetey, Owusu, and Mensah 2009; World 
Bank 2014). Several authors have therefore drawn a correlation between 
urbanisation, poverty, and crime victimisation in Ghana (Owusu et al. 
2015; Oteng- Ababio et al. 2016a).
 In this context, we report findings based on the primary data collected 
by the Safe and Inclusive Cities (SAIC) team based in Ghana for the 
“Exploring Crime and Poverty Nexus in Urban Ghana” project. Princi-
pally, the team studied crime in Ghana’s four largest cities (Accra, Kumasi, 
Sekondi- Takoradi, and Tamale), which constitute about 40 per cent of the 
nation’s population (GSS 2012), and tested whether the predominant 
 theories of crime, mostly from the Global North, apply in the Ghanaian 
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context. Based on the three different socioeconomic neighbourhoods 
studied in each of these cities, the project primarily examined the spatial 
relationship(s) between poverty and the incidence of crime (Owusu et al. 
2015: 10).
 Our findings mostly confirm the “poverty penalty” regarding violent 
crime victimisation in the cities and communities studied. We found that 
our low and, particularly, middle socioeconomic status (SES) neighbour-
hoods experienced more sophisticated and more successful violent crimes 
such as armed robbery, shootings, strangulation, rape, and murder, com-
pared to the high- SES communities. Conversely, respondents in the high- 
SES neighbourhoods had the highest police presence. They also seemed to 
have the greatest ability to muster and deploy personalised/individualised 
sophisticated crime prevention and mitigation apparatus, including paying 
bribes to the local police service for increased surveillance in their 
communities.
 In fact, respondents in the middle- SES communities seemed to have 
experienced more dangerous crimes, compared to those in the low- SES 
areas. Understandably, respondents in the middle- SES communities were 
found to be the most vulnerable to violent crime as they lacked both the 
individual and communal ability as well as the apparatus to prevent/fight 
crime, compared to those in the high- and low- SES communities. Our find-
ings showed that respondents in the middle- SES communities do not have 
the more sophisticated crime- fighting apparatus that their high- SES coun-
terparts employ. Nor do they have the community- initiated attempts to 
ward off crime that the low- SES areas utilise—for example, community 
watch committees that keep an eye on the neighbourhood and report any 
suspicious behaviour to the authorities are rare. Middle- SES community 
respondents lack the sophisticated crime- fighting apparatus of the high- SES 
areas and community- initiated attempts to ward off crime, such as com-
munity watch committees that keep an eye on the neighbourhood and 
report any suspicious behaviour to the authorities, are rare, unlike in low- 
SES areas. Middle- SES communities also lack social cohesion, which is 
known to help prevent crime (Owusu et al. 2016; Gafa 2017).
 Additionally, a relationship between SES and reporting crime to law 
enforcement authorities was discovered. Respondents from high- SES areas 
reported crime to the police the most often, those in the low- SES areas 
showed the second highest level of reporting, and those in middle- SES 
communities reported crime the least. While there was a general perception 
of low confidence in the police, respondents in the middle- SES communities 
may be exposing themselves to more violent crime by reporting crime to 
the police the least. They are possibly giving the erroneous impression that 
they are safer and need less police surveillance, while having a higher 
appeal to criminals compared to low- SES communities.
 We also found gender and city- level differences in the types of violent 
crime experienced, and in the reporting of criminal victimisation to the 
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police and other community- level leaders. Furthermore, our findings 
showed that other indigenous arrangements for resolving crime- related vic-
timisation exist in the communities studied.
Definitions
Our operational definition of crime is a breach of an established penal code 
or, in the absence of linking it to a well- established penal system, a contra-
vention of a defined community’s previously agreed/established mores. 
Underpinning this understanding is a definition of crime as “an action or 
omission which constitutes an offence and is punishable by law” and/or 
“an action or activity considered to be evil, shameful, or wrong” (Simpson 
and Weiner 1989). We also use the World Health Organization (WHO 
2002: 4) definition of violence:
… the intentional use of physical force or power, threatened or actual, 
against oneself, another person, or against a group or community, that 
either results in or has a high likelihood of resulting in injury, death, 
psychological harm, mal- development or deprivation.
Caldeira (2012), Muggah (2012), and Oteng- Ababio et al. (under review) 
have noted that this definition of violence overlaps the definition of crime. 
The US Department of Justice’s Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI 2011: 
1) defined violent crime as “offenses which involve force or the threat of 
force”. Examples of violent crimes, as defined by the FBI (2011: 1), are 
“murder and non- negligent manslaughter, forcible rape, robbery, and 
aggravated assault, followed by the property crimes of burglary, larceny- 
theft, and motor vehicle theft, but … not [including] arson”. It is important 
to note that some property crimes are considered violent crimes.
 Violent crimes were operationally defined as those that involve the use 
or threat of force against another individual, group, or property and/or 
such attacks that inflict physical and psychological/emotional harm on an 
individual or a group of persons and that involve using force. For example, 
stealing a parked motorbike was considered non- violent, while snatching a 
motorbike from the owner was considered a violent crime.
Ecological concentration of crime and the nexus between 
crime, poverty, and urbanisation
Several authors have observed the ecological/geographical concentration of 
crime, i.e. that a relationship exists between the size of a city and crime 
rates (Owusu et al. 2015; Oteng- Ababio et al. 2016a; Rosenfeld, Vogel, 
and McCuddy 2018). The literature has even established that certain types 
of houses are unique to particular neighbourhoods and that certain 
housing- neighbourhood types attract some crimes disproportionately 
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(Cozens, Hillier, and Prescott 2001: 225–226; Sohn 2016; Gafa 2017). For 
instance, Gafa’s (2017) study in Accra concluded that compound houses/
shared homes, common to low- SES neighbourhoods, are typically more 
criminogenic than other housing types (apartments, detached homes and 
multi- storey buildings) usually found in middle- and high- SES neighbour-
hoods in Ghana. Owusu et al. (2015) and Wrigley- Asante et al. (2016) 
found that certain types of crimes occur more frequently in neighbour-
hoods of a particular status than in others in Ghana. Patino et al. (2014) 
found similar results in Medellin, Colombia. Similarly, Sohn (2016) con-
cluded that median income levels for neighbourhoods correlated with 
crime.
 Such studies have also often concluded that urban crime is coterminous 
with poverty. Hipp and Yates (2011), Taniguchi and Salvatore (2012), 
Sohn (2016), and Oliveira, Bastos- Filho, and Menezes (2017) have drawn 
a positive correlation between poverty/low family SES or poor residential 
neighbourhoods and crime. McIlwaine and Moser (2003) linked youth 
violence to chronic and vicious poverty. Wirth (1938) is arguably the 
earliest known researcher to have drawn a connection between urbanisa-
tion, poverty, and crime, arguing that urbanisation erodes the familial 
bonds and the concept of neighbourliness. In the Ghanaian context, studies 
by both Oteng- Ababio et al. (under review) and Frimpong (2016: 97) con-
cluded that, in the urban communities of Tamale and New Takoradi, 
poverty and unemployment were important underlying factors in youth 
“disorder” in these cities. Nevertheless, a direct, causal crime–poverty link 
is not straightforward, because not all poor individuals and communities 
are criminogenic (Fafchamps, Gabre- Madhin, and Minten 2005).
 The crime prevention through environmental design (CPTED) planning 
strategy has often been used both theoretically and empirically to explain 
the differential criminogenic levels and crime prevention potentials of 
urban neighbourhoods, particularly based on their SES, design and land 
use in the correlation between neighbourhoods, crime prevention, and 
crime levels (Grohe 2011; Cassidy et al. 2014; Patino et al. 2014; Sohn 
2016). Cassidy et al. (2014) explain how an improvement in facilities, such 
as maintenance of neighbourhoods, including CPTED measures and light-
ing, helps to decrease crime. Sohn (2016) studied defensible and permeable 
design of urban spaces and their effect on crime in Seattle, concluding that 
density and diversity of neighbourhood land use such as bus stops, average 
number of storeyed buildings, and providing more streets for better link-
ages, had an adverse effect on neighbourhood crime levels.
 Advancing the “broken windows theory”, a variant of CPTED that 
argues “that visible cues of physical and social disorder in a neighbour-
hood can lead to an increase in more serious crime”, Patino et al. (2014: 
48) note that the outward appearance of a neighbourhood mirrors its 
socioeconomic status in Medellín, Colombia. They found that urban 
layouts that were more disordered—crowded and cluttered, with small 
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houses, narrow roads, and minimal green spaces—had higher rates of 
homicide.
 Although UN- Habitat (2012: 69) acknowledges that a correlation exists 
between poverty/deprivation and crime, Patino et al. (2014) mention that 
cities such as Cairo, Hong Kong, New York, and Singapore are exceptions 
to this association. Instead, the authors blame poor urban planning, design, 
and management for increased criminal tendencies. They emphasise that 
relative income inequality has a greater influence on crime and violence 
than poverty per se, since inequality leads to exclusion from education, 
employment, health, and basic infrastructure.
 The general idea behind CPTED theory and crime is that richer neigh-
bourhoods are more often able to defend against crime while poorer ones 
are forced to use permeable designs which provide little or no protection 
(Owusu et al. 2015, 2016). On the other hand, unlike richer neighbour-
hoods, poor neighbourhoods tend to have strong social cohesion, which is 
a factor in preventing and reducing crime (Owusu et al. 2016; Gafa 2017).
 In tandem with these findings, Banfield (1968: 180) states, “Theories 
about the causes and cures of crime tend to be variations of ones about the 
causes and cures of hard- core poverty.” This established and prevalent 
association between economic deprivation/poverty and violent crime has 
considerable support (Gennetian et al. 2012; White 2012; Cassidy et al. 
2014; Dubow et al. 2016; McAra and McVie 2016). The same applies to 
the association between poverty and youth violent crime victimisation 
(White 2012) and young peoples’ engagement in crime and violence 
 (McIlwaine and Moser 2003; Cassidy et al. 2014; McAra and McVie 
2016); however, Kim et al.’s (2016) study found no difference regarding 
the effects of SES and youth violence in Seattle.
 Moreover, violence and criminogenic levels in neighbourhoods are 
highly correlated with the kind of neighbourhood in question (Gennetian 
et al. 2012; Taniguchi and Salvatore 2012; Cassidy et al. 2014; Oliveira, 
Bastos- Filho, and Menezes 2017). Neighbourhoods with high levels of 
poverty tend to see high levels of violence (Gennetian et al. 2012; Cassidy 
et al. 2014), and the reverse is true (Cassidy et al. 2014). This association 
is what Flango and Sherbenou (1976: 331) termed the “situational deter-
minants of crime”, or what Cassidy et al. (2014: 79) call “place effects” of 
violence. These include neighbourhood factors such as poverty (Gennetian 
et al. 2012; White 2012) and lower median incomes (Sohn 2016). Even 
family structure (White 2012) and relational quality in a household 
(Dubow et al. 2016; McAra and McVie 2016), city size (Rosenfeld, Vogel, 
and McCuddy 2018), and national inflation trends in relation to monetary 
crime (Rosenfeld, Vogel, and McCuddy 2018) were found to be determi-
nants of violence.
 Using longitudinal studies in the UK and the US, Oliveira, Bastos- Filho, 
and Menezes (2017) conclude that crime is unequally distributed in cities 
and different crimes are unevenly concentrated. Cassidy et al. (2014: 78) 
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contend that the concentration of poverty in a neighbourhood has a more 
entrenched effect on crime and crime victimisation than the effect of 
poverty alone because it encapsulates the combined effects of factors such 
as poor housing, unemployment, limited social integration, and a lack of 
social mobility (see also McAra and McVie 2016; Taniguchi and Salvatore 
2012). Cassidy et al. (2014: 78–79) maintain that poverty concentration 
correlates with high rates of violence and crime through interactive mecha-
nisms such as the “contagion effects of bad behaviour” (for example, peer 
influence on vandalism among youth).
Methods
We triangulate both qualitative and quantitative data for the findings in 
this chapter. Our quantitative work centred on a survey of adult household 
heads of 2,745 households in purposively selected communities of differing 
SES in each city. A combined clustered, multi- stage probability 
proportionate- to-size sampling was used to select survey respondents 
beginning with the use of enumeration areas provided by the Ghana Statis-
tical Service (GSS) from the 2010 Housing and Population Census. Nearly 
11 per cent of the respondents were in high- SES communities, 41.0 per 
cent were in middle- SES neighbourhoods, and 48.1 per cent lived in low- 
SES communities (see Table 2.1). The data were analysed using SPSS 
version 20.0.
 Drawing on Songsore (2003) and Owusu, Agyei- Mensah, and Lund 
(2008), we describe low-SES neighbourhoods as sharing the following 
 characteristics. They are typically unplanned, with poor infrastructure main-
tenance. Dwellings house multiple households and amenities are shared 
among the households in a compound. Compounds typically do not have an 
exterior wall. Overcrowding is common. Community members usually have 
income- earning and social activities in and around the houses. In such 
 circumstances, good social bonding is maintained and residents are often 
available in and around their homes to provide a presence, which potentially 
deters intruders (Owusu et al. 2016; Gafa 2017).
 Middle-SES communities display a vast relative improvement in nearly 
all respects, including usually having enclosed walls, less clutter, better 
maintenance, fewer residents per house, and better availability and less 
sharing of amenities. High-SES communities are well planned. They often 
have well- kept surroundings, good access, individualised walled family/
household housing units, and good infrastructure (water, electricity, san-
itation, and drainage/gutters). Residents typically work outside their 
homes, leaving the environs quiet, individualised, and prone to intrusion. 
Target hardening gadgets, alarms, private security, and trained dogs are 
often used to ward off potential intruders (Owusu et al. 2015; Bagson 
2017). Such neighbourhood classifications are often congruent with the 

































































































































































































































































































































































Opening up or closing off  47
 Our qualitative data comprised in- depth semi- structured interviews with 
40 victims of crime—14 from Tamale, ten each from Kumasi and Accra, 
and six from Sekondi- Takoradi. The respondents, 22 men and 18 women, 
were randomly chosen from within the survey households to represent 
different experiences of crime. Most were individuals who had experienced 
violent crime and were available to be interviewed. In the few instances 
where the victims were unavailable or were minors, heads of households 
or their next closest representatives were interviewed. Respondents were 
asked a series of questions about the types of crime they had experienced. 
Responses were analysed using thematic content analysis (Lieblich, Tuval- 
Mashiach, and Zilber 1998).
 This analysis, however, has some limitations, necessitating careful inter-
pretation of the findings. First, this is a retrospective study that allows 
room for recall bias. Second, we cannot claim causality from the study 
because it is cross- sectional. Finally, regarding the gendered analysis, the 
survey respondents were heads of households, who may have been report-
ing for household members of a different sex. This may, for instance, con-
found the gender- based analysis.
Findings
Our findings are grouped in four thematic areas:
1. types of violence experienced in the neighbourhoods
2. how communities respond to or cope with the violence
3. the role of the police and other state institutions
4. gendered and neighbourhood socioeconomic dimensions of the 
findings.
Types of violent crimes being experienced in the neighbourhoods
Thirty- nine per cent (1,076) of survey respondents said they or a member 
of their household had been a victim of crime.
 The survey respondents mentioned experiencing a series of violent 
crimes 467 times; these were grouped into nine main types (Table 2.2). 
Among these, the most common crime was burglary with entry (34.5 per 
cent), followed by theft of livestock (10.9 per cent) and, almost equally, 
by attempted burglary (8.8 per cent) and car vandalism/theft of car parts 
(8.4 per cent). “Other” violent crimes made up 17.1 per cent. This group 
included rape, defilement (sex with a minor), violent threats, kidnapping, 
and assault. Assault was reported by 4.3 per cent (n = 20), and rape was 
reported by 1.1 per cent (n = 5) of survey respondents. Analysis by type of 
violent crime and neighbourhood SES showed a statistically significant 
relationship between the two variables (Kendal tau p = 0.002, Pearson 
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significant differences in the type of violent crime committed, given a par-
ticular neighbourhood’s SES.
 In fact, results from cross- tabulation of proportions of crime mainly 
showed a negative correlation between neighbourhood SES and violent 
crimes. Generally, the lower the SES, the higher the number of reported 
violent crimes, and vice versa. Respondents in the low- SES neighbourhood 
reported 49.5 per cent of the violent crimes, the middle- SES followed 
closely with 45.6 per cent, and those in the high- SES neighbourhood 
reported only 4.9 per cent of the violent crimes studied.
 Of our interviewees, 85 per cent (16 females and 18 males) reported 
violent crimes. These included one reported murder, four attempted 
murders, four rapes, and an attempted rape. Three shootings, two gun 
assaults, two motorbike robberies, and several forced entry/break- ins into 
homes/rooms with the theft of property were also reported. Several of 
these crimes included the use of weapons by the perpetrators such as guns, 
machetes, and knives. An uncle of a 16-year- old girl reported that she was 
forced to undress, ganged raped by “area boys”, her body slashed with a 
knife, and a black powdery substance put into the cut skin as a way of 
shaming and silencing a girl who “is too known [proud] and disrespectful 
… she walks as if she is more beautiful”. Other crimes that included 
weapons were armed robbery, attempted armed robbery, highway robbery, 
theft from car/vandalism of car/theft of car parts, and domestic physical 
abuse. The remainder included theft of livestock, burglary with entry, 
attempted burglary, and assaults/threats to kill. Two people also men-
tioned that a band of thieves, who steal motorbikes, operate late at night 
in the high- SES neighbourhood studied in Tamale.
… It is a very quiet area. The residential areas like RCC [Regional 
Coordinating Council] road and when you take this road to the new 
stadium between the sub- station to Nyohini, in the night you can’t use 
a motorbike to pass there.
(46-year- old male victim, high- SES neighbourhood, 
victim of theft of a motorbike, Tamale)
How communities respond to or cope with violent crime
It emerged from the interviews that a number of community leaders are 
usually involved in handling crime victimisation cases. These include chiefs, 
local level political leaders (known as Assembly members), spiritual leaders 
(Christian, Muslim, and a variety of traditional ones), family elders, and 
even parents. In addition, a few respondents mentioned praying on their 
own or seeking the intervention of God regarding their victimisation.
 Our findings showed that reporting or the suggestion to report crime 
victimisation to chiefs for assistance was peculiar to Tamale, and specifi-
cally to that city’s low- and middle- SES communities. The respondents 
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who reported that chiefs helped in resolving crime- related problems were 
divided in their opinion about the effectiveness of their reporting. In the 
low- and middle- SES communities in Tamale (particularly the former), it 
was mostly felt that the chiefs and the police aligned themselves with the 
ruling government (the National Democratic Congress) and, if you were 
not a supporter of the government, the chiefs and police would not follow 
up on cases reported to them.
The chiefs and the police are almost the same. They don’t also exhibit 
fairness on any matter that is brought before them.… The Imams too, 
because they are now also putting their hands into politics, they don’t 
anymore exhibit fairness to their people. Because of politics, chiefs, 
Imams and the police are all no more executing fairness or justice 
among their people.
(22-year- old male, low- SES neighbourhood, 
victim of gun assault, Tamale)
Truly speaking, we did not report it [murder case] to the chiefs because 
chiefs in this Tamale are not on their skin1 to deliver justice to the 
people of Aboabo.… We also realised that the chiefs had then taken 
sides.
(25-year- old male, low- SES neighbourhood, 
cousin of a murder victim, Tamale)
 About 30 per cent of the survey respondents said that their neigh-
bourhoods have community watch committees. Respondents from low- 
SES, followed by those from middle- SES neighbourhoods, were more 
likely to respond that their neighbourhoods had a watch committee 
compared to those in the high- SES neighbourhood. This relationship is 
very stringently important statistically (Pearson Chi- square [χ2] = 100.805; 
p value = 0.000).
 Furthermore, the kind of neighbourhood is also very important for the 
existence of community cooperation and support against crime victimisa-
tion. Communities with higher SES were consistently more likely to self- 
report individualism/weak community bonding, support, and cooperation 
against crime: 62.2 per cent for high- SES, 47.6 per cent for middle- level, 
and 36.7 per cent for low- SES neighbourhoods. Again, this correlation was 
stringently statistically significant (Pearson Chi- square [χ2] = 123.953; 
p value = 0.000) (see Table 2.3).
 The qualitative findings corroborated these conclusions. As a crime 
victim from the high- SES community in Tamale whose motorbike was vio-
lently taken from him around 10 p.m. at a traffic light affirmed: “I told 
you, this area, everybody is for himself ”. Interviewees from only three 
communities (two middle- SES, one low- SES) mentioned that they have 
neighbourhood watch committees:
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Though the police are working [elsewhere], if they can patrol our com-
munity, it can help. Though we have a “watchdog committee”, their 
work is not up to satisfaction. They only come out when it is 12 a.m. 
and blow whistles.
(69-year- old male, victim of forced entry for theft at night 
with attempted strangulation, middle- SES neighbourhood, 
Kumasi)
 The interviewees showed patterns of reporting crime based on city, SES 
of their community, and gender. About one- third (32.3 per cent) did not 
Table 2.3  Cross-tabulation—existence of neighbourhood watch committee and 
community cooperation and support against crime by neighbourhood 
SES (from survey)
Existence of neighbourhood watch and neighbourhood SES
Neighbourhood 
SES
Neighbourhood has crime watch committee Total
Yes No Don’t know
Low 476 775 58 1,309
36.4% 59.2% 4.4% 100.0%
Middle 316 764 65 1,145
27.6% 66.7% 5.7% 100.0%
High 22 252 21 295
7.5% 85.4% 7.1% 100.0%
Total 2,749
Pearson Chi-square (χ2 = 100.805) (p value = 0.000)
Community cooperation and support against crime and neighbourhood SES
Neighbourhood 
SES









Both (SCB and 
individualism)
Nothing
Low 476 490 194 174 1,334
35.7% 36.7% 14.5% 13.0% 100.0%
Middle 381 547 114 108 1,150
33.1% 47.6% 9.9% 9.4% 100.0%
High 37 183 17 57 294
12.6% 62.2% 5.8% 19.4% 100.0%
Total 2,778
Pearson Chi-square (χ2 = 123.953) (p value = 0.000)
Source: Authors.
Note
Figures may not total 100% due to rounding errors.
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report the crime to either the police or local community leaders. Those 
who did not report were most likely to be from Tamale (63.6 per cent of 
non- reporting interviewees). Interviewees in Accra were most likely to have 
reported their victimisation to an authority. About 12 per cent of inter-
viewees, all female, reported the crime only to community or religious 
leaders. These differences are further discussed at the end of the chapter in 
the Conclusions.
 Survey respondents generally preferred to solve their own problems and 
tighten their security, without necessarily informing the police. The vast 
majority of them did not inform the police of their victimisation. Neither 
did they consider going through the court system to seek arbitration for 
their crime victimisation. Victims from low- SES neighbourhoods were least 
likely to report to the police, followed by those from middle- SES areas. 
The interviews showed some deviation from the survey respondents, as 
middle- SES interviewees were the least likely to contact the police or 
another authority to report a crime.
 Our findings show that the rather low level of reporting of violent crime 
to the police was mostly based on a lack of confidence in them. Respond-
ents trust the courts a little more than the police, although most of them 
said they had not had any experience with the courts. Generally, it was felt 
that contacting the police would not be beneficial. The police would not 
follow up on the case (particularly felt by residents in the low- and middle- 
SES neighbourhoods, and in Tamale), would take your money, and/or 
waste your time delaying the case. Others did not report because they felt 
they lacked the required evidence, the crime was insignificant, or they did 
not have the time to follow it up.
 The vast majority of respondents also did not report the crime victimi-
sation to their community leaders—chiefs, and political and religious 
leaders. This was particularly so in Tamale. Respondents in Kumasi were 
more likely to have reported the crime to community leaders.
 Some interviewees reported that community members encouraged them 
to report the crime to community leaders, including religious/spiritual 
leaders who reportedly use divination to identify the perpetrator or the 
whereabouts of lost items, to predict the return of stolen property, or to 
spiritually influence the perpetrators to make restitution or confess. Reli-
gious leaders will also pray for the victim and use these cases as examples 
in their preaching to admonish potential criminals.
 Also, in Tamale, two high- SES victims reported that there exists a “Youth 
Chief ” in the Jakara Yili suburb of Kukuo to whom people report crime, 
particularly those involving youth. However, the feeling was that a bribe 
would be required or the case would amount to nothing. As one victim from 
Tamale whose motorbike was stolen told us, “he, too, will be demanding 
some money”. Like the Youth Chief, respondents also mentioned a “Chief 
of Thieves” in Tamale to whom one can report a crime. This person is 
 purported to find the perpetrator and resolve the issue for a fee:
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You pay money to the Chief and they can retrieve a motorbike for 
you? But doing that, you are encouraging indiscipline. You are encour-
aging an unlawful way of doing things.
(46-year- old male, high- SES neighbourhood, victim of motorbike 
theft, Tamale)
Consequently, particularly in Tamale and Kumasi, low- and middle- SES 
respondents were likely to feel that their crime victimisation was a matter 
for the divine and often left it “in the hands of God”, believing He would 
reveal and punish the perpetrators and restore what was lost.
 While low- and middle- SES respondents put their trust in God, those in 
high- SES and some middle- SES neighbourhoods, particularly in Accra, take 
matters into their own hands. They exchange telephone numbers and use 
social platforms to network across the community. They also use sirens, 
alarms, private security guards, and sophisticated security systems involv-
ing barbed wire, security dogs, and even electrified fences to improve 
household security. As a result, communal security was said to be improv-
ing in these areas.
 These notwithstanding, some of the relatively rich respondents felt that 
a return to traditional methods of social bonding and networking are 
needed, where neighbours look out for and care for each other. A respond-
ent in the high- SES neighbourhood in Tamale also mentioned collabora-
tion between the Christian Council and Muslim leaders in organising 
workshops on crime prevention. In the low- SES neighbourhood in Tamale, 
it was reported that community members assist the police when arresting 
criminals.
Role of the police and other state institutions
For the most part, information on the role of the state was gathered 
through in- depth interviews. A slim majority (55.9 per cent) of the inter-
viewees reported their victimisation to the police. Victims from Accra were 
most likely to have reported the crime to the police (90.0 per cent), while 
those in Tamale were least likely to have done so (36.4 per cent). Only 50 
per cent of violent crime victims interviewed in both Sekondi- Takoradi and 
Kumasi reported their victimisation to the police.
 Generally, survey respondents perceived the role played by state crim-
inal justice institutions, especially the police, negatively, with the courts 
being viewed as somewhat better. The respondents saw interaction with 
the police as a waste of time and money. That said, the state is seen as 
having only a minimal role in the threats of crime reported to the authors 
of this chapter. In other words, the state is seen to be absent in responding 
to crime. This was most pronounced in the low- SES neighbourhoods, 
where there are particularly few police stations and a limited police pres-
ence in general.
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No, we don’t have a police station and that is also another big 
problem. The police station is far, and we have always insisted 
that they should provide us with one here, but this has fallen on 
deaf ears.
(68-year- old male, low- SES neighbourhood, victim of forced entry 
with property theft, Sekondi- Takoradi)
The same applies to police patrols, which interviewees from Kumasi, Tamale, 
and Sekondi- Takoradi said were sometimes brief, especially in the low- SES, 
followed by the middle- SES communities. Conversely, victim- interviewees in 
high- SES neighbourhoods in Accra and Tamale reported a high frequency of 
police patrols in their communities. Unique to Sekondi- Takoradi was mention 
that both the police and military frequently patrol the low- SES neighbour-
hood studied (New Takoradi), mainly due to the existence of nearby places of 
national security interest and in pursuit of suspects.
This place, sometimes we have soldiers patrolling these areas, because 
of the oil pipeline and the extension work going on at the harbour. But 
I think the police can also increase their patrol activities.
(22-year- old female, victim of forced entry with theft, low- SES 
neighbourhood)
 Yet again, two respondents from neighbourhoods in Tamale (Aboabo, 
low SES) and Kumasi (Anloga, middle SES) reported involving their 
local community- level political representatives, popularly called 
“Assembly members”, in their case. However, the Assembly members’ 
roles in dealing with these cases were conflicting. In Aboabo, it was 
reported that an Assembly member in the community had called for the 
arrest of someone who was accused of murder. Conversely, in Anloga, it 
was reported that the Assembly member did not permit the victim to 
report a case of break and enter with theft of money and other property 
to the police. The Assembly member managed the case himself by asking 
the perpetrator to refund the stolen money, which his mother did. The 
victim felt that it was not appropriate for the Assembly member to have 
handled the case informally since it did not serve as a deterrent to the 
perpetrator who, shortly afterwards, committed a far more violent 
crime.
Gendered and neighbourhood dimensions of the findings
Gender was statistically very important to the types of violent crime experi-
enced by respondents (Pearson Chi- square [χ2] = 33.369; p value = 0.000). 
Based on the household survey, females—particularly those living alone—
were far more likely to have been victims of burglary with entry (39.9 per 
cent of females and 28.8 per cent of males surveyed). Additionally, three 
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women, but no men, reported being kidnapped and more females reported 
other unspecified violent crimes (21.8 per cent of females, 12.4 per cent of 
males). Yet, interestingly and quite unheard of in Ghana, three of the five 
victims of reported rape cases in the survey were male.
 The study findings also reflected a gendered accumulation of assets as 
men ordinarily have greater access to capital. Males were more likely to 
have reported theft of a bicycle (11.1 per cent of males, 3.4 per cent of 
females), theft of motorbikes (9.3 per cent of males, 3.4 per cent of 
females), theft from a car (8.0 per cent of males, 4.2 per cent of females), 
and theft of livestock (12.8 per cent of males, 9.2 per cent of females). 
Both males and females were almost equally likely to experience crimes 
such as attempted burglary, car vandalism/theft of car parts, and theft of 
car/car hijacking.
 Cross- tabulation by gender, type of violent crime, and inter- SES 
neighbourhoods (see Table 2.4) generally follows a similar trend, with 
women, particularly those within middle- SES neighbourhoods, report-
ing burglary with forced entry more frequently than men. The same 
applies to the victims of car vandalism/theft of car parts. It is important 
to note that 60 per cent of victims of assault in the survey were female; 
and all cases of assault were reported exclusively in low- SES 
neighbourhoods.
 Results from interviews corroborated some of the observed gendered 
differences in the survey. Women reported certain types of violent attacks 
more frequently (such as rape, attempted rape, assault, and kidnapping). 
This may be due to the general lesser relative strength of females when 
facing male perpetrators. It could also be explained by perpetrators taking 
advantage of the generally higher vulnerability of women. For instance, the 
interviews showed a trend where female victims of burglary/forced entry 
into homes, accompanied with other crimes such as rape, attempted rape, 
attempted murder, etc., were more likely to be alone at the time of victimi-
sation. As the example below from Kumasi shows, perpetrators may have 
prior information about the increased vulnerability of their female victims, 
which contributes to the incidents.
Around 2 a.m., I heard that someone has broken the padlock to my 
house. When I woke up, I saw three people and one of them was 
holding a knife [and said] that if I scream he will kill me.… My 
husband works in the night and so does not sleep in the house with us 
… I heard that it is someone who gave them that tip.… And after they 
have robbed you, they force to sleep with you.
(29-year- old female, middle- SES neighbourhood, victim of forced 
entry with theft and attempted murder, Kumasi)
 Other violent crimes such as murder, shootings, and property thefts 
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I was sleeping in the night around 10:30 to 11:00 thereabouts.… Sud-
denly, I saw that someone was strangling my neck, trying to kill me. I 
struggled with him and overpowered him.
(69-year- old male, middle- SES neighbourhood, victim of attempted 
property theft with strangulation, Kumasi)
The property- related crimes exemplify that males have a higher degree of 
property ownership and operation/management of items such as cars, 
motorcycles, bicycles, and livestock in Ghana. This argument is strength-
ened by the fact that both males and females reported attempted burglary 
or car vandalism/theft in similar proportions. Notably, these are instances 
of unsuccessful violent crimes that did not often involve resistance from 
the victim, or were typically carried out in the absence of the victim.
 The interviews further showed neighbourhood effects within these gen-
dered differences. It seemed that males and females within the low- SES 
neighbourhoods reported more heinous crimes more often. Victims of gun- 
related offences such as murder, attempted murder, and gun assaults were 
all male, almost all of whom lived in the low- SES neighbourhoods.
On 2nd January 2013, around 3 a.m. … I was walking with my girl-
friend when we saw two gentlemen coming towards us … one of them 
told me to give him my car keys and the money I have [or] else he will 
shoot me.… I resisted … the guy shot me but luckily for me, the bullets 
fell on my side. When I fell down, they took my GHc 3502 and my 
phone. I have over eight bullets in my side now but I don’t have any 
help to go for operation for them to remove the bullets.
(35-year- old male, low- SES neighbourhood, victim of shooting and 
theft, Kumasi)
 These results are borne out by the survey data (see Table 2.4). More-
over, all cases of rape and attempted rape reported by interviewees were 
from low- SES communities. From the narratives of the victims, Aboabo in 
Tamale, for instance, seemed like a melting pot of violent crime where sus-
picion alone could lead to one being murdered and where some residents 
were depicted as unbridled gangsters who could own/wield guns, shoot 
others at will, and go scot- free. On the other hand, the stealing of motor-
bikes and car parts, and one attempted armed robbery, were the only 
violent crimes reported in the high- SES communities.
We were here in the night and some guys came in.… The gates have 
been locked and I saw the guys come in, some scaled the wall into our 
house. And then all that I saw was they had cutlasses and started 
breaking the gates and so forth … before they [the police] came, they 
had looted all they could.
(72-year- old male, low- SES neighbourhood, victim of forced entry and 
armed robbery, Accra)
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 Findings from the interviews also showed a gender- and SES- related trend 
in reporting violent crime. Males (66.7 per cent) were more likely to have 
reported victimisation to the police than females (43.8 per cent). Of all the 
violent crime victims who reported to the police, only 36.8 per cent were 
female. Conversely, females (25.0 per cent) were more likely to report their 
violent crime victimisation to others such as community leaders.
 For the interviewees, reporting the violent crime victimisation to 
someone in authority showed an inverse relationship with the SES status of 
their neighbourhoods. Seventy- five per cent of respondents in the high- SES 
communities reported the crime to the police/someone in authority as 
opposed to 58.3 per cent of those in the middle and 68.4 per cent of those 
in the low- SES communities. Among the interviewees who reported the 
crime to someone in authority, those in the high- SES communities were 
most likely to have done so (75.0 per cent), followed by those in the low- 
SES communities (61.1 per cent), and finally those in the middle- SES com-
munities (41.7 per cent).
 Interviewees from the high- SES communities corroborated our findings 
from the survey: they reported using target hardening and other sophistic-
ated means such as private security services, electronic alarms, security 
doors, barbed wire, and private police patrols (paid) to ward off crime.
I tapped the alarm signal first … we blew the alarm and he ran 
away.… Admittedly, the doors to our inner rooms are tough security 
doors. We made a report to the estate’s security … and they also 
quickly brought us security men.… We also told the police so we had 
police patrol … from time to time at night. My husband made some 
investigations and we realised other estates around had security—
police protection and surveillance.… So together with the other resi-
dents we decided to make arrangements for it but this is not for free.…
(39-year- old female, high- SES neighbourhood, victim of attempted 
gang armed robbery, Accra)
Some respondents in the middle- SES communities also reported that, when 
in danger, they sometimes call for police patrols and receive a response. 
Furthermore, interviewees in most low- and a few middle- SES neighbour-
hoods mentioned having citizens’ watch committees.
Conclusions and implications for policy and practice
In sum, our findings corroborate previous literature regarding the ecology 
of crime that argues that crime is not randomly distributed in geographical 
space (Gennetian et al. 2012; White 2012; McAra and McVie 2016; 
Oteng- Ababio et al. 2016a, 2016b; Sohn 2016, etc.). We found important 
links between urbanisation, poverty, and violent crime in Ghana, and 
 confirmed the importance of the “situational determinants” of crime (Flango 
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and Sherbenou 1976), as well as the “place effects” (Cassidy et al. 2014: 79) 
of urban crime and violence. Specifically, we generally found a negative 
correlation between the SES of the neighbourhood and the amount of crime 
reported as well as the seriousness of violent crimes. That is, these tended to 
decrease/be less serious as the SES of the communities studied increased. 
Also, the lower the SES of the neighbourhood, the higher the propensity for 
the crimes reported to be physical violations, while the high- SES areas were 
more associated with property- related violent crimes.
 Some inter- city differences in the types of crimes reported also emerged. 
For instance, more serious crimes such as murder, shootings, and rape 
were reported both in Kumasi and, particularly, Tamale than in Sekondi- 
Takoradi, especially, and Accra. It is clear that we cannot discount “the 
cultural settings” (Flango and Sherbenou 1976: 331) of these neighbour-
hoods, and even those of the cities studied. Owusu et al. (in press) note 
that each of the cities studied is unique.
 There were also inter- city differences in the reporting of violent crime to 
the police and to community leaders. Qualitative respondents in Accra 
reported crime to the police the most often, with those in Tamale doing so 
the least. This may be due to the higher presence of police in Accra 
(Abudu, Nuhu, and Nkuah 2013; Bagson and Owusu 2016; Oteng- Ababio 
et al. 2016a), compared to other cities. Perceptions about the compromised 
loyalty of the police were most prevalent in Tamale, possibly explaining 
why victims of violent crime there reported to the police the least. Qual-
itative respondents in Kumasi were also most likely to have reported the 
crime victimisation to local, non- religious leaders, possibly reflecting the 
acclaimed status of Kumasi as “the cultural centre of Ghana”.
 The finding that female interviewees were more likely to report their 
crime victimisation to informal community leaders may reflect the 
entrenched patriarchy in Ghana. Those women may identify more with 
such informal community leaders, all of whom happened to be men, as 
“heads” and authority figures within their communities rather than the 
police, who are formal and typically distant from the communities. Dif-
ficulties with accessing the police, such as the need to travel to distant 
police stations, offer bribes, or provide evidence that a crime has been 
committed were said to unduly delay the investigation of cases reported to 
them. Overall, the cost in terms of time, transport, and lost wages in addi-
tion to a perception of partiality on the part of the police, contribute to 
women’s reporting choices. Compared to men in Ghana, women are less 
likely to have the resources, such as money for transportation. Further-
more, based on gendered norms filtered through patriarchy, the female 
victims may have felt more comfortable dealing with informal types of 
social regulation and authority than formal ones.
 Boateng (2018) documented that in Ghana, informal control systems 
are powerful in shaping crime victims’ reporting behaviour. He demon-
strates a rational choice approach underlying the decision about how and 
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to whom to report a crime. It involves a complex process of evaluating 
both the costs and benefits of reporting (Bowles et al. 2009), particularly 
to the police (Kaukinen 2002). Consequently, victims report crime to the 
police only if they perceive the benefits to outweigh the costs (Tarling and 
Morris 2010). In light of this, Boateng (2018) suggests that when it comes 
to reporting crime, victims give high priority to informal systems of 
support rather than formal ones. While noting that this is problematic, 
Boateng posits that the most plausible explanation for victims preferring to 
report crimes to the informal types of social regulation and authority is 
that they are more likely to receive a favourable reaction from informal 
groups than from formal ones. Boateng (2018) articulates further that this 
may be true in all social contexts, and particularly more prevalent within 
African societies. Crime victims’ sociodemographic characteristics influ-
ence their reporting to the police, and this is true regarding crime victims 
in Ghana (Boateng 2018).
 Furthermore, the qualitative interviews affirm findings by previous 
authors that compared to the low- SES communities, those in the high- 
and middle- SES neighbourhoods have a higher police presence and more 
patrols (Abudu, Nuhu, and Nkuah 2013; Bagson and Owusu 2016). 
Conversely, our findings affirm previous research that residents of low- 
SES neighbourhoods are most likely to team up for neighbourhood watch 
activities in response to crime, while those in the high- SES communities 
use modern, expensive target hardening/CPTED devices and private 
security mechanisms to protect themselves from crime victimisation 
(Owusu et al. 2015).
 Our study has several implications for policy and practice. First, crimes 
were usually not reported due to very low confidence in the police, in par-
ticular, but also in the court systems. It is clear that there is a need for 
significant reform of the criminal justice system to establish, as well as 
restore, confidence in it. Second, we suggest that the police service and the 
local government ministry make attempts to intensify efforts to encourage 
citizens to do more crime reporting. This will help the police to improve 
and strategise more thoroughly regarding crime control efforts. Third, we 
recommend that the police and National Bureau of Investigation work on 
ridding communities of dangerous informal forms of crime control such as 
the “Chief of Thieves”.
 Fourth, this study has unearthed data showing that middle- SES com-
munities may be particularly vulnerable to violent crime. Middle- SES 
neighbourhoods have a lower police presence than the high- SES com-
munities and fewer personalised/individualised target hardening/CPTED 
mechanisms. At the same time, residents in the middle- SES neighbour-
hoods studied revealed the fewest community- based communal attempts to 
ward off crime, such as having neighbourhood watch committees. This 
may also be due to the fact that, as became clear in this study, these 
middle- SES neighbourhoods were the least likely to report crimes to the 
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police, creating what our study has shown to be an erroneous impression 
that they may be safer, and require less of a police presence. However, this 
study found that they are the most prone to violent crime.
 The finding that the selected middle- SES neighbourhoods attract more 
violent crime complicates the analysis from mainstream literature on “the 
poverty trap and crime victimisation” otherwise referred to as the “con-
centric zone theory” of crime and urbanisation as originally proposed by 
Shaw and McKay (1942). This theory states that there is a consistent 
inverse relationship between the SES of neighbourhoods and crime victimi-
sation. We recommend that the middle- SES communities studied in this 
research improve community collaboration to enhance their security. Resi-
dents of the middle- SES communities studied are also encouraged to step 
up their reporting of violent crime to the police. Broadly, however, our 
study has affirmed most of the previous findings in the mainstream liter-
ature about the link between crime victimisation and poverty.
 Our study also found that victims were unlikely to report crime to com-
munity leaders. Based on the significant legitimacy and reputation of such 
leaders and the fact that nearly all communities in Ghana have a variety of 
these informal leaders, the Local Government Ministry should strategise to 
find ways of orientating these leaders (Chiefs, Assembly members, religious 
leaders) to help mitigate violent crime, particularly in the urban com-
munities studied. Given the financial and time costs involved in using offi-
cial arbitration systems, it would be appropriate to strengthen alternative 
dispute resolution mechanisms such as the indigenous ways of handling 
criminal victimisation revealed in mainly low- income neighbourhoods. 
Additionally, the findings provide insight into neighbourhood SES and 
security adaptation measures. More security networking against crime in 
these cities is also recommended. We suggest a combined police and Local 
Government Ministry effort to encourage more proactive community 
policing such as setting up community crime- stopper activities, including 
supporting neighbourhoods to better organise watch committees and 
sharing intelligence.
 Furthermore, our study found a gendered aspect related to the type of 
violent crime victimisation. Females were disproportionately victimised in 
contexts where they would be challenged due to their lower physical 
strength. For instance, data triangulation showed that most of the cases of 
assault, rape, and attempted rape happened to women. There were more 
break- ins and accompanying crimes (rape, attempted rape, petty property 
thefts) against women. Interestingly, the qualitative data showed that this 
was particularly true when the women were alone, without a male family 
member or partner/husband/boyfriend. The perpetrators were also said to 
be neighbours who had foreknowledge that the women were alone. We 
recommend increased efforts to prevent these violent crimes; for example, 
by working against gender stereotypes that underpin the prevalence of rape 
and assault against women.
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 Another gendered aspect of the crime victimisation we uncovered was 
that more gun- related violence, including gang- style armed robbery and 
property theft in general, was targeted at males. Violent property crime 
against men underscores the greater opportunity men have to own and 
control social resources, which makes them a target for this type of crime. 
It is possible that perpetrators use weapons, such as guns, against male 
targets because they are more likely to be able to fight back.
 Finally, we propose that to help curb violent crime in the studied com-
munities, additional short-, medium-, and long- term efforts toward poverty 
alleviation be undertaken by policymakers. These should particularly 
target residents in the urban slums we studied as our results support 
previous findings (for instance, Patino et al. 2014: 48) showing that neigh-
bourhoods tend to reflect the SES of their residents. The short- term meas-
ures should strengthen and possibly widen current social protection efforts 
against poverty. Medium- and longer- term strategies such as ensuring 
better/higher education, employable skill development, and higher youth 
employment avenues are proposed.
Notes
1 A “skin”, usually the full skin of an animal, for instance a goat or sheep, which 
has been cleaned and dried, is a symbol of the authority of a chief in the three 
northern regions of Ghana. In such communities, chiefs sit on a skin to receive 
homage or handle chieftaincy- related matters.
2 Approximately US$75.
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positive social outcomes in 
Cape Town, South Africa
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Introduction
Among the interventions to reduce crime and violence in South Africa, 
there is growing interest in those that address the social and structural 
environments that entrench exclusion and are considered important ante-
cedents to a range of deleterious health and well- being outcomes. In Cape 
Town, the Violence Prevention through Urban Upgrading (VPUU) pro-
gramme applies an integrated approach, with a strong focus on social 
interventions and community participation, alongside urban upgrading. In 
this chapter, we used data from three community- based surveys, conducted 
in Khayelitsha in 2013, 2014, and 2015, to explore the association 
between the infrastructure developed by VPUU and several social out-
comes: (1) experiencing interpersonal violence; (2) signs and symptoms of 
depression; (3) satisfaction with neighbourhood infrastructure; (4) involve-
ment in community activities; and (5) social cohesion.
 The initial findings were positive. Respondents who lived within 2 km of 
VPUU infrastructure (i.e. ‘the intervention area’) experienced less violence, 
showed fewer signs of depression, and were more satisfied with the infra-
structure in their neighbourhood than those who lived further than 2 km 
from VPUU infrastructure. There were similar levels of social cohesion 
among residents exposed to the intervention and those who were not 
exposed, but residents living outside the intervention area were more likely 
to be active in their communities.
 These findings support recent policy developments that foreground 
safety through environmental design. For example, the Western Cape Prov-
ince’s 2013 Integrated Provincial Violence Prevention Policy Framework 
highlights the importance of the modification of urban environments and 
public spaces (Western Cape Government 2013). At a national level, the 
2016 White Paper on Safety and Security includes the integration of safety, 
crime, and violence prevention principles into urban and rural planning 
and design to promote perceptions of and actual safety as a key theme 
(Civilian Secretariat for Police Service 2016). There are several other 
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research questions that should be answered before these interventions are 
scaled- up nationally: Are there other factors that might partially explain 
the positive findings related to urban upgrading and improved social out-
comes? Are there unintended consequences of urban upgrading such as dis-
placement of violence to other areas? Are urban upgrading interventions 
such as the VPUU programme sustainable? Until such time as these ques-
tions are addressed, the urban upgrading intervention implemented by 
VPUU should be considered a promising intervention.
Background
South Africa has high levels of interpersonal violence—a major contributor 
to the burden of disease (Pillay- van Wyk et al. 2016)—and one of the 
world’s most unequal income distributions (World Bank 2018), both of 
which undermine quality of life and development progress. The South 
African National Development Plan acknowledges the relationship 
between poverty, inequality, and crime, and there is growing interest in 
interventions that address the social and structural environments, which 
have entrenched exclusion and inequality arising from the country’s Apart-
heid past (National Planning Commission 2012). For example, the 2016 
White Paper on Safety and Security foregrounds “safety through environ-
mental design” as one of six key themes for crime and violence prevention 
alongside an effective criminal justice system; early interventions directed 
at children; comprehensive and high- quality victim support; effective and 
integrated service delivery; and active public and community participation. 
The White Paper calls for “the integration of safety, crime and violence 
prevention principles into urban and rural planning and design that pro-
motes safety and facilitates feeling safe” (Civilian Secretariat for Police 
Service 2016: 18).
 Cape Town, the capital city of South Africa’s Western Cape Province, 
has typically had the country’s highest or second highest provincial homi-
cide rate (Prinsloo et al. 2016) Here, the municipal government co- funded 
an urban upgrading programme that addresses violence called VPUU. 
VPUU adopts an integrated community participative approach premised 
on situational, social, and institutional crime prevention that also includes 
crime prevention through environmental design principles (Lloyd and Mat-
zopoulos 2019). The approach encompasses building interventions across 
four categories: buildings, sports facilities, landscaping, and surfacing. In 
conjunction, social interventions, such as a neighbourhood watch pro-
gramme, activate these spaces. The programme attempts to offer redress 
for the deep inequality of Apartheid- era segregated urban development and 
has broad appeal among different tiers of government. It has been high-
lighted in the Western Cape Provincial Government’s Integrated Violence 
Prevention Policy Framework as exemplifying a “whole- of-society” 
approach to preventing violence. VPUU is currently being implemented in 
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several high- violence urban communities in Cape Town that feature prom-
inently in the national and provincial rankings of police precincts with the 
highest number of murders per capita, as well as one semi- rural site and 
one rural site in Western Cape Province. In Cape Town, VPUU operates in 
two designated Safe Node Areas (SNAs1) within Khayelitsha: the Harare 
SNA and the Monwabisi Park SNA.
 Evaluation research has shown that interventions aimed at urban 
upgrading show promise, but there is a dearth of studies from low- and 
middle- income countries (Cassidy et al. 2014). There is also a pressing 
need for empirical evidence of the effectiveness of modifying the built 
environment in conjunction with social interventions as a violence preven-
tion intervention in the South African setting.
 In this chapter, we use data from three community- based surveys con-
ducted in Khayelitsha, Cape Town in 2013, 2014, and 2015 to provide a 
preliminary analysis of the associations between living in proximity to the 
VPUU intervention area and five outcomes: (1) experiences of severe inter-
personal violence; (2) showing signs and symptoms of depression; (3) satis-
faction with neighbourhood infrastructure; (4) involvement in community 
activities; and (5) social cohesion. We considered that these outcomes were 
implicitly addressed in the design of the intervention and would be measur-




The study was based on a repeated cross- sectional design with surveys con-
ducted annually in 2013, 2014, and 2015.
Study population and sampling procedure
The sampling area covered the suburb of Khayelitsha, Cape Town, which 
is approximately 30 km from Cape Town’s city centre and, at the 2011 
census, had a population of 391,749 (City of Cape Town 2013). A total 
of 1200 households were randomly selected for the first survey in 2013 
using the 2012 version of geographical information systems data for all 
formal dwellings in Cape Town (i.e. registered serviced households) 
originally sourced from the City of Cape Town’s address database (City 
of Cape Town Open Data Portal 2015). Informal dwellings (i.e. houses 
that were not registered with and serviced by the municipality at the time 
of their construction) were mapped using the 2011 version of the Eskom 
SPOT 5 Building Count dataset (de la Rey 2008). The 2014 and 2015 
surveys were conducted at the same approximate geographic locations 
selected in 2013, but previously interviewed households were substituted 
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with neighbouring dwellings. This provided three annual cross- sections 
from the same 1200 locations. Fieldwork took place from July to Novem-
ber each year.
 For each survey, the ‘main household’ at each property was defined as 
the residence of the property’s owner. Where the owner was not resident, 
the household with the longest residing tenant was considered as the main 
household. Surveys were completed by the female head of the main house-
hold (i.e. the adult female identified as the primary caretaker of the house 
and household members). A male adult resident was selected if there was 
no female adult resident or if the main household adult female was unable 
to respond due to psychological or hearing impairment. Comparisons in 
strata restricted to males were limited by smaller sample sizes. Our ration-
ale for selecting female respondents was twofold. First, the questionnaire 
included a range of topics relating to the household and the neighbour-
hood that might be reported differentially by gender and we required a 
structured sampling process that would limit potential bias if fieldworkers 
had the discretion to select respondents from within a household. Second, 
our understanding, based on pilot studies and consultation with com-
munity members, indicated that female respondents were likely to have a 
more complete understanding of household and neighbourhood dynamics 
because they had more restricted mobility than their male counterparts in 
a high violence community like Khayelitsha.
 Households were substituted after three unsuccessful visits, if the prop-
erty was vacant, if residents refused to be interviewed, if the resident had 
been interviewed in a previous survey, or if there was no one aged 18 or 
older in residence. Substitutions were made from a second random sample 
drawn immediately after the initial phase of fieldwork, after which field-
workers systematically visited households to the left and then to the right 
of the households selected for the second random sample. The study was 
approved by the Human Research Ethics Committee of the Faculty of 
Health Sciences, University of Cape Town (HREC REF 637/2013) and all 
residents provided written informed consent.
Instruments and procedures
Trained fieldworkers collected information on sociodemographics, experi-
ences of interpersonal violence, signs and symptoms of depression, satis-
faction with neighbourhood infrastructure, participation in community 
activities, and social cohesion using a structured questionnaire.
Outcomes
For interpersonal violence, we constructed a binary measure for experience 
of severe interpersonal violence if the respondent reported any attempted 
or actual rape or murder of someone well known to the respondent, assault 
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with a weapon, or two or more of the following incident types affecting 
the respondent personally: assault (with or without a weapon), rape, 
robbery, petty theft,2 arson, car hijacking, victim or witness of another’s 
experience of discrimination- based violence,3 drug- related violence, gang- 
related violence, victim or witness of another’s experience of targeted or 
threatened community justice, or domestic violence.
 To measure signs and symptoms of depression, we used the 10-question 
version of the Center for Epidemiological Studies- Depression scale (CES- 
D-10) adapted from the original 20-question version developed as a screen-
ing tool for depression in the general population and suitable for use in 
Black and White English- speaking Amer ican populations of both sexes 
across a wide age range and socioeconomic strata (Radloff 1977; Andresen 
et al. 1994). Each CES- D-10 question was measured on a 4-point scale 
(0 to 3), which produced a composite score between 0 and 30. A CES- D-10 
cut- off of 13 was used to indicate the presence of significant signs and 
symptoms of depression, which has been validated among isiXhosa- 
speaking South Africans, the predominant language group in Khayelitsha 
(Baron, Davies, and Lund 2017).
 To measure satisfaction with neighbourhood infrastructure, respondents 
were asked to report their current satisfaction (yes/no) with the conditions 
and maintenance of the following infrastructure and services provided in 
whole or in part by VPUU: roads or pathways, storm water drainage, 
streetlights, high mast lights, electrical supply, refuse removal, green space, 
public open space, sports and recreational facilities, water taps (in areas 
with informal houses), nearest waste collection point, nearest pension pay- 
out point, nearest clinic, nearest library, and nearest sports facility. Each 
response was scored on a 0/1 scale, which produced a composite score 
ranging from 0 (i.e. not satisfied with any aspect of infrastructure) to 15 
(satisfied with all aspects of infrastructure). We used a cut- off of 75 per 
cent (i.e. satisfied with more than 11 of the 15 services) to indicate suffi-
cient neighbourhood infrastructure satisfaction.
 For community participation, respondents were asked whether they 
were actively involved in any of five different types of community groups 
that we were concerned with: (1) neighbourhood services or problems; 
(2) social, religious, or hobby groups; (3) formal or informal sports groups; 
(4) voluntary security- related organisations; or (5) other voluntary organi-
sations. These categories were derived from the work of De Silva et al. 
(2007). Residents that were actively involved in two or more groups were 
considered as being ‘active in the community’.
 The 2015 survey measured social cohesion by asking residents the 
 following questions: (1) How common is it that neighbours help each other 
out?; (2) How common is it that neighbours do things together?; (3) How 
common is it that people in your neighbourhood are aggressive?; and 
(4) Can the majority of people in your neighbourhood be trusted? Each 
question was rated on a 5-point Likert scale (reversed for question 3 and 
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with missing values recorded as zero), providing a cumulative score 
ranging from 0 to 20.
Defining the intervention area
Exposure to the intervention was defined as the household’s proximity to the 
VPUU built environment. Households situated within 2 km—equivalent to a 
20 minute walk—were considered exposed to the intervention (i.e. interven-
tion group). According to urban fabric theory, this measure is consistent with 
the limit of the walking city (Newman, Kosonen, and Kenworthy 2016). 
Households located outside this zone were considered to be unexposed to the 
intervention (i.e. the control group). Figure 3.1 illustrates the spatial distribu-
tion of exposed and unexposed households included in the study.
Statistical analysis
Survey results were pooled from each of the annual cross- sections and pre-
valence was estimated for each of the four binary outcomes. Exposed and 
Figure 3.1  Household survey points and proximity to VPUU intervention stratified 
by category of exposure.
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unexposed households were compared using the Pearson’s Chi- squared test 
for the binary outcomes and Student’s t- test to compare the mean scores for 
social cohesion. Summaries were stratified by gender and formal/informal 
area to take into account possible effect modification. Acknowledging the 
multiple comparisons made in this study, associations were assessed using a 
significance level of alpha = 0.01 rather than the conventional 0.05. The ana-
lysis was conducted using Stata version 13.1 (Stata Corporation, USA).
Findings
The sample consisted of 3703 participants, most of whom were women 
(82 per cent). A similar number of houses were sampled in formal and 
informal areas and for each year from 2013 to 2015. The stratified find-
ings for each outcome that follow were not adjusted for potential con-
founders and may be reflective of other differences across the exposure 
groups (see Table 3.1).
Table 3.1 Summary statistics for each outcome and covariates by exposure category






n (%) n (%) n (%)
Gender
Male  348 (17)  282 (19)  630 (18)
Female 1645 (82) 1164 (80) 2809 (82)
Area type
Formal  952 (45) 1017 (65) 1969 (53)
Informal 1182 (55)  547 (35) 1729 (47)
Year
2013  694 (32)  499 (32) 1193 (32)
2014  741 (35)  516 (33) 1257 (34)
2015  703 (33)  550 (35) 1253 (34)
Outcomes
Experience of violence  482 (23)  216 (15)  698 (20)
Signs and symptoms of  
  depression
 327 (16)  152 (11)  479 (14)
Satisfaction with  
   neighbourhood 
infrastructure
 422 (19)  408 (27)  830 (22)
Community participation 1041 (51)  591 (40) 1640 (46)
Mean (SD) Mean (SD) Mean (SD)
Social cohesion (n = 1192)   11.4 (3.4)   12.0 (3.4)   11.7 (3.2)
Note
* Exposed households were situated less than 2 km from the infrastructural intervention.
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Violence
The survey confirmed the considerable burden of violence experienced by 
residents of Khayelitsha. Overall, 19.7 per cent of residents were con-
sidered to have been exposed to severe interpersonal violence within the 
last year. There was considerable variation in the experience of violence by 
neighbourhood within Khayelitsha (see Figure 3.2).4 Site C (34.0 per cent), 
Site B (22.2 per cent), and Harare (19.4 per cent) were the areas that 
experienced the highest levels of violence.
 In the intervention area, 14.7 per cent of households experienced severe 
interpersonal violence, which was significantly less than the 23.3 per cent 
of households outside the intervention area (p < 0.001) (see Figure 3.3).
 Gender was an important risk factor for violence. Men were more likely 
to have experienced severe interpersonal violence within the last year than 
women—23.2 per cent compared to 18.9 per cent (p = 0.016). However, 
both men (p = 0.001) and women (p < 0.001) living in the intervention area 
were significantly less likely to experience severe interpersonal violence 
than those living outside the intervention area.
Figure 3.2  Experience of severe violence in the last year by neighbourhood within 
Khayelitsha.
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 The type of area where residents lived also influenced the risk of experi-
encing severe interpersonal violence. Experience of severe interpersonal 
violence was significantly higher among residents living in informal areas 
(22.8 per cent) compared to residents living in formal areas (16.8 per cent) 
(p < 0.001). Although the VPUU intervention was more concentrated in 
formal rather than informal areas, the significantly lower prevalence of 
severe interpersonal violence among residents exposed to the intervention 
was observed in both formal and informal areas. Residents in informal 
areas were at significantly lower risk of severe interpersonal violence if they 
were exposed to the intervention than if they lived outside the intervention 
area (16.6 per cent vs 25.6 per cent; p < 0.001). Similarly, in formal areas, 
people living within the intervention area experienced less severe interper-
sonal violence than those outside the area (13.5 per cent vs 20.2 per cent; 
p < 0.001).
Signs and symptoms of depression
Overall, 13.9 per cent of residents were considered to be exhibiting signs 
and symptoms of depression. Outside the intervention area, 16.3 per cent 
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Figure 3.3 Experience of severe violence by proximity to VPUU intervention.
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of respondents reported signs and symptoms of depression, which was 
significantly higher than the 10.6 per cent reported by the exposed popula-
tion (p < 0.001) (see Figures 3.4 and 3.5). Prevalence of depression was 
similar among men and women (13.1 per cent and 14.0 per cent, respec-
tively). Among women, there was a significantly lower prevalence of 
depression in the intervention area compared to outside the area (10.9 per 
cent vs 16.2 per cent; p < 0.001), whereas the lower prevalence of depres-
sion among men living in the intervention area compared to outside the 
area was not statistically significant (11.0 per cent vs 14.8 per cent; 
p = 0.165).
 Prevalence of depression was similar in formal and informal areas: 15.0 
per cent of residents living in informal areas and 12.9 per cent of residents 
living in formal areas showed signs and symptoms of depression 
(p = 0.068). In formal intervention areas, residents were significantly less 
likely to show signs and symptoms of depression (9.9 per cent) than resi-
dents living in formal, control areas (16.0 per cent) (p < 0.001). In informal 
areas, residents residing within the intervention area also had a lower pre-
valence of depression (11.8 per cent) than residents living outside the inter-
vention area (16.5 per cent) (p = 0.014).
Figure 3.4 Symptoms of depression by neighbourhood within Khayelitsha.
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Satisfaction with neighbourhood infrastructure
Overall, just 22.4 per cent of residents were satisfied with the range of 
infrastructure and services in their neighbourhoods, but residents were 
significantly more satisfied if they lived within the intervention area (27.0 
per cent vs 19.1 per cent; p < 0.001). Gender was not identified as an inde-
pendent determinant of satisfaction with infrastructure; approximately 21 
per cent of both men and women reported satisfaction with services 
(p = 0.92). Among both male and female respondents there was signifi-
cantly more satisfaction with services within the VPUU intervention area 
compared to those outside it (24.8 per cent vs 17.5 per cent of men and 
24.7 per cent vs 17.8 per cent of women, respectively; p < 0.001 for all 
comparisons).
 Overall, living in formal areas was significantly associated with satisfac-
tion with neighbourhood infrastructure (see Figures 3.6 and 3.7): residents 
living in informal areas were significantly less likely to be satisfied with 
infrastructure than those living in formal areas (10.1 per cent vs 33.2 per 
cent; p < 0.001). Within formal areas, residents were significantly more 
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Figure 3.5 Depression by proximity to VPUU intervention.
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likely to report satisfaction if they lived within the intervention area (36.8 
per cent vs 29.4 per cent; p = 0.001). However, there was no statistical 
difference in the level of satisfaction among residents living in informal 
areas when comparing those in and outside the intervention area (8.6 per 
cent vs 10.7 per cent; p = 0.167). It should be noted that because VPUU 
was primarily involved in the upgrading of infrastructure in the public 
space, it had considerably less influence on overall infrastructure in 
informal settlements, which were mainly residential and where the local 
municipality was the primary service delivery agent.
Community participation
Overall, 46.3 per cent of residents were considered ‘active’ participants in 
their community (i.e. were actively involved in two or more community 
groups). Residents outside the intervention area were significantly more 
likely to be active participants than residents within the intervention area 
(50.7 per cent vs 40.0 per cent; p < 0.001). Women tended to be more 
Figure 3.6 Satisfaction with infrastructure by neighbourhood within Khayelitsha.
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involved in community activities than men, but not significantly so (46.5 
per cent vs 43.8 per cent; p = 0.224) and they were significantly more likely 
to participate in community activities if they lived outside the intervention 
area (50.9 per cent vs 40.1 per cent; p < 0.001). Men were also more likely 
to participate if they lived outside the intervention area (47.8 per cent vs 
38.5 per cent; p < 0.021).
 Levels of community participation were generally higher in informal 
areas than in formal areas (48.6 per cent vs 44.0 per cent; p = 0.006). The 
higher participation levels observed outside the intervention area were con-
sistent in both informal areas (40.9 per cent vs 52.2 per cent; p < 0.001) 
and formal areas (48.8 per cent vs 39.5 per cent; p < 0.001) (see Figures 3.8 
and 3.9).
 In interpreting the community participation findings, it is important 
to note that the measure of community participation in this analysis is a 
composite of several different activities. The rationale for participation 
in voluntary organisations (security- related or otherwise) vs private 
interest groups (such as sports organisations) could be very different, 
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Figure 3.7 Satisfaction with infrastructure by proximity to VPUU intervention.
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and conflating these activities into a single participation measure might 
not be appropriate.
 It could be argued that VPUU would impact all forms of participation 
(e.g. sports clubs through improved infrastructure and church or book 
clubs by improving mobility and strengthening opportunities for inter-
actions and social networks). However, it is more likely that any com-
munity participation effect from VPUU would be concentrated within the 
designated SNAs and would be focused on participation in voluntary 
organisations and voluntary security- related activities, particularly neigh-
bourhood patrols.
 The 2 km distance- based exposure used in the current analysis did not 
take into account the differential exposure of households within the SNA 
to these VPUU activities, which may have diluted any possible effect. 
Figure 3.9 is instructive in that within the area exposed to the VPUU infra-
structure (as defined by the 2 km boundary), the areas within the demar-
cated SNAs appear to have relatively higher community participation 
scores.
Figure 3.8 Community participation by neighbourhood within Khayelitsha.
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 In addition, there is emerging evidence that, in low- income contexts, 
community participation may be negatively associated with mental health, 
particularly for those from a relatively privileged socioeconomic position 
(Lloyd 2017). In this volume, Barolsky and Borges (Chapter 5) allude to 
the association between certain negative communitarian forms of com-
munity participation that are associated with interpersonal violence. This 
does seem evident when we compare areas with high levels of community 
participation (Figure 3.9) and those that experience high levels of interper-
sonal violence (Figure 3.2). Further analysis is required to understand the 
effect of the intervention on different forms of participation separately, 
and which forms of participation are in fact desirable in terms of strength-
ening communities and building social cohesion.
Social cohesion
Social cohesion was the only non- binary outcome and was recorded only 
in the 2015 survey. We used a narrow measure of social cohesion that 
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Figure 3.9 Community participation by proximity to VPUU intervention.
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evaluated four separate questions pertaining to interpersonal connections 
that provided a continuous score from 0 to 20. The mean score was 11.7. 
In an ethnographic study of the intervention area, Barolsky (2016) cau-
tioned that the VPUU intervention’s attempts to formalise the urban space, 
while beneficial, might disrupt complex social networks by not fully utilis-
ing community resources and conceptions of social solidarity.
 Using our measure of social cohesion, we could not find any empirical 
evidence to support this hypothesis in the overall sample, nor among male 
or female heads of households, nor in formal or informal areas, according 
to our measure (see Figures 3.10 and 3.11). We found, overall, that resi-
dents living within the intervention area had higher social cohesion scores 
than residents living outside the intervention area (average scores 12.0 vs 
11.4; p = 0.004). Among females, there was a positive, but again not signi-
ficant, association between social cohesion and proximity to the interven-
tion compared to other areas (average scores 11.9 vs 11.4; p = 0.017), with 
similar levels recorded among males (average scores 12.0 vs 11.3; 
p = 0.117). There were no significant differences in average social cohesion 
scores when comparing female with male respondents (average scores 11.7 
vs 11.6; p = 0.765).
Figure 3.10 Social cohesion by neighbourhood within Khayelitsha.
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 Residents living in formal areas had significantly, but modestly, higher 
average social cohesion scores than residents living in informal areas 
(average scores 11.9 vs 11.4; p = 0.002). A modest positive association 
between the intervention and higher levels of social cohesion was also found 
in the informal areas. Residents in informal areas living within the interven-
tion area had higher social cohesion scores than residents of informal areas 
living outside the intervention area (average scores 12.0 vs 11.1; p < 0.001). 
In formal areas, social cohesion scores were similar between residents that 
lived close to the intervention and those that lived further away (average 
scores 12.0 vs 11.9; p = 0.762) (see Figures 3.10 and 3.11).
 It may well be that the intervention could be improved through a more 
nuanced understanding of the pathways to enhance social cohesion. 
However, this initial analysis indicates that, far from the VPUU interven-
tion having a negative impact because of its disruption of pre- existing non- 
Western communitarian forms of social cohesion, VPUU is either a 
beneficial addition to social cohesion or it is at least unlikely to be part of 
a zero- sum context between indigenous and colonially imposed dimensions 
of social cohesion.
9 10 11 12 13
Not exposed (n = 376) 
Exposed (n = 194) 
Not exposed (n = 305) 
Exposed (n = 317) 
Not exposed (n = 521) 
Exposed (n = 397) 
Not exposed (n = 128) 
Exposed (n = 87) 
Not exposed (n = 681) 






















Figure 3.11 Social cohesion by proximity to VPUU intervention.
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 One further aspect in relation to Barolsky’s (2016) work that we were 
able to address was the relationship between social cohesion and violence, 
in respect of which there is limited empirical research in South Africa. In 
our 2015 survey, residents that reported experiencing severe interpersonal 
violence had significantly lower social cohesion scores than those who did 
not experience severe interpersonal violence (average scores 11.0 vs 11.9; 
p < 0.001). This association leads to the thesis that increased social cohe-
sion may reduce violence, or vice versa. What remains to be tested is 
whether the lower prevalence of exposure to severe violence in the inter-
vention area results from the effect of the intervention on interpersonal 
violence directly or through the mechanism of improved social cohesion.
Conclusion
Two programmatic interventions in South Africa have already been shown 
to be effective in reducing violence through strong study designs: Stepping 
Stones, an HIV prevention programme promoting safer sexual behaviour 
among youth (Jewkes et al. 2006), and IMAGE, a microfinance interven-
tion for the prevention of intimate- partner violence (Pronyk et al. 2006). 
Notwithstanding these positive developments, programmatic interventions 
face challenges with replication and scale- up. There remains a need to 
develop the evidence base for more complex interventions and passive 
structural interventions that address the urban space, given the prominence 
of such initiatives in policy documents.
 In this study, comparison between households exposed versus those not 
exposed to the VPUU intervention area suggests a positive association 
between living in proximity (within 2 km) of the VPUU intervention and 
three of the five social outcomes: experience of violence, signs and symp-
toms of depression, and satisfaction with neighbourhood infrastructure. 
For social cohesion, scores were, on average, similar in intervention and 
non- intervention households, although slightly higher in the intervention 
area. There was a significant negative association between the intervention 
and community participation, but the nature of this participation and 
whether, as defined, it can be considered a characteristic with positive com-
munity impact is unclear. The findings were broadly consistent for both 
genders and for households in formal and informal areas.
 In interpreting the statistical significance of comparisons between 
groups, the magnitude of the differences in outcomes must be considered. 
For most comparisons, these were modest. For violence and depression, 
the difference in prevalence between exposed versus unexposed households 
was approximately 5 per cent. For community participation, the difference 
in prevalence between exposed and unexposed households was also 
approximately 5 per cent, but in the opposite direction. For infrastructure 
satisfaction, the difference in prevalence between exposed and unexposed 
households was approximately 9 per cent. For social cohesion (measured 
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on a scale of 1 to 20), the difference in mean scores between households 
inside versus outside the intervention area was 0.5.
 These initial findings corroborate the positive effects of infrastructural 
and urban upgrading interventions such as VPUU and provide evidence to 
support recent policy developments that foreground environmental inter-
ventions. However, it should be noted that, except for the stratification by 
gender and formal versus informal areas, we have presented an unadjusted 
analysis that does not account for other independent factors known to 
influence these outcomes and which may also be associated with VPUU 
exposure. The findings could well be reflective of other differences across 
the exposure groups. Further analyses should also consider and adjust for 
potential confounding.
 We also recognise the limitations of some of the simple binary measures 
and scores that we used to parsimoniously describe multiple outcomes and 
which may have diluted the estimate of the intervention effect. For 
example, our use of a binary exposure based on proximity to the interven-
tion does not take into account more complex urban geography. Residents 
considered to be within the area of influence of the intervention may in 
fact have limited access due to the nature of road, rail, and pedestrian 
infrastructure. Investigation of the impact of VPUU could be enhanced 
through further analysis using more complex geoinformatic methods. In 
addition, the intervention area was defined based on proximity to the 
VPUU built environment and did not take exposure to VPUU social pro-
gramming into account, which may also influence outcomes. We did not 
consider the cost implications of the intervention in this analysis, but note 
that replicating and scaling- up programmatic interventions in under- 
resourced contexts is also challenging and costly.
 All of these aspects can be addressed through more complex multivariable 
analyses of each outcome. However, the study consists of a series of post- 
VPUU intervention cross- sections and therefore cannot address temporal 
aspects of cause and effect. For example, areas in Khayelitsha within 2 km of 
the intervention that have ostensibly benefitted from the intervention may 
always have been safer and more habitable. Alternatively, increased popula-
tion density in the intervention area may also have caused a reduction in 
crime. Both these hypotheses would need to be tested through the analysis of 
longitudinal data that investigates risk prior to and after the intervention and 
measures possible displacement of violence to other areas.
 The approach utilised in this chapter to evaluate the VPUU intervention 
could be applied to assess whether other large- scale infrastructure projects 
have a positive effect on social and health outcomes. This would provide 
further insight into the potential causal mechanisms through which inter-
ventions such as VPUU impact violent crime and other outcomes, whether 
any effect is due to the explicit inclusion of crime prevention through 
environmental design principles, or whether it is the infrastructure expend-
iture alone that matters. If there is indeed a benefit for multiple outcomes 
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at a population level, then it would seem the approach adopted by VPUU 
is worthy of consideration.
Notes
1 The VPUU methodology emphasises community participation and ownership. 
Once the boundaries of a SNA have been defined, all developments are preceded 
by a social compact, developed in consultation with community representatives 
and an elected representative body.
2 Fieldworker quality control revealed inconsistent conceptualisation by field-
workers and residents with the result that some muggings, in which people were 
threatened but not injured, were incorrectly recorded as “petty theft” instead of 
robbery.
3 Examples include xenophobic or homophobic assaults.
4 We also defined a measure for “any violence” reflecting a resident’s experience 
of one or more of the following incidents in the previous year: assault (without a 
weapon), murder, rape, robbery, arson, car hijacking, discrimination- based viol-
ence, drug- related violence, gang- related violence, community justice, domestic 
violence, and petty theft. Overall 32.5 per cent of residents experienced some 
form of violence, and the findings were broadly consistent irrespective of our 
choice of definition for experience of violence.
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4 Towards safer communities
The impact of the Community 
Work Programme on the prevention 
of urban violence in South Africa
Malose Langa, Themba Masuku, and 
Hugo van der Merwe
Introduction
Despite investing heavily in strengthening the criminal justice system over 
the last decade, levels of crime and violence are still high in South Africa. 
While extensive attention has been given to the role of police and the 
courts in curbing violent crime, social violence prevention strategies that 
show great potential, such as the Community Work Programme (CWP), 
have not been acknowledged or prioritised in addressing this problem.
 The rates of crime and violence in South Africa are among the highest in 
the world. For example, the latest 2016–2017 crime statistics show an 
increase in the most significant categories of violent crime in South Africa: 
the murder rate has shown a steady increase over the last five years from a 
low of 15,554 murders in 2011–2012 to 19,016 in 2016–2017. This 
means the murder rate in South Africa is 34.1 murders per 100,000 people 
(Africa Check 2017), about five times the global average.
 Other categories of crime and violence in South Africa, such as rape and 
violent public protests, are also significantly higher than in countries across 
the globe. This general high crime rate is taking place within the context of 
increased political and social tensions, and is manifest in attacks against 
foreign nationals and protests against poor delivery of basic services in 
low- income communities.
 Against this backdrop, the Centre for the Study of Violence and 
Reconciliation (CSVR) undertook a study in six urban areas in the vicini-
ties of Johannesburg and Cape Town to examine the impact of the CWP 
in preventing violence. The CWP is a government initiative under the 
aegis of the Department of Cooperative Governance and Traditional 
Affairs (COGTA), which was designed to provide “an employment safety 
net” to unemployed people by offering them regular work two days each 
week, totalling 100 days per year. In 2015, at the time of the study, 
general CWP participants were earning R700 (approximately US$50) per 
month and their coordinators were earning R2,000 (US$140) per month. 
Towards safer communities  91
In terms of the programme’s scope, any unemployed South African 
citizen over the age of 18 is eligible to join the CWP.
 The research consisted mainly of individual and focus group interviews 
with CWP participants and coordinators, police, councillors, and other 
local stakeholders regarding the impact of the CWP in preventing urban 
violence. The study engaged intensively with the CWP in six diverse com-
munities, namely, Ivory Park, Orange Farm, and Kagiso (situated in 
Gauteng Province); Bokfontein (North West Province); and Grabouw and 
Mannenberg (Western Cape).
 The initial part of the chapter explains the inception and implementation 
of the CWP and provides a practical illustration of how the programme 
operates. It then reflects on the various avenues through which these activ-
ities may directly and indirectly impact on the present high levels of violence 
and crime experienced by these communities. We argue that the CWP, as a 
state- sponsored employment programme, has the (partially realised) poten-
tial to contribute to the prevention of urban violence in South Africa, and 
that this experience holds important lessons for other countries.
The inception and development of CWP within the 
South African context
The CWP emerged against the backdrop of a number of social problems, 
which include high levels of poverty and lack of employment opportun-
ities. The official unemployment rate in South Africa is estimated to be at 
27.6 per cent (Statistics South Africa 2017). The expanded unemployment 
rate which includes those who wanted to work but did not look for work 
rose to 36.8 per cent in 2017 (Reuters 2017).
 Urban townships and informal settlements are particularly prone to high 
unemployment rates. Urban poverty, combined with extreme inequality, a 
legacy of apartheid political repression, and many other factors have given rise 
to various social ills, including HIV/AIDS, violent crime, alcoholism, gang 
violence, family violence, etc. (Seedat et al. 2009; Ratele 2013). Against this 
backdrop, in 2006–2007, the Office of the Presidency initiated various pro-
grammes aimed at creating job opportunities especially for people who were 
less likely to be employed in the formal sector, which seek people with specific 
skills and qualifications. According to one of the key CWP architects, the strat-
egies were part of a programme to “address structural inequality, to restruc-
ture the economy and put South Africa on a new path” (Philip 2007: 8).
 As a result of the high rate of unemployment, various government pro-
grammes were implemented to promote skills development and create 
work opportunities. The Expanded Public Works Programme (EPWP) was 
launched as a poverty- alleviation strategy by providing temporary employ-
ment through involvement in infrastructural and technical projects such as 
building roads, dams, sewerage systems, storm water drains, and bridges 
(Nzimakwe 2008). EPWP participants were provided with 100 days of 
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full- time work within major infrastructure projects run by various govern-
ment departments, mainly the Department of Public Works. The main aim 
of the EPWP was to provide participants with technical skills and training 
in the hope that they would become permanently employed once they had 
completed their involvement (Nzimakwe 2008). Major criticisms made 
against the EPWP were that it provided too few days of work for people to 
learn skills that would sufficiently equip them for permanent formal 
employment, and that the projects were mainly state- driven rather than 
community- driven and -oriented (Nzimakwe 2008).
 In response to these criticisms, the CWP was established in 2007 as a 
pilot project. Like the EPWP, it offers 100 days of part- time work, spread 
over two days a week throughout the year, but the CWP generally extends 
over multiple years, compared to the short- term contracts offered by the 
EPWP. The work to be done through the CWP is selected through a 
partici patory process that identifies “useful work” that the community 
feels will contribute to the public good and improve the community’s 
quality of life, whereas EPWP projects are identified directly by the state.
 Philip (2013) provides positive indications of the effectiveness of the 
CWP in alleviating poverty and unemployment in communities: by 2015, 
186 sites had been established, operating in 140 municipalities across the 
country, with approximately 1,000 participants per site (COGTA 2015: 
4). In his State of the Nation Address in January 2016, President Jacob 
Zuma asserted that the state aims to increase CWP participants to one 
million. The CWP is not intended as a provider of permanent employment 
but rather as an “employment safety net” while people are still searching 
for permanent job opportunities (Philip 2013). However, the reality is that 
many stay in the programme over multiple years.
 Participants work at a community level to provide a wide range of social 
services, which vary from one site to the next. They include: early child-
hood support, maintaining community gardens that grow food for indigent 
families, care for the elderly and the sick, and street cleaning. Additionally, 
some of the projects are directly focused on addressing local safety con-
cerns. For instance:
•  conducting community patrols of crime hotspots
•  cutting long grass to create safer living environments
•  recruiting ex- offenders into the project as part of the reintegration 
strategy
•  organising campaigns against crime
•  providing education and support for substance abuse
•  assisting victims of domestic violence.
The CWP was not developed as a violence prevention programme but, as our 
research demonstrates, it presents a viable strategy to prevent violence in com-
munities through addressing the underlying and direct causes of violence. This 
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was confirmed in the individual and focus group interviews that CSVR 
researchers conducted with ward councillors, police officers, community 
police forum leaders, police officials, school principals, NGO representatives, 
and CWP representatives (participants, coordinators, facilitators, and site staff 
members). Interviews with all these participants were wide- ranging, covering 
the history of the CWP, its recruitment processes/identification of potential 
participants, and the community projects undertaken to prevent violence.
 This chapter seeks to illustrate how various initiatives taken by CWP 
participants are contributing to violence prevention. It will also serve to 
illuminate how the violence prevention potential of these projects could be 
upscaled. The limitations of these initiatives will also be discussed, particu-
larly the gender dynamics that impact on their effectiveness.
Impact of CWP in violence prevention initiatives
As discussed earlier, crime and violence are major concerns for many South 
African communities. So it is not surprising that some of the projects initi-
ated by the CWP participants were aimed at reducing the crime and viol-
ence in their communities. Examples of various crime and violence 
prevention initiatives through CWP are outlined below.
Cutting grass and community patrols
Crime surveys in South Africa show that common street robberies, which 
involve personal possessions being taken through the threat or use of force, 
are the most frequent everyday experience of crime in many urban settings 
that shape people’s sense of safety (Bruce 2010). These robberies are influ-
enced by environmental factors such as streetlights or long grass where perpet-
rators can easily hide. Given these concerns about common street robberies, 
one of the key activities in which CWP participants engaged in many urban 
settings involved cutting the long grass in “crime hot spots” where people 
have been attacked (Bruce 2015b). According to Bruce (2015b), this is an 
example of “environmental” work done by CWP participants that has a safety 
focus; it aims to create a safe environment so people can walk freely in open 
spaces that are generally considered to be unsafe and dangerous. Cleaning the 
environment and engaging with local governmental authorities to fix street 
lights created some safety within these spaces. Local residents interviewed 
asserted that the cutting of long grass has significantly increased their safety.
This corner used to have a lot of trees and very long grass. You see, 
criminals will hide there at night and take people’s bags when they 
come from work, and then run into those bushes. We now, as CWP, 
decided to clean that rubbish. The area is clean and there is no more 
crime. We cleaned that place as CWP.
(Individual interview with CWP participant)
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We clean parks.… We cleaned this other bridge where street boys used 
to stay and rob people. We have patrollers in that place when people 
come from the train so that no one takes their bags.
(Individual interview with CWP participant)
 In addition to cleaning the environment, CWP participants were also 
involved in patrols to make streets safer, especially at night and in the early 
hours of the morning when many common street robberies occur. It was 
reported in the interviews that the presence of community patrollers on the 
street discouraged people from participating in crime.
People used to get mugged in the mornings. And then we’d patrol there 
… at 6:00. [From 7:00 to 8:00] we would go to the schools to escort 
children.… We would go back at 12:00 until 15:00 when children go 
back home.… They’d fight each other, but when they see us, they 
would not fight.… Their mothers were happy when they see us stand-
ing guard there to make sure the children are safe.… So people were 
happy, even my neighbours were happy. And when we were not there 
they would complain.
(Group interview with CWP patrollers)
People rely on community patrollers for their own safety in this com-
munity. Criminals know us that we patrol the streets to stop crime.
(Individual interview with a CWP patroller)
 In some communities, CWP patrollers also accompany children on their 
way to and from school to protect them from being victims of crime or car 
accidents (Bruce 2015a). In areas where there is a clash between gangs, the 
CWP members ensure that children are taken off the streets. CWP particip-
ants played this role to ensure the safety of children in Manenberg, a town-
ship in Cape Town characterised by high levels of gang violence. After an 
intensification of gang violence in Manenberg in 2014, the CWP site man-
agement initiated a campaign against it. Several marches took place under 
the banner “Take Back Our Streets” (Mullagee and Bruce 2015). Although 
gang violence remains a critical problem in this community, many inform-
ants interviewed asserted that these public campaigns help in raising 
awareness about crime and violence in Manenberg.
At the moment the campaign is only between 5:00 and 6:00 p.m. We 
want to increase our time on the road, but people are scared of what 
might happen to them if they stay out late.
(Group interview with CWP participants)
The visibility of the CWP- initiated “Take Back Our Streets” campaign 
increased both inside and outside the community as it gained 
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 momentum. Every Wednesday evening, there were marches against 
gang violence.
(Group interview with CWP participants)
 The CWP participants often work closely with the police and other law 
enforcement officials, including community policing forums. In the 
Western Cape, some of them receive training provided by the provincial 
Department of Community Safety. In Orange Farm, a township on the 
outskirts of Johannesburg, CPW participants worked closely with the 
police to address the problem of domestic violence. In the context of 
increasing levels of crime and violence in South Africa, police stations were 
mandated to establish a Victim Empowerment Programme (VEP) to 
support victims of crime and violence in avoiding secondary victimisation. 
The CWP participants’ work on this project involves providing basic coun-
selling to survivors of domestic violence. They also help survivors obtain 
protection orders by assisting them in completing the necessary paperwork 
and accompanying them to court to file their cases. CWP participants also 
work with local organisations that assist abused women. Their long- term 
goal is to ensure that their VEP service is provided 24 hours a day, espe-
cially on the weekends, as many cases of domestic violence occur due to 
heavy drinking during this period.
 In addition to the direct assistance provided to victims, public cam-
paigns are held by CWP participants involved in the VEP to raise aware-
ness about domestic violence in Orange Farm. These public campaigns are 
conducted in collaboration with the police and other local organisations. 
The campaigns acknowledge that although women are more often victims 
of domestic violence, men are also encouraged to seek help if they are in 
abusive relationships. This is in line with the emerging literature that it is 
important for campaigns opposing domestic violence to include men as 
victims, rather than to simply treat them as potential perpetrators of 
domestic violence (Sathiparsad 2008).
Ex- offenders and anti- crime initiatives
In South Africa, it is estimated that close to 6,000 offenders are released 
from various correctional facilities each month, either through parole or 
completion of their sentences (Muntingh 2008). It is hoped that upon their 
release many will no longer engage in criminal activities. However, due to 
the lack of dedicated interventions aimed at facilitating their reintegration, 
many ex- offenders re- offend and return to prison. Currently, there are no 
reliable statistics on recidivism in South Africa, but it is estimated to be 
high (Gaum, Hoffman, and Venter 2006). Many ex- offenders face chal-
lenges in finding employment, increasing their risk of re- offending and 
returning to jail (Muntingh 2008). At some sites, such as Manenberg, 
Orange Farm, and Ivory Park, ex- offenders were recruited to participate in 
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the CWP. Being able to join the CWP facilitated their reintegration into the 
community and decreased their risk of re- offending.
Going [to] prison was [easier] than coming out of prison. In prison 
there are many programmes that are provided and I am glad that I 
received a lot of training while in prison. I am now a qualified chef 
and can prepare a variety of dishes and menus. The biggest problem is 
finding a job with a criminal record; it’s not easy, my brother … I am 
lucky to be in the CWP soon after I came out of prison.
(Individual interview with an ex- offender working in the CWP)
Believe me, my friend, I would not be here if it was not for CWP. I 
would be back at jail but I can say CWP has saved [me].
(Individual interview with an ex- offender working in the CWP)
 Ex- offenders in Orange Farm and Ivory Park have also been involved in 
activities with a specific crime prevention focus such as going into local 
schools to encourage young people to stay away from criminal involve-
ment. They use their own life stories as examples to others (especially 
youth) that “crime is not good” and that “crime does not pay”.
We want to spread a message that crime is not good.… We have public 
anti- crime campaigns.… We tell [young people] as ex- offenders 
because we know that crime is not good.
(Group interview with CWP ex- offenders)
With crime prevention programmes in CWP, we have a project 
whereby we motivate young people [in and out of school] not to do 
crime and drugs.
(Group interview with CWP ex- offenders)
Uggen and Staff (2001) argue that the involvement of ex- offenders in 
various community projects can be a “turning point” in their lives, moti-
vating them not to reoffend. Bruce (2015c) contends that involvement in 
community work hastens ex- offenders’ reintegration into society and 
enables them to resist returning to a life of crime. It was also evident from 
the interviews that ex- offenders saw their involvement in the CWP as 
positive, giving meaning to their lives through the work they were doing in 
schools and the wider community. Other campaigns by ex- offenders 
included public campaigns aimed at preventing substance abuse among 
youth.
 However, other studies (Petrosino, Turpin- Petrosino, and Finckenauer 
2000; Petrosino, Turpin- Petrosino, and Buehler 2013) have questioned the 
effectiveness of awareness raising campaigns about the risks associated 
with crime. These studies argue that campaigns, such as Scared Straight in 
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the USA, have been found to be ineffective in deterring young people from 
involvement in criminal activity. Despite reviews questioning their effec-
tiveness, these campaigns still remain popular. Follow- up interviews and 
detailed studies still need to be done on the effectiveness of the CWP and 
its prevention of violence, but preliminary findings show that it is effective 
in providing ex- offenders with an opportunity to reintegrate into society 
and play a constructive role in assisting other youth to avoid risk- taking 
behaviour.
Gender dynamics in the CWP
The majority of participants at all CWP sites are women. From April 2014 
to March 2015, there were 202,599 participants at 186 CWP sites across 
South Africa. Of this total, 75 per cent were women, and 42 per cent of 
those were women over 35 years of age. Women represent the majority of 
coordinators, office staff, and participants at all the CWP sites (Brankovic 
2016). Men represented 25 per cent of CWP participants during the same 
period, with 13 per cent of total participants being men over the age of 35 
(Brankovic 2016).
 A number of reasons were advanced to explain why there are fewer men 
in the CWP than women. These include the issue of male pride and differ-
ences in the approaches that men and women have to the low wages paid 
by the CWP.
A lot of men refuse to join the CWP because they say that the money 
is too little. However, for most women even if the money is little we 
are able to persevere and make it work. Other men are full of pride 
and refuse to work for little money or be associated with a poverty 
relief project.
(Focus group interview with CWP participants)
This is a very difficult job for many men to do. It is not easy for a man 
to be seen working in a poverty relief project and earn the kind of 
money that we earn.… Men would rather try other means like looking 
for piece jobs and marketing themselves elsewhere in order to get 
better- paying jobs. Just look at my group here—I have only 3 men out 
of 30 people. As you can see, the men that are working are very old 
and no longer have stamina to take on difficult jobs.… It’s difficult for 
unemployed younger men who still have school- going children to enrol 
in the programme also because money will definitely not be enough to 
sustain the family.
(Focus group interview with CWP participants)
 Interviews with male participants provided a different set of reasons as 
to why so few men join the CWP programme, despite the fact that many 
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are unemployed. The most common reason given was the lack of financial 
security in the CWP.
It’s difficult for unemployed young men to join the CWP because the 
money we get is pathetic. Not many men who have huge responsibil-
ities of raising children would be keen to work for R71 [about 
US$5.75] per day. Most men believe that working for CWP is a waste 
of their time because they can make more money per day than CWP 
participants make in a month. I mean it’s easier to say men don’t want 
to work hard but the reality is that the CWP income is very little if you 
have [the] responsibilities of raising children.
(Focus group interview with CWP participants)
Another male respondent concurred:
I personally think that it is not that men are lazy or don’t want to 
work hard, it is because the money is very little. Remember that when 
this project was introduced, we were the first people to join the CWP 
and there were many men who joined the programme but left because 
we were promised permanent jobs but that never happened.…
(Individual interview with a male CWP participant)
 The reasons for women joining the CWP were generally different from 
those of men, although both emphasised the issue of providing food 
security to their families. Many women who were interviewed had never 
worked before and had opened a bank account for the first time when they 
joined the CWP. For these women, being part of the CWP gives them an 
income, ensuring that they are able to raise their children and be financi-
ally independent of their partners. Many women in the CWP have young 
children and some receive a child support grant from the government. As 
men are not eligible for such grants, they have fewer options to supplement 
their CWP income. As a result, men’s income is relatively low compared to 
that of some of the women they work with in the CWP. It is possible that 
this impacts men’s sense of masculinity, as men traditionally associate 
work with a particular social status and the ability to support their family 
by being the primary breadwinner (Hunter 2006).
 Some CWP participants suggested that men fear they will be ridiculed 
or lose social status if they participate in the programme. This is partly 
because some men feel the CWP is not a “real” job, as men tend to associ-
ate work with going to the factories five days per week and working under 
highly demanding conditions. This point is well illustrated by Catherine 
Campbell (1992) in her work on men in the mines who link their work 
underground with constructions of hegemonic masculinity. According to 
Campbell (1992), it is in these diamond and gold mines that “masculinity 
emerged as a master narrative”. The masculine identity was then developed 
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as an enduring symbol of bravery, strength, and hard work. It is possible 
that men may consider CWP work to be too feminine.
Men stay at home—they feel “what are people going to say?” if they 
work here. But women do not care.
(Individual interview with CWP participant)
Men think a real job is about going to the firms and working the 
whole week.
(Individual interview with CWP participant)
 One CWP senior representative suggested that opportunities should be 
created within the programme for men to learn new technical skills, such 
as welding and plumbing. It was implied that learning these skills would 
make men more interested in the programme as it would facilitate their 
employability beyond the CWP, and that such technical skills would 
connect with their sense of masculinity. It is also possible that some men 
are uncomfortable with the idea of working in the CWP as they regard 
work involving vegetable gardening, home- based care, and early childhood 
projects as “women’s work”. In terms of gender roles, these activities are 
traditionally reserved for women and considered emasculating for men. It 
is therefore important that men’s lack of participation in the CWP is seen 
within the context of the kind of work that the CWP does. This raises the 
question of whether men would participate in the CWP in greater numbers 
if the nature of the work changed.
 On the other hand, the CWP does empower women economically and 
socially. There is, however, emerging evidence that some men feel disem-
powered when their female partners are the main breadwinners in the house-
hold while they are not able to contribute anything financially due to their 
unemployed status. It has been suggested that this may increase the risk of 
domestic violence (Bruce 2015a; Brankovic 2016). However, the benefits of 
women being part of the CWP outweigh these risks. Female participants 
value their participation, the support they receive through the CWP, and the 
new skills that they acquire in the programme (Brankovic 2016).
Policy implications of CWP in preventing violence
There are many policy implications for the CWP. The impact of the CWP 
on violence can be examined in relation to the various underlying and 
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In addition, the way that the CWP is implemented—through community 
participation in its design, collaborative inclusive implementation across 
divisions in a community, and through building agency in a local 
 community—serves as a key contributor to building community cohesion 
and local capacity to address social problems. A strong example of the 
success that can result from a CWP comes from Bokfontein, a community 
created when the citizens of two communities were evicted and relocated 
in 2005–2006. The formation of a CWP in Bokfontein brought harmony 
and peace to the relationships between the citizens of the original two 
communities, including the absence of xenophobic violence (Langa and 
von Holdt 2011).
 A common CWP initiative involves the provision of early childhood ser-
vices. The existing literature shows that early childhood programmes can 
serve as a violence prevention mechanism. For example, a study conducted 
by Berk (2001) proved that children who have attended early childhood 
centres have higher self- esteem. This self- confidence helps children to resist 
peer pressure to engage in risk- taking behaviours such as crime and viol-
ence (Berk 2001). Peer pressure works easily on children who are in dire 
need of love and approval from friends or others. Research in this area 
shows that early childhood programmes can play an important role in pre-
venting violence. At a policy level, it is therefore important that early child-
hood services are made compulsory for all children in South Africa as this 
may help children to develop cognitively, socially, and psychologically.
 For many participants, the CWP contributes to economic inclusion. 
Ordinarily many people would not be doing useful community work if it 
was not for CWP. The CWP provides participants with some training/skills 
and facilitates their economic inclusion, despite the fact that the money is 
modest. Some participants asserted that they are able to use these meagre 
resources to cover basic needs. At a policy level, attempts need to be made 
to try and recruit young men to social programmes such as CWP. This may 
help to reduce crime and violence. Many research studies (Newburn and 
Stanko 1994; Newburn and Shiner 2006) have shown that young people 
are more likely to be involved in criminal activities. The CWP may also be 
used as a space in which to provide mentorship about what it means to be 
a young male in the new South Africa, and to identify opportunities that 
these young men may explore rather than resorting to crime and using 
drugs.
 The CWP facilitates the development of social cohesion through various 
processes, which in turn play a role in violence prevention. Before the 
inception of the CWP in the six communities studied, many community 
members did not know one another despite living in the same neighbour-
hood. The inception of the CWP facilitated the process of participants 
getting to know one another, which served as the first step towards them 
working together to assist their community members. The spirit of togeth-
erness and oneness is a key element in the CWP’s work. For example, CWP 
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participants meet once or twice a week to discuss work to be undertaken 
in the community. These weekly meetings enhance social relations and the 
spirit of collegiality among community members. In addition, CWP parti-
cipants are typically organised to work in teams. Generally, the CWP 
appears to foster a high level of cohesion among community members, 
drawing participants from different neighbourhoods to work together for 
the betterment of their communities. At a policy level, the CWP may assist 
in bringing social cohesion, peace, and reconciliation to communities if 
implemented in an inclusive and participatory manner.
Concluding remarks
It is important to recall that the CWP was not specifically intended to be a 
crime- and violence- prevention programme when the government con-
ceived it. However, given the ways that safety concerns have been priori-
tised by local communities, the CWP has framed local projects so as to 
directly address the causes of violence and it has the potential to play an 
expanded role in this arena. In communities that have been torn apart by 
violence and conflict (both political and interpersonal), the CWP offers a 
model for restoring agency to a community to address its priority concerns 
in a way that builds social cohesion and restores the capacity to act collec-
tively to address violence.
 It is, however, important to acknowledge that the effectiveness of the 
CWP differs from one community to another, depending on how it is imple-
mented. In the sites studied, the programme’s success depended entirely on 
the participants’ commitment to implementing violence prevention initi-
atives. Some policy impact has been made through this work and the gov-
ernment now acknowledges that the CWP does have the potential to prevent 
violence in communities, as shown through our work and the policy briefs 
we have written (see Bruce 2015b, 2015c; Brankovic 2016; Langa 2017).
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5 Is social cohesion the missing link 
in preventing violence?
Case studies from South Africa 
and Brazil
Vanessa Barolsky and Doriam Borges
Introduction
This chapter constitutes a comparative investigation of the role of two 
major violence prevention interventions in South Africa and Brazil in 
building social cohesion and collective efficacy based on ethnographic 
studies of these programmes. Violence Prevention through Urban Upgrad-
ing (VPUU) was implemented in the township of Khayelitsha in Cape 
Town, South Africa, while Pacifying Police Units (known by its Portuguese 
acronym, UPP) was set up in the favelas of Rio de Janeiro, Brazil.
 Social cohesion is a broad concept that has been widely deployed in 
global policy discourse since the 1990s. The South African Presidency has 
described social cohesion as “the factors that hold a society together” (The 
Presidency, Republic of South Africa 2004: iv). These “factors” refer to a 
broad array of social characteristics perceived to contribute to connected-
ness and solidarity within society, including the ties that bind citizens to 
each other and to the state. They encompass questions related to a sense of 
belonging and trust, to the form and extent of cooperation between 
citizens, as well as to shared inclusion in economic and political life.
 Social disorganisation theory posits that local social cohesion or connec-
tivity between citizens is critical to mediating the link between urban dis-
advantage and crime. It argues that social ties, shared norms, and social 
interaction are important because they create informal social controls 
which inhibit “delinquent” behaviour if residents are prepared to collec-
tively intervene for the “common good” (Shaw and McKay 1942; 
Sampson, Raudenbush, and Earls 1997). Collective efficacy investigates 
how social ties can prevent violence when they are translated into col-
lective action at a neighbourhood level through informal social controls. 
Sampson, Raudenbush, and Earls (1997: 918) define collective efficacy as 
“social cohesion among neighbours combined with their willingness to 
intervene on behalf of the common good”.
 Thus far, however, there has been little empirical research or theoretical 
engagement with social cohesion and collective efficacy and their relation-
ship to violence in the specific conditions of the Global South, and even 
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less research about how violence prevention interventions mobilise social 
cohesion in these contexts. Both interventions in this study were broadly 
influenced by theories around social disorganisation which link the spatial 
distribution of crime to concentrated disadvantage in particular urban 
neighbourhoods. Addressing crime is therefore envisaged as involving spa-
tially targeted interventions that also try to change social relations in the 
neighbourhoods where they are implemented.
 Although both programmes were broadly informed by social disorgani-
sation theory, VPUU and UPP implemented what Muggah (2012: ix) has 
categorised as “soft” (voluntary) and “hard” (coercive) approaches, respec-
tively, that attempted to reclaim urban space in different ways. UPP seeks 
to forcibly re- establish state authority in favelas to integrate them into the 
wider city and to reinstate a normative social order without drug traffickers. 
“Softer” approaches such as that used by VPUU seek to restore “order” to 
the urban environment through a variety of urban renewal and upgrading 
initiatives combined with social interventions aimed at changing social and 
economic relations.
 Shaw and McKay’s original Community Action Programme in the 
suburbs of Chicago, based on social disorganisation theory, has been 
described as “a conceptual framework meant to encourage and facilitate 
indigenous social invention” (Schlossman and Sedlak 1983: 428). In their 
subsequent work, building on Shaw and McKay’s original project, Sampson, 
Raudenbush, and Earls (1997: 918) sought to explore this “indigenous” 
capacity by investigating “the effectiveness of informal mechanisms by which 
residents themselves achieve public order”. However, as Warner, Beck, and 
Ohmer (2010: 355) point out, “the humanistic philosophy underlying social 
disorganization theory” that “encouraged the community to develop their 
own solutions to problems and were based primarily on providing social 
support” has been subsequently undermined by interpretations of disorgani-
sation theory that focused on increasing surveillance by communities of anti- 
social conduct and reporting to police. This trend was reflected in the 
interventions that took place in South Africa and Brazil and both struggled 
to make the most effective use of “indigenous social invention”.
 The fieldwork we conducted in South Africa and Brazil revealed the 
diverse roles that violence prevention interventions can play in building the 
type of social cohesion that can have a long- term violence prevention 
effect.
 Our chapter explores how VPUU, a violence prevention intervention co- 
funded by the German Development Bank that seeks to address conditions 
of violence and poverty in Khayelitsha, South Africa, interacted with exist-
ing forms of social relation and organisation. Drawing on international 
development policy discourse, we argue that the intervention was informed 
by a Euro- Amer ican imaginary of a managed society characterised by 
ordered and economised social relations founded on a normative concep-
tion of a formalised city and the economic- rational actor. This conception 
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of the city has been critiqued by a growing body of urban scholars who 
have sought to understand cities in the Global South on their own terms 
rather than evaluating their “failure” against the ideal of the Western city 
(Nuttall and Mbembe 2008; Myers 2011; Pieterse 2011; Roy 2011; Parnell 
and Robinson 2012; Pieterse and Simone 2013). VPUU’s conception of the 
city was profoundly contested by the material reality of informal norms of 
regulation and control in the fluid space of Khayelitsha where “everyday” 
networks often have significant social and symbolic resonance (Tshehla 
2002; Shearing and Wood 2003; Steinberg 2012; Gillespie 2014; Super 
2016). As a result, the role of the intervention in building social cohesion 
and collective efficacy was ambiguous.
 Ethnographic research in two favelas in Rio de Janeiro, Tabajaras/
Cabritos and Cidade de Deus, where the UPP intervention was imple-
mented, similarly showed complex effects in relation to social cohesion. 
We found that, paradoxically, where the intervention was most success-
ful in reducing violence it had the most negative effect on social cohesion. 
In the community of Tabajaras, the reduction of violence brought about 
by the intervention led to a process of gentrification with new residents 
moving into the area, resulting in the decline of existing networks of 
cohesion. In the community of Cidade de Deus, the UPP was not as suc-
cessful in reducing violence as in Tabajaras, while also complicating 
existing forms of cohesion and governance as the police failed to displace 
the drug dealers who were becoming a competing source of authority. At 
the same time, the UPP was perceived to have had a negative effect on 
existing social organisations in the favela as they took over the roles of 
community organisations and appropriated funding previously directed 
to them.
Methodology
An ethnographic methodology was used in this research to help elucidate 
how social relations and cohesion were understood—and produced—by 
social actors themselves. Ethnography is a widely used qualitative methodol-
ogy that seeks to interpret the meanings located in social and cultural 
systems, as well as the way in which our understanding of the world is 
socially constructed within these contexts (Fetterman 2010; O’Reilly 2012).1 
The study therefore sought to understand how shared “webs of significance” 
(Geertz 1973: 5) or perceptions of “reality” in communities shaped concep-
tions of social relations and social norms and the impact this had on the 
manner in which individuals understood and interacted with the VPUU and 
UPP interventions. As a result, this investigation did not attempt to carry out 
a quantitative measurement of the impact of the interventions on violence or 
social cohesion that could provide a conclusive finding on whether the pro-
grammes decreased violence or increased social cohesion. Instead, it sought 
to analyse what meanings social actors attributed to the interventions, 
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including how they were understood and experienced within the context of 
existing social relations and cultural norms.
 Ethnography is valuable when conducting evaluation work as it exam-
ines human behaviour in relatively natural conditions, which allows for a 
deeper understanding of the social context in which a programme takes 
place. Most importantly, ethnographic approaches to evaluation emphasise 
the need to critically engage with the perspective of all stakeholders 
(Youker 2005), including those who may be less empowered (Lay and 
Papadopoulos 2007). In line with the phenomenological approach of 
ethnography, which recognises that different groups and individuals may 
have varying perceptions of reality and that these conceptions of reality 
inform their actions and beliefs, the central research goal of ethnographic 
approaches to evaluation is to “ ‘get inside’ the world of program particip-
ants and to understand, describe, and explain the program and its effects 
from participants’ points of view” (Dorr- Bremme 1985: 65), as well as “its 
consequences in terms of participants’ realities and meaning systems” 
(Dorr- Bremme 1985: 66). The analysis of a programme in terms of the 
“reality” of programme participants is important because “it is in terms of 
those (and not the evaluator’s concepts of reality and meaning) that 
program participants routinely take action” (Dorr- Bremme 1985: 67). 
Understanding the perspective of those who engage with programmes 
therefore helps unpack their effects and outcomes.
 Like quantitative researchers, qualitative social science researchers need 
to establish the credibility and trustworthiness of their research. While 
quantitative researchers use the concepts of “validity” and “reliability” to 
measure the credibility of their research, evaluating the trustworthiness of 
qualitative research relies on different criteria and standards.2 Ethno-
graphic researchers use techniques such as prolonged engagement,3 them-
atic analysis,4 and “peer debriefing”5 to ensure their work meets accepted 
standards of academic rigour.
 Ethnography in general tends to emphasise an inductive approach to 
data collection and analysis, where the researcher goes to the field with an 
“open” mind, which allows for the discovery of unanticipated “seren-
dipity” (Bryant and Charmaz 2007) in the data (i.e. rich new data that 
were not necessarily included in the initial research design). At the same 
time, the research was clearly iterative. No researcher goes into the field 
without being informed by certain ideas, concepts, and theories (O’Reilly 
2012). Nevertheless, these concepts and theories were “played against sys-
tematically gathered data” (Strauss and Corbin 1994: 277) in a continuous 
“conversation” (Strauss and Corbin 1994: 280) between extant theory and 
newly collected information. This approach of carefully grounding the ana-
lysis in the data supports what Lincoln and Guba (1986) have identified as 
another important criterion of trustworthiness in qualitative research, 
namely, “confirmability”, which relates to demonstrating that the research-
er’s findings and interpretations are clearly derived from the data and are 
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not distorted by bias. This requires the researcher to “demonstrate how 
conclusions and interpretations have been reached” (Nowell et al. 
2017: 3).
 In developing the analysis, efforts were made to triangulate data from 
multiple sources, although this was inhibited in some instances by limited 
access to internal documentation from either of the interventions in Brazil 
or South Africa. For this reason, the study included a review of both aca-
demic and grey literature on the programmes and related issues. It also 
solicited the viewpoints of community and government stakeholders and 
professional practitioners.6 Transferability7 and dependability8 are two 
further criteria for establishing the trustworthiness of qualitative research 
that we have built into our approach.
Violence prevention through urban upgrading in 
South Africa
The VPUU intervention was investigated as a socially and culturally 
embedded undertaking through an analysis of empirical material relating 




Spaces of contention provide rich data for understanding the interaction 
between VPUU and Khayelitsha residents, in addition to the effects of the 
intervention in relation to social cohesion.
 The research exposed some of the difficulties of translating models of 
social order and citizenship that inform violence prevention interventions 
formulated in the Global North to an urban space—such as Khayelitsha—
characterised by deep informality, an ethics of communitarianism, and 
local conceptions of community justice that involve violence. Tensions 
around these contending rationalities are not unique to the VPUU inter-
vention. As Watson (2003: 401) argues,
a vast gap exists between the notion of “proper” communities held by 
most planners and administrators (grounded in the rationality of 
Western modernity and development), and the rationality which 
informs the strategies and tactics of those who are attempting to 
survive, materially and politically, in the harsh environment of Africa’s 
cities.
While Southern cities are often viewed as places “bursting at the seams, 
overtaken by their own fate of poverty, disease, violence, and toxicity”, 
Roy (2009: 820) argues that they are also places where those living in 
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abject poverty apply their resourcefulness and innovation to survive and 
thrive. This is not to idealise these urban environments but to argue for an 
analysis that attends to the way in which their current conditions and 
modes of organisation are the result of a complex legacy of colonialism, 
capitalism, globalisation, and extraordinary rates of recent urbanisation. 
In addition, inadequate policy and planning has left many of these urban 
centres struggling to cope with the multiple social challenges created by 
this complex legacy. In a context like this, “illegality and informality tug at 
the normative roots of the state leading to an arena charged with the viol-
ence of and toward the governed” (Rao 2006: 229).
 Nevertheless, the imaginary of an “ordered” city, founded on the model 
of European and Amer ican urbanisation, remains the primary conceptual 
framing for development interventions such as those funded/co- funded by 
the German Development Bank and implemented by VPUU in Khayelitsha. 
In this vision of the city, urban planners favour formality, order, and mod-
ernisation to promote an international urbanism associated with a vision 
of the modern city as “hygienic” (Steck et al. 2013), sanitary, and “respect-
able”. In this context, informality can be misunderstood and misrecognised 
as a result of normative notions of “rational” economic behaviour and 
values (Neves and du Toit 2012).
 These differences in the “webs of significance” in which actors are 
entangled lead to what can be called a problem of incommensurability. 
“Incommensurability” refers to something more profound than disagree-
ment or contradiction—both of these assume a common language, a 
common frame of reference (Pellizoni 2003: 209). Instead, incommensur-
ability refers to a condition where there is no shared language or concep-
tual framework: “What is lacking is a single description and connection of 
the facts, a shared vision of the meanings of concepts and principles” 
 (Pellizoni 2003: 206).
 In these contexts, common ground may be hard to find. As a Khayelitsha 
trader explained, expressing the sense of incomprehension several inter-
viewees articulated, “We don’t understand what VPUU is saying” 
(Informal group interview, Ntlazane traders association, Khayelitsha, 
 February 2014). In this milieu, a number of respondents argued that they 
found it hard to be heard in relation to the intervention: “They don’t sit 
down and talk to the people they found here to find solutions” (Focus 
group, informal traders, October 2014). And: “They just come to us only 
to tell us what they have decided to do” (Informal group interview, 
 Ntlazane traders association, February 2014).
Local methods
The fieldwork in Khayelitsha was carried out by research team member 
Ncedo Mngqibisa over a period of ten months. He immersed himself in the 
communities living in the Harare and Kuyasa sections of Khayelitsha by 
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conducting daily field visits that allowed him to produce a “thick descrip-
tion” of the “way of being” (Geertz 1973: 5) of these communities through 
semi- structured interviews, focus groups, informal conversations, and 
ongoing systematic observations, which were recorded in field notes.
 All interactions probed questions about the way in which people do and 
do not cooperate in Khayelitsha, forms of social and other organisation, 
the degree of sociality between neighbours, experiences and norms around 
violence, and local responses to violence, including both formal interven-
tions such as VPUU and informal activities such as community patrols and 
vigilante action.
 Interviewees were identified through a “snowball sampling” methodol-
ogy that gave the researcher deepening access to different components of 
the community. Snowball sampling is particularly useful for accessing 
“hidden” (Salganik and Heckathorn 2004: 193) or more “vulnerable” and 
“impenetrable” (Atkinson and Flint 2001: 1) social groups. The research 
began with a process of community profiling that involved identifying and 
interviewing key community leaders from local government, civil society, 
schools, and non- governmental organisations. While every effort was made 
to speak to a range of role players with different perspectives, a snowball 
sampling approach does introduce the possibility of bias as a result of the 
fact that the methodology depends on referral from one interviewee to 
another, individuals that are almost inevitably linked within social or other 
networks. Nevertheless, the researchers sought to engage with a wide range 
of stakeholders from different constituencies.
 The research on VPUU was constrained by the fact that the lead 
research institute—the Human Sciences Research Council—was unable to 
secure formal cooperation with the VPUU intervention, although this was 
the initial intention of the research project and significant efforts were 
made to establish this cooperation. Therefore, this study relies on the per-
spectives of those who interacted with the intervention and the publicly 
available documentation we could obtain.
 Through a process of engagement with the Khayelitsha community in 
Harare and Kuyasa, informal traders emerged as a group who had a signi-
ficant level of engagement with, and a stake in, the VPUU intervention and 
hence were interviewed systematically, both individually and in a focus 
group. Another focus group was held with informal traders who are 
foreign nationals to gain their perspective on informal trading in the town-
ship. In addition, focus groups were held with beneficiaries of the VPUU 
social development programme who had received funding from the 
 organisation for community- based projects, as well as with young 
 entrepreneurs who had been using VPUU facilities such as the “Hub” 
 business development space. Finally, focus groups were held with young 
men and young women, respectively, to draw out the gendered dimensions 
of violence in Khayelitsha.
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Background of the VPUU programme
The VPUU programme was initiated in 2004 as a partnership between the 
City of Cape Town and the German government that contributed funds 
via the German Development Bank (Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau, KfW). 
This partnership was both financial and ideological in the sense that the 
German Development Bank provided finance to implement a model of 
“integrated violence prevention” through urban upgrading that it had 
already applied in two other developing world contexts characterised by 
high levels of violence, namely, El Salvador and Colombia. It now sought 
to execute a similar model in South Africa based on the perceived success 
of these interventions.
 The German Development Bank’s model of violence prevention seeks to 
address violence by using “conventional urban planning tools” (Bauer 
2010: 5) and “coherent and integrated town planning” (Bauer 2010: 6) to 
create an ordered and managed urban environment that bridges “the 
divide between the formal and the informal city” (Bauer 2010: 3) and 
“stabilise[s] the social environment” (Bauer 2010: 5). Speaking on behalf 
of VPUU, Chris Giles (2014: 2728) argued, “What the programme would 
like to show over time is the increase in what we would call managed 
urban areas.” Urban upgrading, from this perspective, creates the founda-
tion for new forms of citizenship based on physical and symbolic owner-
ship of space. “For inhabitants, having an official address means formally 
being [a] resident of a city” (Bauer 2010: 12). This ordered urban environ-
ment can ostensibly prevent violence.
 VPUU was therefore established as an urban upgrading programme 
drawing on the principles of Crime Prevention through Environmental 
Design (CPTED), which posits that changes in the built environment can 
both deter offender behaviour and increase feelings of safety among resi-
dents. The intervention locates upgrading within a model of integrated 
violence prevention with three key pillars:
1. situational crime prevention (urban upgrading, construction of public 
facilities)
2. social crime prevention (funding for community-based organisations 
and educational support, e.g. early childhood development)
3. institutional crime prevention (promoting local economic development 
through skills training and “empowering” communities to run facili-
ties built through urban upgrading).
In the context of Khayelitsha, the challenge was, however, not simply the 
unidirectional “transfer of knowledge” (problematic as this construction 
itself is), but a task of translation between two different knowledge 
 systems—that of high modernity, which values rationality and autonomy 
in all its forms, and another knowledge system founded on what has been 
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called in the South African context, Ubuntu, an ethos of community and 
reciprocity.
 Ubuntu, a Nguni word, signifies an extremely complex concept that is 
not easily translated into English but nevertheless has a profound impact 
on African belief systems across the continent. It can be described as 
evoking a “communal” or communitarian ethic (Bohler- Muller 2005: 4) in 
which the very meaning of being human is located in one’s relation to 
others. The essence of Ubuntu is that an individual owes his or her exist-
ence to the existence of others: “ ‘I am’ because ‘you are’ and you are 
because ‘I am’ ”. Unlike the discourse of rights, which emphasises indi-
vidual rights, Ubuntu tends to emphasise mutual obligation and duty to 
support the welfare of the community.
Community participation
The concept of community participation at both the planning and imple-
mentation stages is a central organising principle in the formal design of 
the VPUU intervention. Drawing on the methodology outlined by the KfW, 
which sees such community participation as critical to the success of viol-
ence prevention interventions, VPUU argues that it engaged in a participa-
tory methodology that “strives for negotiated solutions in cooperation 
with communities” (VPUU 2013: 2). Community participation in, and 
ownership of, the intervention are seen as crucial mechanisms through 
which it contributes to building social cohesion.
 However, Piper (2012) has called the form of community consultation 
that VPUU engages in, and the forums it creates, “designed” in ways that 
allow for a very limited form of direct citizen participation in democratic 
decision- making. While the VPUU model allows for community participa-
tion in identifying the key social issues to be addressed in an area, those 
who participate in this process are carefully selected through a prior 
process in which VPUU audits and chooses the organisations that will take 
part in its key decision- making structure, the Safe Node Area Committee 
(SNAC). The process of identifying the critical issues to be addressed, and 
the means to address them, is carefully supervised by VPUU professional 
staff to ensure that “unrealistic” expectations are managed.
 Consultation regarding the intervention concerns the technicalities of 
how the intervention will be implemented, rather than an engagement 
about its substantive grounds. Broader community meetings are held, 
largely as forums for the endorsement of decisions already taken, rather 
than contexts where fundamental alterations to the intervention could be 
implemented. For example, a consultative community meeting is held once 
a community action plan has been formulated in response to the process of 
identifying local needs; however, the plan is launched and signed by the 
Mayor at the end of the “consultative” meeting, “suggesting that the 
process is largely a symbolic one” (Piper 2012: 7). This managed process 
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of consultation is purported to be necessary to protect the new SNAC 
leadership from local, particularly political, elites who might attempt to 
capture the development process.
 Therefore, while there are elements of representative democracy in the 
design of the VPUU model, it is not participatory in the sense of creating the 
space for the type of extended deliberation where even if “ ‘citizens or their 
representatives disagree morally’, they continue to reason together to reach 
mutually acceptable decisions” (Roux 2006: 17). Rather, the objective of the 
consultative processes that do take place appears to be largely instrumental 
and designed to ensure the efficient implementation of the intervention 
through the selection and socialisation of a cohort of “responsible” leaders 
who are tutored, through training, in the practices, norms, and ethics of the 
economic rational actor. In addition, they are deliberately shielded from the 
vagaries of public engagement, which could subject them to alternative 
claims from the local community and hence slow the execution of the inter-
vention. Inevitably, the SNAC forum was not completely immune to polit-
ical contestation and patronage claims. A former VPUU reference group 
member argued, “Due to politics we were removed from that [SNAC]. 
People wanted to bring in their people and so forth” (Personal interview, 
former VPUU reference group member, February 2014).
 The potential limitations of this model of engagement, both on prag-
matic grounds and in relation to building the kind of meaningful consensus 
that could foster social cohesion, were evidenced by a variety of sites of 
tension regarding VPUU ’s implementation, where the substantive grounds 
and rationale for the programme were contested by specific community 
stakeholders.
 It was in the intervention’s deeply contractarian imaginary of state and 
society that the most fundamental tensions emerged between it and the 
communities with which it engaged. VPUU envisaged a world in which 
“rational”, autonomous agents freely enter administrative or legal con-
tracts, which specify the terms of the relationship between agents. This was 
disputed by a local imaginary of social relations founded on reciprocity or 
Ubuntu, which normatively structures social life in the township. Con-
temporary modernity in South Africa is in fact a product of the intersec-
tion of these imaginaries of social order; however, in its forceful 
articulation of a contractarian vision the VPUU intervention became a 
flashpoint (detailed below) for a display of the tensions between these 
worldviews. Most importantly, inseparably tied to these social imaginaries 
were contending visions of moral order. In terms of Ubuntu, ethical per-
sonhood, as opposed to mere existence, is realised through the collective 
and by means of actively carrying out duties and obligations to kin and 
community. On the other hand, in the contractarian imaginary, moral 
norms derive their normative force from the idea of contract or mutual 
agreement between individuals who act to rationally maximise their self- 
interest (Cudd and Eftekhari 2017).
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Informal traders
A pivotal site where tensions emerged between the formality that VPUU 
sought to create and local practices of informality related to disputes 
around trading kiosks VPUU built as part of its upgrading initiative. While 
these kiosks provided important services that had not been available to 
traders previously, such as access to water, electricity and shelter from the 
weather, these objective conditions were subjectively construed by some 
traders as a symbolic capture of local space by “outsiders” that under-
mined pre- existing relationships of sociality and reciprocity. One trader 
asserted, “They treat us as Germans while we are in South Africa” (Per-
sonal interview, trader, February 2014).
 Lefebvre (1991) has argued that space is socially produced and it is 
within physical space that social identities and social relations are 
embodied and enacted. VPUU seeks to establish new forms of ownership 
of space, in line with classic CPTED principles that theorise the link 
between urban space and crime in terms of the notion of “territoriality”, 
i.e. the concept that a sense of ownership of and responsibility for space 
can help reduce crime. CPTED is fundamentally about redesigning and re- 
signifying space to create a new spatial symbolism. What used to be “bad” 
and “dangerous” space is reconstituted as “safe”, “aesthetic”, and orderly.
 However, it is exactly this ownership of space and the re- signification of 
its meaning that was challenged by traders who disputed whether VPUU 
had the right to displace, physically and symbolically, the informal trading 
spaces they had occupied on “our land” (Personal interview, trader, Febru-
ary 2014) and replace them with formalised space that traders now had to 
pay for. “Now we pay but we were occupying and using that area when 
there was just sand there. They moved us and build premises there and 
told us to pay” (Focus group, informal traders, October 2014).
 The amount of rent charged by VPUU (R900 per month at the time of 
the research) was a deep source of discontent among traders in a context 
where the average monthly income in Khayelitsha is R2000 per month 
(Seekings 2013). Several traders appear to have struggled to meet their 
financial obligations and were indebted to VPUU. The intervention was 
therefore seen as reconstituting available land into inaccessible and expen-
sive space. While traders’ real administrative “ownership” of the land on 
which they previously traded is questionable, the process of upgrading was 
experienced as an alienation from this land, which made them junior parti-
cipants in an upgrading initiative rather than autonomous economic 
agents.
 It was in VPUU’s attempts to establish formal contractual relationships 
with traders that some of the key disputes regarding the meaning of the 
space of Khayelitsha emerged. For traders, these contracts signified a sur-
render to unequal terms of engagement that required them to sign “on the 
dotted line” to secure access to newly constituted trading spaces from 
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which they could be subsequently evicted and which imposed on them a 
new and foreign regulatory regime. “Keep in mind that they build in your 
spot with your business not registered” (Focus group, informal traders, 
October 2014). One trader explained, “You know how we work.… We 
don’t even have business accounts. We work to feed ourselves. They need 
to understand that this is not the same as town” (Personal interview, 
trader, February 2014).
 At the centre of the VPUU imaginary was what has been called the “eco-
nomic man” or homo economicus, the classic Western “entrepreneur”—a 
self- interested, utility- maximising individual whose major rationale is to 
generate profit by extracting surplus value. Through its contractual agree-
ments with traders, VPUU actively sought to constitute this homo eco-
nomicus during training that endeavoured to re- socialise traders into this 
normative paradigm as well as by enforcing regulatory “business” prac-
tices such as “auditing” of traders “books”. One trader commented, 
“What they do is send an auditor. Who are they sending the auditor to? 
Whose money are they auditing? They did not give you money” (Personal 
interview, trader, February 2014).
 VPUU’s enforcement of the contractual agreements it entered into with 
the traders, including eviction if rent was not paid, was interpreted by 
traders in terms of the norms of reciprocity and informality that allow sur-
vivalist businesses to endure through community and kin networks, even 
in an environment where there is little immediate income or surplus value 
created. Therefore, VPUU’s warnings of eviction to traders who did not 
pay rent were perceived as a betrayal of these relationships of reciprocity, 
a vision of reciprocity which VPUU representatives reportedly caricatured 
as charity. “They say, ‘This is not charity, vacate if you cannot afford. We 
have a list of people that want to move in’ ” (Personal interview, trader, 
March 2014). “You will leave and go stay at the location and what will 
you eat?” (Informal group interview, Ntlazane traders association, Febru-
ary 2014). These testimonies echo sentiments we heard expressed by many 
traders. Myers (2011) argues in this vein that the integration of social net-
works and patterns of sociality into structured formal forms of urban 
development can be a poor substitute for previous forms of economic reci-
procity and sociality. In this context, formality can constitute a threat to 
social networks and patterns of sociality, and can render the benefits that 
may be derived from it “doubtful or uncertain” (Neves and du Toit 
2012: 142).
Community patrols
Another site of tension concerned the way VPUU tried to assist in fostering 
police–community relationships through support of Community Police 
Forums (CPFs) and the neighbourhood watches or community patrols that 
functioned under them. In a context where there is a “pluralisation of the 
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governance of security” (Shearing and Wood 2003: 403) in the township, 
these community patrols were only one initiative within a wide variety of 
informal patrols that would arise sporadically in response to problems of 
crime and violence, often conducted by men and informed by a communi-
tarian ethos which could include violence against residents allegedly 
involved in crime or simply breaking informally imposed “curfews”. This 
violence was performed as a public spectacle to police the boundaries of an 
often authoritarian conception of moral community. This was the nor-
mative framework in which the neighbourhood watches, established under 
the CPFs, also operated. CPFs are constitutionally mandated local forums 
operating at the level of the police station, intended to foster a cooperative 
relationship between the South African Police Service and the community 
in which they function. There is widespread acknowledgement, however, 
that these forums have not been functioning effectively in Khayelitsha. An 
investigation by the police’s inspectorate in 2012 found that “generally” 
the contribution that the CPFs are making to improve police–community 
relationships in the Khayelitsha area was “questionable” (SAPS 2014).
 VPUU provided support to the CPFs through contractual relationships 
which sought to establish “standards” for neighbourhood watch conduct 
in legalistic and procedural terms, drawing on Western Cape government 
regulations for CPFs. Funding was contingent on CPFs meeting these 
terms, which included “accurate” documentation of neighbourhood watch 
membership and activities as well as “development contracts” with indi-
vidual volunteers (Giles 2014). While VPUU wanted to regularise patrols 
in ways that would mitigate violence and make them sustainable, this pro-
cedural methodology exposed the tensions between the approach it 
attempted to introduce and those that framed the activities of existing 
patrols. As a former patroller argued, VPUU “did their work in English” 
(Focus group, Older men, October 2014), i.e. in a “foreign” manner.
 The VPUU intervention into community police patrols was an 
important attempt to counter the violence committed by some of these 
groups and was lauded by a number of residents, one of whom argued, 
for example, that, “On the topic of patrolling, VPUU helped us a lot” 
(Focus group, Older women, October 2014). However, the programme 
did not take into account the informal patrols that were genuine 
attempts by citizens to take responsibility for their own safety in the 
context of the allegedly inadequate and corrupt policing in Khayelitsha. 
These informal patrols are also, as Gillespie (2014) points out, part of a 
network of informal community regulation that has existed in many 
townships for decades; they represent a legitimate form of self- 
governance that needs to be recognised when designing interventions so 
that the most positive aspects of these community initiatives can be har-
nessed and built upon.
 Through its efforts to establish contractual relationships with CPFs in 
Khayelitsha, VPUU attempted to reform neighbourhood watches in terms 
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of a Western conception of voluntarism as the product of individual 
 altruism, rather than an assumed part of the relationality of daily life. A 
VPUU volunteer safety coordinator articulated it as: “in terms of the 
understanding within our communities” (Mtwana 2014: 159). However, a 
Western concept of voluntarism pertinent to voluntary work as a form of 
middle- class self- sacrifice was anachronistic in a context of extreme 
poverty, which was already characterised by reciprocity as both an ethos 
of living and a way of surviving poverty.
 In accordance with its contractual agreements with the CPFs, VPUU 
therefore specified a new administrative process for the regularisation of 
patrollers. This involved a formal “registration process” and a “contrac-
tual obligation” in terms of which individuals acknowledged the “volun-
tary” nature of their role (i.e. they would not receive a salary) and 
stipulated exactly what activities they would undertake. In return, volun-
teers would be offered opportunities for “development” to be provided by 
VPUU (Mtwana 2014: 165). While this agreement was meant to clarify the 
terms of the relationship between patrollers and VPUU, these legal terms 
complicated the ethics of reciprocity that underpinned informal patrols in 
which no material reward was expected but, equally, no accountability 
could be enforced.
 In this paradigm, residents (particularly men) would engage in patrols 
as a perceived need arose to defend the interests of an often ambiguously 
defined “community”. These activities were informed by a communitarian 
ethic in which identity is realised through actions that support community 
and kin. This was different from the legal and individualised contractual 
relationship that VPUU sought to institute where obligations and duties 
are defined by a contract, which autonomous agents freely choose to enter. 
While existing patrols were sometimes carried out under the auspices of 
locally constituted organisations, this hierarchical relationship was often 
weak and, in many instances, patrols were largely spontaneous responses 
to contexts of severe violence. In this environment, then, there was very 
little of the sort of accountability that VPUU wanted to introduce through 
its contractual relationship with patrollers which, in some cases, led to a 
proliferation of violence by the patrollers.
 By introducing a different approach into the ongoing practices of 
patrolling, VPUU disrupted existing ethics of reciprocity in which indi-
viduals had patrolled with no expectation of material reward or indi-
vidual accountability. Patrollers who entered contractual relationships 
with VPUU assumed this was a commercial relationship and they would 
be rewarded in monetary terms, either immediately or in the future. The 
“currency” that VPUU offered, i.e. “development” opportunities that 
could potentially better equip patrollers to enter the labour market, was 
viewed with scepticism by some in the light of pervasive, structural 
unemployment. The coffee that VPUU offered volunteers became a meta-
phor for the scarcity of the reward they received: “Other people are 
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demotivated because they patrol for years and don’t get anything. They 
just get coffee with milk only. You patrol with bare hands” (Personal 
interview, March 2014).
 The interaction between VPUU’s aspiration to regularise CPF patrol-
ling in terms of a normative understanding of their role and function, 
and the unintended impacts this produced, illustrates the complexity of 
introducing Western models of community policing to environments such 
as Khayelitsha, without significantly adapting to or engaging with local 
forms of regulation and social policing. A number of studies of policing 
in South Africa have noted the difficulties and unpredictability of trans-
ferring international “models” of crime prevention, such as community 
policing, to contexts outside of the environments in which they were ini-
tially formulated (Brogden and Shearing 1993; Van Der Spuy 2000; 
Brogden 2002, 2004; Pelser and Louw 2002; Steinberg 2011). Brogden 
(2002: 92) argues that the dissemination of the concept of community 
policing in South Africa was part of a wider process of “commodifica-
tion” of community policing as a result of processes of globalisation. 
However, as Steinberg (2011: 350) notes, “the results of policy transfer, 
especially to societies in the process of a major transition, are often 
unknowable”.
The UPPs in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil
In 2015, fieldwork was carried out in two favelas9 in Rio de Janeiro: 
Cidade de Deus,10 where the UPP was established in February 2009, and 
Tabajaras/Cabritos,11 where the intervention was launched in January 
2010. Forty semi- structured interviews were conducted with residents and 
leaders of the two localities, 20 interviews in each. The focus of this work 
was to understand sociability, social cohesion, and the relationship of UPP 
police officers with residents.
Local methods
The concept of social cohesion that the Laboratory for the Analysis of 
Violence at Rio de Janeiro State University worked with was analysed at 





•  micro- regulation of  social deviance,  also  conceived as  social  efficacy, 
i.e. the belief that one can and should intervene when individuals break 
basic social norms in order to restrain that behaviour
•  participation in associations and institutions at the local level.
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 Ethnographic work took place over seven months in the community of 
Cidade de Deus and over five months in Tabajaras. Interviews were 
recorded and transcribed, though seven interviewees did not agree to being 
recorded. In these cases, the analysis relied on notes taken by the research-
ers. Apart from the formal interviews, the researchers participated in many 
informal conversations and conducted systematic observation with weekly 
visits to the communities. Unlike in South Africa, focus groups were not 
carried out as the level of conflict and social tension in these favelas meant 
that residents felt that their safety could be compromised by expressing 
their views openly in a focus group. All the material was recorded in field 





Recorded interviews were also coded according to a list of categories that 
included topics outlined in the interview questionnaire and emergent 
themes that appeared during the research.
Background of UPP
The absence of the state in favelas is one of the ways that public security 
managers in Rio de Janeiro explain the control of these territories by crim-
inal groups. Based on this assumption, a series of public policies and pro-
grammes aimed at reducing violence and controlling drug trafficking have 
been implemented over the last 30 years.
 In 2008, the government of the State of Rio de Janeiro initiated the 
UPP programme. Its objective was to regain state control of the favelas 
and reduce armed confrontations, using an approach focused on long- 
term prevention. One of the main pillars of this programme was the 
application of a concept of “Proximity Police” in order to change the 
model of police action away from sporadic, reactive, temporary interven-
tions and lethal operations. The philosophy and strategy of Proximity 
Policing focuses on prevention, with the citizen becoming the centre of 
police attention. Success in arresting offenders is seen to be the result of a 
close relationship between the police and society, which makes it possible 
to create a highly developed network of solidarity that provides protec-
tion for citizens.
 Inaugurated in December 2008, the UPP was created as an alternative 
to the community policing approach previously tried in the favelas of Rio 
de Janeiro. The “pacification” process applied by the UPPs follows four 
predefined steps:
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1. The Batalhão de Operações Policiais Especiais (BOPE), the Special 
Police Operations Battalion of the military police of the State of Rio de 
Janeiro, occupies the territory in a favela through armed intervention 
in the locality. This is the phase with the greatest potential for violent 
conflict as the BOPE essentially invades a territory controlled by armed 
groups. However, the state government makes public announcements 
about these BOPE operations in advance, reducing the potential for 
conflict to some degree. In general, members of criminal groups choose 
to leave the favela before the BOPE operation begins.
2. Once the initial territorial acquisition has been carried out, the BOPE 
identifies and removes sources of resistance and those identified as 
“criminals”. Once the situation is more stable, the third phase of occu-
pation is initiated.
3. Police officers from the UPP enter the favela and begin operations to 
establish “law and order”.
4. The UPP work to establish a positive relationship with residents based 
on trust and peacekeeping.
Although the time and labour required for each stage varies, depending on 
the specific situation, the overall process remains the same.
 The policing programme is set up in terms of a decree12 that provides a 
very basic outline for its implementation. The decree defines the criteria for 
selection of the locations where UPP will be implemented, outlines project 
objectives, and the organisational aspects of the programme. Subsequently, 
there is a process of formalisation and systematisation to develop a model 
of policing for the favela based on its specific conditions.
 An intervention like the UPP seeks to replace the previous tactic of 
police invasions in the favelas, which had resulted in armed confrontations, 
with the ongoing presence of a fixed group of police officers trained in a 
more community- based approach. According to the international literature 
on community policing in these types of programmes, the police cultivate 
relationships with the population of mostly poor urban communities 
(Kelling and Coles 1996; Piquero et al. 1998; Moraes and Cano 2007). 
The success of police efforts to reduce crime often depends on community 
involvement in the programme.
 The UPP intervention has been criticised as having sought to effect 
change through significant militarisation of the daily life of favela inhabit-
ants as a new instrument of coercion of the working classes and as a 
strategy “to make noble”, i.e. upgrade areas that are of interest for tourism 
and major sporting events (Batista 2011; Fleury 2012; Freeman 2012). The 
distribution of UPPs across the city would seem to support this assertion as 
it was not implemented in the most violent western region of Rio de 
Janeiro but instead focused on the southern, central, and northern areas of 
the city. What has emerged are real gaps between coercive and punitive 
practices and the stated objectives of the programme: guaranteeing rights 
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of citizenship and meeting the social needs of the population. It also does 
not appear to have met the objective of integrating favelas into the main-
stream dynamics of the city through the expansion of public services 
(garbage collection, basic sanitation, transportation, etc.) and private ser-
vices (regularisation of the connection of electricity and cable TV, gas dis-
tribution, etc.) (FGV 2012). In some cases, when these services have been 
expanded this has led to a process of gentrification that has forced favela 
residents out of their homes.
What has changed with the UPP?
Despite criticisms, it is well recognised that the UPP has reduced violence in 
the favelas where it has been implemented. The most widely acknowledged 
change was the reduction of armed confrontations between groups of traf-
fickers and police officers (see, for example, Cano, Borges, and Ribeiro 
2014). A report by the Stanford Center for International Development found 
that, in areas where the UPP intervention was implemented, police killings 
would have been 60 per cent higher without the intervention (Magaloni, 
Franco, and Melo 2015). Various researchers have found the results listed 
below regarding the UPP (IBPS 2009; CECIP 2010; de Souza e Silva 2010; 
Burgos et al. 2011; Oliveira and Abramovay 2012; Rodrigues and Siqueira 
2012; Serrano- Berthet 2013; Cano, Borges, and Ribeiro 2014):
•  a  suspension  or  significant  reduction  in  violent  shootings  and  police 
incursions
•  the virtual elimination of the overt carrying of weapons by actors other 
than the police
•  greater freedom of inhabitants to come and go
•  reduced stigma of living in some favelas
•  greater internal and external social control over corruption and abuse 
of power by police.
The terms used to describe this change by residents are “war” and “peace”, 
respectively, which indicates a major improvement in their sense of per-
sonal security from the insecurity and fear residents reported in the period 
before the UPP’s entry into their communities.
 On the other hand, public security experts have identified several prob-
lems in the programme that may affect its sustainability and legitimacy. 
Among them are the absence of social investments; difficulties in the rela-
tionship between police officers and residents of the favelas; the perception 
that there is still authoritarian control over communities; the low institu-
tionalisation of so- called proximity policing; and the channels of dialogue 
between the population and police, with the consequent tendency to trans-
form police commanders into the “favela’s manager” or “new owners of 
the hill” (Cano, Borges, and Ribeiro 2014).
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The impact of the UPP on social cohesion
The analysis of the impact of the UPP on social cohesion in the two favelas 
of Rio de Janeiro where the research was conducted was based on the per-
ception of residents and people working in both territories regarding the 
effect of this policing model on the dynamics of community relations.
 The analysis revealed the specificity of patterns of social cohesion in 
both sites, related to their particular histories and current forms of social 
organisation. The research explored social cohesion at the community level 
in terms of:






In terms of mutual trust and cooperation between neighbours, many resi-
dents of the two favelas mentioned that they are willing to help their neigh-
bours, but they do not usually ask favours of them. That is, they are open 
to providing some kind of help and even do it with some frequency, but 
they emphasise that there is no reciprocity in this relationship. Neverthe-
less, bonds of cooperation seem to be strong in times of personal crisis and 
collective tragedies caused by natural disasters, diseases, fires, etc.
 The research revealed that interaction among residents is strongly associ-
ated with age. Generally, older people stay at home and attend few social 
gatherings, while their younger counterparts participate in community events 
more frequently. However, regardless of age, residents of both favelas were 
open to receiving visits from inside and outside the community.
 In Tabajaras/Cabritos, the intervention had an ambiguous impact on 
social cohesion. The implementation of the UPPs led to a reduction of 
violence and increased perceptions of safety. This encouraged the entry of 
new residents to the favela, which is located in a privileged position in the 
city within an important tourist region, near major commercial centres, 
and with good transport connections and services. Since the implementa-
tion of the UPPs, properties in the area have increased enormously in 
value and, therefore, many people from different neighbourhoods, other 
municipalities, and even from other countries have been attracted to live 
in the slums of the southern zone of Rio de Janeiro. This change of profile 
of the favela led to an increase in rental prices and the legalisation and 
regularisation of some public services such as electricity and water, which 
residents had previously accessed illegally but without cost. In light of 
this, some residents, usually the poorest, had to leave these favelas because 
they could not afford the increased cost of living in the area. In this 
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context, the ethnography revealed that it has become commonplace for 
original residents to comment about “new people” on the streets that they 
do not recognise. This generates a sense of estrangement in an environ-
ment where previously residents had been closely tied together.
 In this context, residents who had recently moved to the favela did not 
know the local rules and, according to some interviewees, generated “dis-
order” and disrespect with regard to community norms. The greater turn-
over of residents, the changing profile of people living in the favela, and 
the increase in the price of services have transformed interaction, 
cooperation, and social control in the area. Some informants reported that 
they did not feel comfortable asking their neighbours for help because they 
often did not know them. If there was a problem, the UPP would be the 
first to be contacted rather than asking for the help of a neighbour or any 
other known organisation in the favela. Thus, the UPP seemed to loosen 
community bonds because it caused a greater transit of outsiders who 
knew nothing of the local reality, the dynamics and routine of the favela.
 In Cidade de Deus, the UPP reportedly led to a decline in local organisa-
tions. Before the UPP was implemented, local community groups organised 
many activities such as karate, dancing, or other cultural activities. 
However, according to some leaders in the area, after the UPP was imple-
mented, many parents withdrew their children from social projects as they 
no longer saw the need to prevent them from playing in the streets; the 
favela was perceived to have become “less violent” because of the UPP, 
reducing the need to enrol children in social projects. Thus, one of the 
unexpected effects of UPP was the loss of investments in local organisa-
tions that had enabled social projects in the favela. The lower number of 
participants in attendance meant that some organisations had to limit their 
activities. However, this favela still needs a substantial amount of social 
investment. Its residents, especially children and adolescents, remain in a 
situation of social vulnerability and would likely benefit from continuing 
to participate in social programmes.
 With regard to micro- regulation, when respondents were asked who or 
what institution would be called in situations of conflict between neigh-
bours or even a crime, Cidade de Deus residents generally mentioned the 
“traffic” (drug traffickers). Under “favela laws” that still structure life in 
Cidade de Deus, the police should not be called since the territory remains 
under the control of drug traffickers, even after the implementation of the 
UPP. In this context, it would be the traffickers who would solve the fave-
la’s problems, be it a conflict between neighbours or a crime such as 
robbery or rape. The police could only be called in limited situations, such 
as the removal of the body of a homicide victim. With two systems of 
authority now in place, there is tension in the relations of the inhabitants 
of Cidade de Deus. Residents have to show respect for the UPP at the same 
time as obeying the rules of the traffickers, without allowing the police to 
know about this. According to interviewees, life was relatively “easy” 
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before the UPP because the favela was unambiguously “ruled” and con-
trolled by the traffickers alone.
Conclusion
VPUU and UPP were quite different interventions in many ways, but both 
sought to reconstitute social relations, establish new norms, and stabilise 
the social fabric within the communities in which they were located as part 
of long- term efforts to counter violence. While they adopted different 
methodologies, both were informed by a desire to “recapture” the space of 
the favela or township from the informal sources of authority and regula-
tion that had governed it and which were seen as contributing to violence.
 In Rio de Janeiro, these “formalisation” processes took place through 
attempts to forcibly evict drug traffickers and replace them with state police 
in order to create normative modes of social regulation. In contrast, VPUU 
tried to recapture areas of the township experiencing high levels of violence 
through urban upgrading initiatives that were seen as a way of facilitating 
local ownership and investment in this space. The strong emphasis on form-
alisation by VPUU, drawn from international models of urban upgrading, 
created tensions with some local residents, such as informal traders and 
community patrollers, regarding aspects of its implementation. While the 
UPP was an entirely Brazilian driven initiative, it too was influenced by inter-
national crime prevention models and also struggled to build sustainable 
relationships with citizens in the favelas in which it was implemented. The 
UPP intervention was able to demonstrate more dramatic reductions in viol-
ence than VPUU, particularly in its initial period of implementation. 
However, it is unclear how sustainable these reductions are and whether 
either of the interventions have had an impact on cohesion and collective 
efficacy in ways that will help reduce violence in the long term.
 While theories of social disorganisation posit a “breakdown” in social 
relations and norms as a result of urbanisation, which they argue contributes 
to violence, the research showed that there was not an absence of organisa-
tion or collective norms in the favelas of Rio de Janeiro or the neighbour-
hoods of Khayelitsha, but a complex network of informal authority, 
regulation, and organisation. Neither intervention appears to have been able 
to harness these local resources, which were instead seen as an impediment 
to social control. While slum upgrading interventions may seek to “gentrify” 
areas in order to reduce violence, the research in Tabajaras/Cabritos showed 
the potentially negative impact of these processes on the poor, who may be 
driven out of upgraded areas, thus exacerbating and displacing inequality 
while existing social bonds in a neighbourhood are undermined.
 In Khayelitsha, urban upgrading did not lead to significant reductions in 
violence that would fundamentally change the character of the area or the 
profile of its residents. What the research revealed, however, was that 
despite the fragmentation and division in the community, there was a 
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strong ethos of reciprocity, expressed in the adage, “I am human because 
you are”, which led residents to help and even risk their lives for each 
other. Sometimes, collective action in support of neighbours could lead to 
violent retribution. In this context, close social ties could have a negative 
impact on violence. VPUU struggled to mobilise the positive aspects of this 
ethic of reciprocity and build cohesion as it limited the participatory 
aspects of the programme and pursued an approach that privileged 
Western norms and social relations. In Cidade de Deus, the UPP reduced 
violence, but complicated existing systems of social authority, thereby cre-
ating a dual authority structure that included both the police and drug 
traffickers. At the same time, local social organisations suffered as a result 
of the diversion of funds away from them to the state.
 Therefore, despite the fact that these interventions were in fact premised 
on the idea that “disorganisation” of the social fabric contributes to viol-
ence, paradoxically, the ways in which they intervened often exacerbated 
this problem and may well influence their long- term impact.
 Findings from this research project suggest the following changes would 
lead to improvements in policy and programming to prevent violence:
1. Investigate how social cohesion works in developing countries so that 
assumptions based on how it operates in the Northern context do not 
negatively influence developing world programming.
2. Unpack social cohesion as a concept when developing policy. Break 
the idea down to identify violent and non- violent forms of cohesion so 
that specific elements can be targeted when designing interventions.
3. Take informal mechanisms of social regulation into account when 
designing interventions. Informal mechanisms, both positive and neg-
ative, such as volunteer security guards and vigilante groups, are crit-
ical for understanding how social cohesion and collective efficacy can 
prevent violence or may, in some contexts, exacerbate it. As Shaw and 
McKay (1942) argued, this type of knowledge helps promote success-
ful interventions that are relevant to the local context and encourage 
“indigenous social invention” (Schlossman and Sedlak 1983).
4. Involve communities democratically in violence prevention initiatives. 
Recognise and seek to strengthen, rather than bypass, local institutions 
and local traditions wherever possible. This includes integrating com-
munities in the design and conceptualisation of interventions as part-
ners so that programmes resonate with local norms and systems of 
regulation. International models of violence prevention should be 
drawn on as a resource rather than uncritically implemented. These 
approaches may need to be revisited, revised, or reformulated in the 
light of local conditions. Interventions may be useful for increasing 
security and reducing violence, but without the democratic participa-
tion of the people affected they risk being unsustainable and poten-
tially causing harm.
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5. Learn more about local operating environments before interventions 
are implemented. Conducting contextualised qualitative and quant-
itative analyses in every community before interventions—such as 
VPUU in South Africa or Brazil’s UPP—are rolled out would con-
tribute to these programmes’ success. These investigations should 
include analysis of demographic and social conditions in addition to 
informal networks, mechanisms of social regulation, and formal and 
informal power structures. This will help to ensure interventions are 
appropriately attuned to the environment in which they are to be 
implemented.
Notes
 1 Since the late 1970s, ethnography has increasingly been recognised as having an 
important role in evaluating social programmes in fields such as education and 
health (Guba 1978; Guba and Lincoln 1981; Dorr- Bremme 1985; Fetterman 
and Pitman 1986; Patton 1990; Schensul and Schensul 1990; Nastasi and Berg 
1999; Hopson 2002; Morgan- Trimmer and Wood 2016). For example, Schen-
sul and Schensul (1990: 51) note that, “Early in the AIDS epidemic, evaluators 
and intervention researchers recognized that experimental design and other tra-
ditional approaches to research and evaluation could not provide sufficient 
information to program developers and policy makers to guide interventions in 
communities.” In this context, ethnography provided a crucial means to collect 
data on issues such as “life- styles, social networks, needle- sharing activities, 
sexual patterns, and decision- making processes of drug users” (Schensul and 
Schensul 1990: 51). This study has drawn on some of the insights that have 
emerged from ethnographic approaches to evaluation.
 2 Lincoln and Guba (1986) developed four key criteria that are now widely used 
to establish the trustworthiness of qualitative research: credibility, transfer-
ability, dependability, and confirmability. There are recognised techniques for 
ascertaining the extent to which each of these criteria has been applied in a 
research study. For example, credibility concerns the researcher’s confidence in 
the “truth” or validity of their findings. Techniques identified by Lincoln and 
Guba (1986) for establishing credibility that were used in this study include 
“prolonged engagement”, “peer de- briefing”, “member- checks”, and “triangu-
lation” (Lincoln and Guba 1986: 77).
 3 Prolonged engagement concerns the researcher or researchers immersing them-
selves in the field long enough to understand the social context of a particular 
phenomenon, including speaking with a range of relevant actors. In this study, 
extended ethnographic fieldwork of six to ten months at each research site 
included engagement with a wide range of community and government actors 
at the field sites and at the city level in both countries through interviews, focus 
groups, meetings, and informal conversations. Following the fieldwork, pro-
longed engagement with the ethnographic material continued as researchers 
immersed themselves in the data, including reading and re- reading them during 
a systematic thematic coding process.
 4 Thematic analysis has been described as a “method for identifying, analyzing, 
organizing, describing, and reporting themes found within a data set” (Braun 
and Clarke 2006: 79). A theme captures and unifies fragments of information 
and ideas into a coherent concept that “tells a story” about the data, for 
example, what they say about “gender”, “violence”, or “community”.
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 5 “Peer de- briefing” was used during the coding process to come to a consensus 
about the meaning of the data; it is an important technique for establishing the 
credibility of research. Peer de- briefing refers to a process of systematic engage-
ment between researchers where each researcher exposes their ideas and ana-
lysis to a peer or colleague in order to bring to light “aspects of the inquiry” 
that may otherwise have remained implicit (Lincoln and Guba 1986: 308). In 
this study, the data were analysed through a process of systematic engagement 
between field researchers at the sites of data collection and broader research 
teams in both South Africa and Brazil, as well as through a cross- country 
review of data.
 6 The research team endeavoured to implement a consultative approach to the 
research process through “member checks” and “analyst triangulation” by 
testing interpretations and conclusions from the research with members of 
the groups from which the data were obtained. Lincoln and Guba (1986) 
have emphasised the importance of this technique for establishing credibility. 
Analyst triangulation occurs when different perspectives on the findings of 
the research are elicited from a panel of engaged stakeholders. In this study, 
consultative workshops and reference group meetings with stakeholders 
from community, government, and professional practitioners were held at 
critical points in the research in both countries to facilitate “member check-
ing” and “analyst triangulation”. This included engagement around the 
initial research plan, during the course of the research project to present pre-
liminary findings, and in report back meetings at the conclusion of the 
research.
 7 Transferability is another criterion for establishing the trustworthiness of qual-
itative research and relates to the extent to which the research is applicable in 
contexts other than where it was conducted. This can sometimes be a complex 
requirement in qualitative research, which generally focuses on in- depth inter-
pretative analysis of a particular case that is not easily generalisable across 
different contexts. Here, “The researcher cannot know the sites that may wish 
to transfer the findings” (Nowell et al. 2017: 3).
 Nevertheless, the transferability of qualitative research can be facilitated by 
what anthropologist Geertz (1973: 5) has called “thick description”. This refers 
to a detailed account of field experiences in which the researcher makes explicit 
patterns of cultural and social relationships and puts them in context (Hollo-
way 1997). These “thick descriptions” make it possible for researchers reading 
the analysis to make an informed assessment as to whether the findings and 
analysis, developed in one context, could be applicable in another context. In 
this study, “thick description” of the data is provided in the case studies of the 
field contexts in South Africa and Brazil.
 8 Dependability is a further criterion for ascertaining the trustworthiness of qual-
itative research and relates to the replicability of the research process. It asks 
whether another researcher would be able to replicate the study based on the 
information provided by a research study. Dependability is primarily estab-
lished through making the research processes transparent in a “dense descrip-
tion” of research methods (Krefting 1991). This makes the research “auditable” 
in the sense that researchers reading the analysis are able to understand how 
research conclusions were arrived at. In this study, the extended methodology 
section in this chapter is an attempt to ensure that the research methods and 
process of this study are explicit and transparent.
 9 A favela is a low- income historically informal urban area in Brazil.
10 Cidade de Deus, popularly known as CDD, is a neighbourhood in the West 
Zone of the city of Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. It has long been considered one of the 
most dangerous regions of the city.
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11 Tabajaras/Cabritos is a favela between the neighbourhoods of Copacabana, a 
popular tourist destination, and Botafogo, one of the wealthy neighbourhoods 
of the South Zone of Rio de Janeiro.
12 Decree- law 42,787 of 6 January 2011.
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6 Social exclusion, violences, and 
urban marginalisation in 
Central America
Empirical evidence and 
consequences for public policy
Juan Pablo Pérez Sáinz, Mario Zetino Duarte, 
and Florencio Ceballos Schaulsohn
This chapter has three objectives. First, we attempt to identify the dynamics 
of violence in urban territories in Central America where social exclusion 
is a significant problem.1 Second, we consider the responses that the resi-
dents of these territories have attempted to implement to deal with these 
dynamics. And finally, based on this analysis, we reflect on issues that 
emerge in terms of public policy and that point to problems extending 
beyond the territories studied.
 With these aims in mind, the chapter is divided into four sections. The 
first contextualises the study sites in terms of the issue of social exclusion. 
This is followed by the main section, which examines the dynamics associ-
ated with the types of violence identified. The third section presents a crit-
ical analysis of a series of initiatives aimed at dealing with violence in the 
territories studied, highlighting their achievements and challenges. Finally, 
the conclusion offers three reflections that aim to define a series of ques-
tions and challenges from the perspective of public policy.
The territories: an overview from the perspective of 
social exclusion
The sites studied were located in Costa Rica (Concepción Arriba, Pacuare, 
and Cariari) and El Salvador (Quebrada Honda, Palomar, and Los Ranchos 
in Santa Tecla and El Puente, San Simón, and El Cocotal in Sonsonante). Con-
cepción Arriba is located in the San José metropolitan area. It is the result of 
public housing projects sponsored by the Costa Rican government in the late 
1980s to accommodate rural migrants. Pacuare is the product of subdivision 
and urbanisation processes promoted by public institutions, and is populated 
by people from different parts of the city of Limón. And Cariari, located in the 
province of Limón, was originally a rural settlement that has been subject to 
urbanisation, attracting migrants from different parts of the country.
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 The three territories of Quebrada Honda, Palomar, and Los Ranchos,2 
all located in Santa Tecla (the metropolitan area of San Salvador), share 
the characteristic of being spontaneous urban developments located in 
environmentally vulnerable zones. Like every marginalised zone of Santa 
Tecla, there is a presence of gangs connected with Mara Salvatrucha, one 
of the two big maras in the country and the one that controls this locality. 
El Puente is an urban settlement located in the intermediate city of Son-
sonate, first established some 50 years ago as the result of a subdivision 
process. San Simón is a precarious settlement that developed spontaneously 
as a result of the occupation of disused urban spaces. Finally, the third site 
located in Sonsonante is El Cocotal, the product of both subdivisions and 
informal settlements. This neighbourhood was still a disputed territory 
between the Mara Salvatrucha and the 18th Street gang at the time this 
study was conducted.3
 As noted above, these are territories marked by the prevalence of social 
exclusion. Throughout this chapter, we will compare the group of Costa 
Rican study sites with the Salvadoran group.
 Our focus on social exclusion requires the consideration of two dimen-
sions. The first is primary exclusion, reflecting extreme disempowerment 
either in terms of employment precarity or the inability to ensure accumu-
lation and growth by means of self- generated economic activity. The 
second dimension, which may consolidate primary exclusion, relates to 
state neglect reflected in a lack of access to social citizenship in terms of 
education and/or social security (i.e. to a social protection floor that makes 
equality of opportunity a viable possibility) (Pérez Sáinz and Mora Salas 
2007; Pérez Sáinz 2012).
 The analysis proposed here has been operationalised through the use of 
three scales (see Table 6.1), framed in terms of the situations that reflect 
the most extreme levels of inclusion and exclusion.4
 The scores on these three scales, although calculated on an individual 
level, are aggregated according to the household to which the individual 
belongs, using a standardised range of values from 0 to 10.5 Thus, on each 
scale a score of 0 reflects a situation of maximum exclusion for the house-
hold in question: it contains only long- term unemployed persons (more 
than one year without work) and/or unpaid workers, none of the house-
hold members has any schooling, and no one has access to social security. 
Conversely, a score of 10 reflects maximum inclusion: household members 
in the labour market are paid employees who enjoy all available employ-
ment benefits and/or run medium- sized or large enterprises, all have com-
pleted higher education, and all have access to social security.
 Based on these scales, the households in the territories of each country 
have been grouped into clusters.6 The averages for each cluster on these 
scales and their respective sizes are detailed in Table 6.2.
 The precarity of these clusters has been charted on social maps using a 
system of coordinates where the y- axis corresponds to the labour market 
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insertion scale, and the x- axis shows a simple average of the other two 
scales (education and social security). The y- axis reflects the dynamics of 
inclusion/exclusion generated by the market, while the x- axis shows the 
same type of dynamics sponsored by the state through aspects of social 
 citizenship. Figures 6.1 and 6.2 represent the social maps for the two 
groups of territories.
 Both figures, or “social maps”, which offer a more immediate picture, 
as well as Table 6.2, reveal similarities and differences between the two 
groups of territories.
 There are two similarities. The first is that both groups of territories are 
characterised by social dualisation, as there are two clusters of households 
Table 6.1 Scales of social inclusion/exclusion








High inclusion Non-precarious 
paid 
employment
Ownership of large 
or medium-sized 
enterprises
Higher education Direct coverage 








No schooling No direct or 
indirect coverage




































Source: Pérez Sáinz, Calderón Umaña, and Brenes Camacho (2016).
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with very different probabilities of social exclusion/inclusion.7 The second 
similarity is that the averages on the education level scales are very similar 
for the two groups of sites: 3.03 for the Costa Rican territories and 2.92 
for the Salvadorans. Two dynamics lie behind this similarity: on the one 
hand, the increasing deterioration of public education in Costa Rica and, 
on the other, the “human capital” initiative implemented by four Nation-
alist Republican Alliance (ARENA) governments in El Salvador, with a 
clear (neo)liberal orientation.
Figure 6.1 Social clusters representing the territories studied in Costa Rica.
Figure 6.2 Social clusters representing the territories studied in El Salvador.
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 The differences, however, are many. The first is related to the weight of 
the cluster with the highest probability of social exclusion. In the Salva-
doran group, this includes nearly two- thirds of all households; however, 
for the Costa Rican group, it contains only slightly more than half. As 
might be expected, there is a higher rate of social exclusion in the Salva-
doran sites. Second, as can be observed on the “social maps”, the social 
inclusion cluster in the Costa Rican territories is located high up on the 
map, suggesting a strong level of inclusion. Conversely, in the case of the 
Salvadoran group, this cluster is closer to the middle, suggesting that inclu-
sion is weaker. Differences between the social security coverage scales and, 
especially, the labour market scales can explain this contrast. A third 
difference, which can also be seen in the maps, is that the exclusion cluster 
in the Salvadoran group is located in a clear exclusion zone, close to the 
origin of the coordinates. On the other hand, in the Costa Rican group this 
cluster is further to the right. This difference is explained mainly by the 
impact of social security. The score on this scale for the exclusion cluster 
in the Costa Rican group is 5.56, reflecting the fact that the old welfare 
state is holding steady and mitigating the effects of primary exclusion from 
basic markets.8 Conversely, the score on this scale is only 0.24 for the Sal-
vadoran sites, revealing the virtual absence of this component of social 
citizenship.
 Consequently, although social exclusion is prevalent in both the Costa 
Rican and Salvadoran territories, it differs in intensity and form. These 
differences are important to understanding the types of violence that char-
acterise these sites, as will be explained below.
The dynamics of violence in the territories
Our focus on social exclusion is based on the central role it plays in power 
relations, insofar as this phenomenon is understood as the result of 
extreme disempowerment occurring either in terms of precarity of paid 
employment or of exclusion from opportunities to accumulate wealth.9 In 
this sense, social exclusion is an expression of extreme inequalities (Pérez 
Sáinz 2016). When the state is not able to neutralise this disempowerment 
through social citizenship, the excluded members of society, exposed to a 
specific situation of marginalisation, are able to empower themselves 
through violence.10 The disempowerment expressed in the mechanisms of 
social exclusion can be understood in terms of objective disempowerment, 
which in turn gives rise to forms of subjective disempowerment. Such 
forms refer to how exclusion is accepted subjectively in the relationships 
that people establish with their peers and with society; that is, by con-
structing a subjective view through which they interpret their own con-
dition in relation to society and give meaning to alternative actions to 
attempt to seize some kind of control (empowerment) over their lives and 
the objective conditions they face (Zetino Duarte 2003, 2006). This is the 
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key factor linking inequality, social exclusion, and certain types of 
violence.
 The dynamics of the different types of violence that are considered in 
this study have been analysed with a special focus on their relational 
nature. Emphasis is placed on the central role of power as a mechanism for 
social relations and for violence. This mechanism refers to the relational 
use of the various resources to which individuals and social groups have 
different degrees of access, and through which they establish social rela-
tions. Such resources position individuals and social groups in the struc-
tures and dynamics of their relationships and, at the same time, orient 
them subjectively to those relationships. Within these contexts and struc-
tures, the use of resources configures power relations and gives content and 
meaning to the unique dynamic of each type or form of violence in a given 
context. This is expressed in the capacity to direct the course of both the 
relationship dynamics and the resulting outcomes. The resources of indi-
viduals or social groups, whether material or symbolic, are configured and 
re- configured historically—objectively and subjectively—in the context of 
the conditioning factors imposed on them by social structures and in 
accordance with their need to confront reality. Power, however, is not syn-
onymous with violence. When the relational dynamic of power or the con-
figuration of power structures in different contexts generates effects which, 
intentionally or not, cause harm, threaten lives or personal security, or the 
conditions leading to these developments, violence occurs (Zetino Duarte 
1997, 2003, 2006; Zetino Duarte, Brioso, and Montoya 2015).
 Understanding the dynamics of violence in these terms, one can see that 
the central role of power as a mechanism is not located on a specific level of 
reality (macrostructure, social context, community, family, or individual) as 
a determining factor of the others; rather, it is present on any and all of these 
levels, depending on the particular dynamic of the level on which the viol-
ence is expressed and of the relationships conditioning the other levels in 
relation to that level. The focus of this study has therefore been on the con-
figuration of different types of violence on relational levels, in the context of 
the dynamics produced on those levels by social exclusion in the territories.
 This study initially considered two types of violence, both instrumental 
but with different purposes. Social violence pursues esteem, honour, and 
prestige, while profit- seeking violence aims for the enhancement of pleasure 
and material benefit (Calderón Umaña 2013). However, this research has 
demonstrated that one of these forms takes on a central role and becomes 
contextual violence, which is effectively a third category. It is precisely in 
relation to this third category that the link between social exclusion and 
the different forms of violence can be seen most clearly. This observation 
leads us to the dynamics of violence that have been identified in the study 
sites, as shown in Table 6.3.
 The first reflection we can draw from Table 6.3 is that the manifestation 
of contextual violence differs depending on the country. In the case of 
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Costa Rica, it is through drug micro- markets, while, in El Salvador, it is 
the control of the territories by the maras. This difference is not unrelated 
to the expressions of social exclusion. In the Costa Rican sites, it is associ-
ated with primary disempowerment, while in the Salvadoran group, it is 
linked to state neglect.
 Indeed, in the Costa Rican territories there was already a demand for 
drugs, but the current supply is more diversified and has been boosted by 
the redefinition of international drug trade routes between South and 
North America, making Central America a bridge. Payment in kind11 (in 
drugs) for logistical services rendered in the region to support the drug 
trade, in addition to the growing problem of money laundering, has led to 
this increase in drug use in the local territories studied. This is a side effect 
of the trade and these micro- markets, although they form part of the global 
drug network, are not located on the main route. This does not mean that 
their external definition will not change in the future if local drug con-
sumption in transit countries becomes key to the profitability of this activ-
ity. The local drug market is characterised by three elements: it is based on 
trust and betrayal brings severe reprisals; it creates specific territorialities, 
privileging certain points in the territory because of its operations; and its 
activity is based on violence. Due to the final element, this activity gener-
ates fear and insecurity among residents of the territories, leading to their 
social isolation (Calderón Umaña and Salazar Sánchez 2015).
 On this point, it is important to highlight that locals turn to drug 
dealing because it offers a much better income than that offered by the 
occupations available to people constrained by exclusion and marginalisa-
tion. In other words, a connection is established between primary exclu-
sion and this type of violence. This dilemma is significant in the case of 
Table 6.3 Dynamics of violence by type of violence and by territory
Types of 
violence
Costa Rican territories Salvadoran territories
Contextual Drug micro-markets
Generation of imaginary 
of fear
Dispute and control of territory by 
maras
Stigmatisation of territory 
Profit-seeking Theft and robbery 
associated with drug 
use
The maras engage in extortion but also 
offer protection against external 
profit-seeking violence
Social Violence between couples 
and between 
neighbours
Resolution of extreme family and 
neighbourhood conflicts by the 
maras
Victim/perpetrator binary in neighbourhood violence is diminished 
These forms of violence are naturalised and rendered invisible
Source: Pérez Sáinz (2015: Chapters II and III).
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youth,12 a fact that supports Valenzuela’s (2012) observation that the 
“narco- world” has become an important space for the definition of life 
projects among young people.13
 In the case of the Salvadoran territories, contextual violence is struc-
tured around juvenile gangs or maras.14 These groups do not merely 
control specific points within the territory, but the whole territory. This 
control is essentially the result of the absence of the state, having effect-
ively given up its monopoly on coercion in these areas and leaving other 
actors to fight over it. In this case, we find another link between social 
exclusion and contextual violence, not in relation to primary exclusion but 
to state neglect.
 This control is often the subject of dispute between gangs; indeed, at the 
time this research was conducted, a dispute was ongoing in one of the sites 
in Sonsonante. The violent activity of the maras has multiple dimensions, 
but in this study there are three that stood out. The first is the recruitment of 
minors. Second, the widespread use of violence generates isolation and 
silence among local residents, restricting the spaces for social interaction in 
the territories. Only in evangelical churches, which proliferate in these con-
texts, is a certain degree of social interaction possible, albeit in the context of 
religious practice. Third, the violent actions of the maras lead to the stigma-
tising of the territories by other sectors of society, with consequent problems 
for local residents when they interact with people outside their own territory 
(Zetino Duarte, Brioso, and Montoya 2015). Indeed, this stigmatisation is 
the result of a metonymic relationship between the criminals themselves and 
the territory where they reside. In prevailing perceptions, especially in the 
media, the territory is socially homogenised and all its residents are deemed 
criminals (Cornejo 2012).15 This metonymy is clear in the case of young 
people not only in El Salvador but also in Guatemala and Honduras, where 
they are automatically viewed as gang members (Aguilar Umaña 2016).
 Theft and assault are the main manifestations of the second type of viol-
ence considered in this study—profit- seeking violence—in the Costa Rican 
sites. In most cases, residents of these territories tend to associate this crim-
inal activity with local drug consumption. This means that, although the 
study has identified this type of violence as a sporadic phenomenon, it con-
stitutes the main source of fear for residents of these territories, who 
respond to these threats in isolated and individual ways (Calderón Umaña 
and Salazar Sánchez 2015).
 Profit- seeking violence also exists in the Salvadoran territories studied, 
but it is engaged in exclusively by the maras. The victims are the local resi-
dents, who are subjected to different forms of extortion, especially in the 
case of small businesses.16 However, this monopoly on violence includes 
protection against profit- seeking violence of external origin. This points to 
the ambiguous role of these gangs, making it impossible to deal with them 
through a simple analysis or facile measures (Zetino Duarte, Brioso, and 
Montoya 2015).
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 This same ambiguous role is evident in relation to the third form of viol-
ence: social violence. In the Salvadoran territories, the maras control and 
restrict extreme expressions both of family conflicts (in which the victims 
are mostly women and children) and neighbourhood conflicts, as they aim 
to prevent external intervention in their resolution.17 This type of control 
mechanism does not exist in the Costa Rican territories, where both viol-
ence between couples (in which women are the main victims) and between 
neighbours is commonplace but is not viewed by residents as being as 
threatening as profit- seeking violence.
 There are two phenomena in relation to social violence that are common 
to all the territories in both countries. One is violence that tends to be ren-
dered invisible and naturalised. This is mainly due to the significance taken 
on by violence that becomes contextual because it is around such violence 
that the local imaginaries of fear are constructed. Second, in neighbourhood 
conflicts, the importance of the victim/perpetrator binary is diminished 
because the roles are often exchanged. Indeed, this phenomenon points to 
the danger of essentialising this dichotomy by assigning fixed identities that 
end up stigmatising the people concerned (Aguilar Umaña 2016).
Initiatives against violence in the territories
In this study, three initiatives in the territories to prevent and/or confront 
violence were identified. Two are in the Costa Rican territories (Cariari 
and Concepción Arriba), while the third has been applied in most of the 
Salvadoran territories analysed.
 The main characteristics of these initiatives are outlined in Table 6.4.
 Collective actors have been identified in the territories, some of which 
are articulated around particular or general interests or needs. Notable in 
the case of general interests are development associations. However, in all 
the study sites, resident participation in these kinds of organisations is 
extremely rare, and thus their potential impact is very limited.18 It is in this 
sense that we argue that the territories have residents but no community. 
The absence of community means that of the three initiatives against viol-
ence identified in the territories, two were of external origin.
 The only relative exception is Cariari because the implementation of the 
Territorios Seguros [Secure Territories] initiative depends on actions by the 
residents themselves. It is a recent initiative that began in a nearby com-
munity but has since expanded—initially on the Atlantic coast—and is 
now nationwide. Through charismatic regional social leadership, a plan 
has been established to recover citizenship, especially social citizenship, for 
subjugated sectors, in which women have played a leading role. Its work 
focuses on three lines of action: citizen security, resolution of conflicts 
between citizens and institutions, and training the individuals participating 
in the process, with the aim of consolidating skills so that they can create 
their own productive choices. Indeed, Territorios Seguros is self- described 
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as a “concept of life”19 and its activities focus on engaging public institu-
tions so they have a presence in the territories where they have been 
organised.
 In Concepción Arriba, we studied experiences in the context of the 
Community Security Programme implemented by the Ministry of Public 
Security. This involves training local residents, through different modules, 
in the prevention of violence in conjunction with the police service. The 
experiences analysed in our study suggest that implementation is uneven. 
There are three factors that could explain this variation: the period of 
residence of the inhabitants, which is generally associated with home 
ownership; the delimitation of the territory; and the operation of the 
resultant committee. Specifically, a committee composed of long- term resi-
dents, overseeing a small and clearly delimited territory and engaging in 
other activities in addition to security initiatives, is the type of committee 
with the best chance of success (Salazar Sánchez and Pérez Sáinz 2015).
 In the case of the Salvadoran territories, the experiences studied relate 
to the Municipal Citizen Security Plans in which the role of the United 
Nations Development Programme (UNDP) has been crucial. Two types of 
implementation have been identified. The first is more focused and limited 
to a closed territory, as in the case of Palomares in Santa Tecla. The second 
is more open and operates through municipal networks, as happens in 
Sonsonante. These two types of implementation have had different effects 
Table 6.4 Initiatives to tackle violence in the territories
Dimensions Costa Rican territories Salvadoran territories




External: Municipal Citizen Security 
Plans (United Nations 
Development Programme), focusing 
on territories or implemented 
through municipal networks
Achievements Strengthening of social 
citizenship
Connecting residents with 
police service
Context of truce
Strengthening of community 
organisations and of institutional 
networks in the territories
Redefinition of power relations 
between community organisations 
and the maras
Challenges Addressing social violence 
(Territorios Seguros)
Sustainability of the 
initiative (Community 
Security)
Sustainability of the initiative after 
end of truce 
Development of community actors in the territories 
Source: Pérez Sáinz (2015: Chapters IV and V).
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on the prospect of turning the populations of the territories into social 
actors capable of tackling the dynamics of violence. The most notable 
aspect of the focused approach in Santa Tecla is that it has reinforced the 
organisational structures in the settlements. It has strengthened residents’ 
capacity for management and independent action without depending on 
the dynamics of local government, generating new leadership structures 
and rebuilding the social fabric. Conversely, in Sonsonante, new leadership 
structures have not emerged. The community association is not auto-
nomous and does not have a capacity for engagement. All actions are 
dependent on the local government. The mechanisms for management, 
planning, decision- making, and execution of the work are based outside 
the community, under the control of the local government (Brioso, Zetino, 
and Montoya 2015).
 These programmes have been assessed in terms of their achievements, as 
well as the challenges they face. Thus, in the case of Territorios Seguros, 
there has been some very significant specific success in the fight against the 
local drug trade due to the collaboration of this organisation with the judi-
ciary. It is also important to highlight its clear commitment to social 
 citizenship. Its purpose involves engaging with the state in defence of the 
public good by asserting citizens’ rights, and there can be no doubt that it 
has helped members of the organisation to develop civic awareness. 
However, there is no similar initiative to deal with the issue of primary 
exclusion. Territorios Seguros also faces significant challenges in tackling 
the two types of social violence considered in this study. Finally, it remains 
to be seen whether the organisation’s actions, under its organisational 
model, will crystallise in the emergence of a community actor defined in 
accordance with the interests of the local residents.
 In Concepción Arriba, the experiences considered reveal that the Com­
munity Security Programme has resulted in engagement and connection 
between local residents and the police service. An analysis of this success 
confirms the recovery of community organisation. We have identified three 
challenges in this territory in relation to this type of experience. First, there 
is a danger that the demands of residents may be limited to the issue of 
security. Second, as a corollary to the first challenge, if the threats associ-
ated with violence are dealt with, the committee will cease to operate, 
which indicates a sustainability problem. And third, as a result of the 
previous two factors, the construction of community would be at risk 
(Salazar Sánchez and Pérez Sáinz 2015).
 The Salvadoran cases are likewise characterised by achievements and 
challenges. Notable among the achievements under the Municipal Citizen 
Security Plans are the following: strengthening of local leadership; “social 
capital” has been stimulated in terms of trust and cohesion among residents; 
and greater confidence in institutions has developed. There are also three 
challenges that these initiatives face. The first is related to the inevitable 
tension between the two logics of public security: the logic of repression of 
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crimes and that of social reintegration of offenders. Unsurprisingly, these 
types of projects are favoured at times when the second logic prevails and, 
conversely, they are threatened when the logic of repression predominates. 
Second, it is important to take into account the sustainability of the projects, 
especially the economic initiatives, which can generate secure sources of 
income that serve to reduce the effects of social exclusion. These two chal-
lenges affect the gangs and, in this respect, we need to consider a third 
factor, related to the change of perspective among the leaders of the maras 
concerning whether these types of interventions represent a transformation. 
Due to the mode of implementation of the Municipal Citizen Security Plan 
in Santa Tecla, there is a certain degree of specificity in the case of the 
achievements in Palomares. There has been a strengthening of community 
organisation that has resulted in a reconfiguration of the power relations 
between the mara and local residents (Brioso, Zetino, and Montoya 2015).
 However, these achievements are overshadowed by the aforementioned 
tension between the two logics of public security—the key issue for the 
viability of these kinds of initiatives. Indeed, the fieldwork for this study in 
the Salvadoran territories was only possible because it coincided with a 
truce between gangs. Nevertheless, there have been situations of repressive 
intervention on the part of law enforcement agencies that have undermined 
the processes encouraged by this type of initiative. The truce is now over 
and at the time of writing (2016–2017) the Municipal Citizen Security 
Plans have been subordinated to the logic of the special nationwide 
security measures approved by the Salvadoran Legislative Assembly in 
April 2016. The preventive component of the original plans has been com-
pletely superseded by the repressive component. As a result, the achieve-
ments indicated above for the territories included in this study are in 
jeopardy, and the dominant presence of the repressive violence of the state 
is being consolidated to confront the violence of the maras. In this way, the 
contextual violence in these territories is mutually conditioned.
Conclusions: consequences for public policy
Public policy on a national scale—and the advice and recommendations 
provided by multilateral bodies offering technical support and cooperation 
that aim to influence that policy—is based on the assumption that certain 
criteria and findings are true. In the case of the reduction and prevention 
of urban violence in Latin America, this advice and the discourse associ-
ated with it involves mapping a characterisation of the violence, reinfor-
cing community strategies in response to it, and developing a 
one- dimensional definition of what organised crime represents in the local 
space.
 The research presented in this chapter aims to appeal to the prevailing 
common sense in the world of policies that address the different types of 
violence in cities. Three conclusions drawn from our findings are proposed 
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that question and complicate the following three aspects: collective action, 
characterisation of the violence, and representations of organised crime.
 The first conclusion relates to the difficulties associated with an a priori 
assumption of the existence of a community actor that would suggest the 
establishment of community within a given territory. The second is that 
violence cannot be conceived of in the singular, but needs to be approached 
as a diverse phenomenon that requires us to consider “violences”, assess-
ing and characterising each instance of violence in order to understand 
how to prioritise it from the perspective of public policy. And third— 
specifically relevant to the Salvadoran case—is the need to understand that 
the phenomenon of the maras reflects an ambiguous reality inherent in 
criminal organisations that have evolved into quasi- official agencies in con-
texts of state neglect, in a way that extends beyond their simple characteri-
sation as an agent of violence. Each of these conclusions is discussed in 
more detail in the following paragraphs.
 First, there is a large body of literature that analyses the difficulties and 
limitations associated with the development of active communities in 
urban territories marked by exclusion and violence. The case studies 
included in this research have made it possible to identify three factors that 
complicate collective action and organisation: territorial factors, social 
factors, and factors associated with violence.
 With respect to territorial factors, we need to recognise first these study 
sites are shaped by different migration flows. The multiple origins of their 
residents hinder the establishment of a collective identity and the mecha-
nisms of social cohesion associated with such an identity. The relatively 
recent establishment of these settlements makes it difficult for residents to 
identify with their territory, as this is something normally associated with 
long- term coexistence. Added to this are problems associated with home 
ownership by the residents, which contributes to a weakening of the sense 
of belonging to the territory. Another important factor is the role and pres-
ence of the state in these communities. Inadequate recognition of these set-
tlements by the city and its authorities, reflected, for example, in limited 
access to basic services, sends a message of exclusion or of not belonging 
to the city.
 The establishment of communities in these kinds of territories is also 
complicated by the social heterogeneity of their composition, which is 
aggravated by the impact of social exclusion. The social maps examined in 
the study are characterised by a tendency towards social dualisation. Not 
all residents are similar from a socioeconomic perspective: one cluster of 
households is irrevocably trapped in exclusion while another manages, 
with varying degrees of success, to distance itself from that exclusion.
 On the other hand, the study has revealed that contextual and profit- 
seeking forms of violence, as generators of fear and insecurity, provoke 
spirals of isolation and silence in the territories. In this context, the evid-
ence appears to indicate that only religious practice and association with 
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religious institutions present in the territory offer a space for the re- 
establishment of social interaction, although their effects are limited.
 In short, we need to view community actors as pre- existing realities for 
which the establishment of public policy entails risks and has con-
sequences. Community organisations and actors exist in the territory, but 
their capacity is limited as they are characterised by contradictions and a 
complex anthropology. In terms of policy recommendations, this means 
that organisations providing external interventions should understand and 
acknowledge—at the same time—that they are not acting in a vacuum and 
that part of their task is precisely to strengthen and contribute to the gen-
eration of a social fabric that will facilitate positive social cohesion. In this 
endeavour, a central element of any policy should be to incorporate a 
gender perspective that clarifies how women and men are differentiated as 
social actors in the territory, and their different definitions of the roles that 
such collective social actors can play in response to violence.
 The second idea associated with the implications of public policy that 
emerges from this study is related to the conceptual pluralisation of vio-
lence in the territory. With respect to contextual violence, the study 
demonstrates the impact of causal factors external to the territories, associ-
ated mainly with social exclusion.
 Social exclusion is expressed in terms of disempowerment in basic 
markets and as the absence of the state in the territories. In this sense, it is 
not enough for public policy to focus only on the state component; it 
should also take into account the basic markets associated with the 
problem: unemployment, paid employment without protection and rights, 
and engagement in activities that are self- generated but trapped in survival 
logic. It is insufficient to influence residents through employability and/or 
entrepreneurial initiatives if these are offered in isolation, on the basis of 
limited engagement; they need to be associated with changes to the socio-
economic structure in which the residents exist and which, to a large 
extent, defines and restricts their empowerment through employment.
 In the definition of public policy priorities and angles of intervention, it is 
important to reconsider the tensions and representations associated with 
profit- seeking and social violence. We believe that the Costa Rican case can 
offer clues in this respect. In the imaginaries of residents, but also of the 
authorities, expressed in surveys and interviews, it is profit- seeking violence 
that emerges as the most threatening and which therefore should be 
 prioritised—and, indeed, it is here where the public authorities tend to focus 
their attention. However, according to the testimonies of the residents, 
profit- seeking violence tends to be sporadic, while social violence, expressed 
in conflicts between couples or between neighbours, is commonplace and 
constant, and its consequences can be just as severe as those of profit- seeking 
violence. Nevertheless, social violence tends to be naturalised and rendered 
invisible, both from the perspective of government action and from the 
actions of quasi- official actors such as the Salvadoran gangs.
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 Social violence associated with couples or families, and its invisibility, 
reveals the need to incorporate a greater emphasis from a gender per-
spective into any analysis leading to the definition of public policy prior-
ities. The invisibility of social violence is, to a large extent, a consequence of 
the naturalisation—as distinct from and stronger than the normalisation—of 
gender violence that affects women and girls. To the extent that it is not 
recognised as such, or that its importance is dismissed, social violence 
tends to be given a lower priority than profit- seeking violence. The pro-
posal drawn from this study is that social violence should be made visible 
and given the priority it deserves. In other words, there needs to be a re- 
balancing of the importance of these two types of social violence (between 
couples or between neighbours) in relation to their context.
 A third and final consideration for public policy, limited in this case to the 
Salvadoran context, relates to the maras and their inherent ambiguity from 
the perspective of the territory and the actors who coexist in it. This study 
confirms something that research into organised crime and quasi- official 
organisations has shown repeatedly in other parts of the world: on the one 
hand, these organisations hold a monopoly on violence, generating fear and 
terror among local residents; on the other, they fill a vacuum left by the 
state, offering and mediating access to essential goods, including control of 
violence in the local territory. In addition to committing violence, the maras 
operate as regulators and, in a complex way, as guarantors of protection 
against profit- seeking violence coming from outside the territories (com-
mitted by “other” maras). They also act as mediators in domestic and neigh-
bourhood conflicts as a way of keeping the state out of their territories. If we 
fail to understand these opposing (and, at first glance, contradictory) per-
spectives that inhabit the imaginaries in the local space, we cannot hope to 
generate effective community responses to mitigate violence.
 We believe that from the perspective of effective and inclusive public 
policies to counteract violence and exclusion, there needs to be a political 
commitment to the reintegration of young people, involving them in the 
establishment of a community actor. This response, however, poses as 
many risks as it does opportunities. In terms of opportunities, it would be 
feasible to implement strategies of this kind only when the logic of recom-
position of the social fabric, as a response to public security, predominates 
over the logic of repression and exclusion. Moreover, these strategies are 
possible only insofar as the presence of the institutional network of the 
state is reintroduced to the territories, filling the institutional vacuum that 
has contributed to the rise of the gangs. If these initiatives are successful in 
strengthening community organisation (rather than assuming it to be pre- 
existing), the power of the maras could be reduced. Finally, economic pro-
jects that attempt to deal with primary exclusion need to be successful and 
sustainable, generating lasting sources of income which, while they may 
not be similar to profits from criminal activity, at least allow individuals to 
lead a decent life and re- establish public recognition of the value of labour.
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 Regarding the risks, the first is related precisely to the lack of sustain-
ability of the aforementioned economic projects that aim to respond to 
exclusion, feeding young people’s argument that society does not provide 
them with the means to achieve their aspirations of wealth, power, and 
prestige. The second risk has to do with the imposition of the logic of 
repression. The logic of reintegration does not always predominate, and 
the cycles of “peace- making” or truce have their own dynamics that may 
also conceal a hidden agenda among gang leaders—to use such moments 
of calm as an opportunity to reinforce their power and control over the 
territories.
 These are the clearest conclusions from the three basic ideas that emerge 
from this research. We conclude by reiterating those ideas, as they form 
the core of our message: we should not assume the existence of a com-
munity actor in a territory that would reflect the existence of community; 
we should not speak of violence in the singular, but of “violences”, and 
assess each form of violence to determine how to prioritise it; and, specifi-
cally relevant to the Salvadoran cases, the phenomenon of the maras 
reveals an ambiguous reality that extends beyond their mere characterisa-
tion as agents of violence, suggesting that the analysis cannot be simple, 
and the solutions will not be easy.
Notes
 1 This chapter summarises the main empirical findings, as well as their con-
sequences in relation to public policy, of the research project carried out in 
Costa Rica and El Salvador between April 2013 and June 2015, in the context 
of the Safe and Inclusive Cities programme developed by Canada’s International 
Development Research Centre (IDRC) and the United Kingdom’s Department 
for International Development (DFID). The project involved a survey of house-
holds, the main results of which are presented in terms of social exclusion, fol-
lowed by a stage of qualitative analysis related to different forms of violence 
and to initiatives in response to them. This research focused on nine study sites: 
three in Costa Rica and six in El Salvador. These sites are urban territories 
located in metropolitan areas and in intermediate cities in both countries, all 
characterised by a prevalence of social exclusion.
 2 The names of the Salvadoran territories are fictitious to protect key informants 
from these locations.
 3 A more detailed description of these territories can be found in Pérez Sáinz 
(2015: Annex A), available online (in Spanish) at www.flacso.or.cr/images/ 
flippingbook/pdfs/libros/exclusion_social_violencia.pdf.
 4 The development of these scales is discussed in Pérez Sáinz (2015: Annex B).
 5 For households where none of the members are employed or unemployed, the 
score on the labour scale has been estimated based on criteria related to the 
quality of the source of non- labour income transferred to this type of 
household.
 6 The procedure used was two- step cluster analysis.
 7 This phenomenon of dualisation is equally clear in each of the sites considered sep-
arately. The only exception is Concepción Arriba, where households are broken 
into four clusters. This is a site located in Costa Rica’s largest metropolitan area, 
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where the diversity of options in the labour market would appear to generate 
greater social heterogeneity.
 8 This refers to markets in which a society’s basic resources are exchanged: 
labour, capital, land, and knowledge. These markets are asymmetrical power 
environments that generate different types of inequalities, making the genera-
tion, circulation, and appropriation of surpluses possible under capitalism 
(Pérez Sáinz 2016).
 9 This proposition is in contrast to current approaches to poverty in Latin 
America, where deprivation is understood in non- relational terms and defined 
according to standards established by experts. Such approaches conceal any ref-
erence to power and conflict.
10 There are other responses to marginalisation: immigration, religious activity, or 
collective action through social movements. In other words, not every excluded 
person resorts to criminal activity.
11 This is a phenomenon that has been identified in other regions since the 1980s 
(Briceño-León 2007).
12  The dilemma can be resolved through various types of mediation: socialisation 
processes (especially at the family level), interactions with public institutions, 
couples/relationship therapy, capacity for agency, etc. (Espíndola Ferrer 2013). 
This means that not every young person growing up in a marginalised area is 
inevitably doomed to a life of crime.
13 Nevertheless, it is also important to note that young people may become 
involved in crime due to debts contracted with dealers rather than out of a 
quest for profit (Zamudio Angles 2013).
14 For obvious security reasons, this research has made the maras an object of 
study. However, when discussing the different dimensions considered, these 
gangs emerged as a key explanatory element. On this point, see the interpreta-
tive diagram of the Salvadoran territories (Pérez Sáinz 2015: 251).
15 Thus, Manzano Chávez (2009), in her study of “critical neighbourhoods” in 
Santiago de Chile, concludes that most of the population does not completely 
lose their ties to the social system.
16 The so- called “renteo” is key to the economic survival of the maras. A study 
conducted in El Salvador on the extortion of small businesses identified three 
types: systematic “symbiotic” extortion, offering protection in exchange for 
payment; systematic “non- symbiotic” extortion, merely taking money without 
offering any service in return, which has a predatory effect because it ultimately 
destroys the businesses it targets; and opportunistic extortion, engaged in by 
independent individuals who take advantage of the existence of the first two 
types (Ponce et al. 2016).
17 On this point, it has been noted that agents of violence who control territories 
abandoned by the state can provide four types of public goods essential to local 
life: protection against external attacks; intermediation in conflicts within the 
community, whether domestic or between neighbours; mediation of community 
activity by filtering and permitting certain actions by agents and institutions 
from outside the community; and the celebration of festive activities that enter-
tain the community and that are highly valued by local residents (Perea et al. 
2014).
18 In the survey of households, the highest participation was in Cariari, where 
only 8.9 per cent of households had at least one member participating in com-
munity organisations.
19 This conception is systematised in terms of progressive processes of empower-
ment of citizens in relation to the state (Salazar Sánchez and Pérez Sáinz 2015: 
148–155).
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7 The contribution of informal 
institutionality to safe cities in 
Venezuela
Roberto Briceño-León
“After they killed my oldest son, I was left thinking about what I could 
do.” This is how Maria started to explain to me and my research team 
how her struggle for peace began. With her face still wracked with pain, 
she tells us that he was her oldest child. “I can’t tell you that he was the 
one I loved most, because you love all your children the same.” But she 
recognises that she had a very special fondness for him, perhaps due to 
how painful and complicated his birth was. “It was like the boy didn’t 
want to be born.”
 Vengeance was the norm in the barrio; the “snake” had to be killed to 
pay back the blood debt. And that debt had to be collected by the brother, 
the father, the cousin, or any man in the area where they lived. Aggression 
is regarded as a collective affront, suffered by everyone: the family, the 
neighbourhood, and the barrio.
 The war between the gangs from the high part of the mountain and 
those from the low part of the mountain had been going on for many 
years. An invisible border was established as there was a danger of being 
attacked by the gang from the other territory: they are both a neighbour 
and an enemy. Economic pressures gave rise to feuds: control of the trade 
in drugs and stolen goods justified control of the territory. But then, over 
time and with the dead, that had been forgotten; honour and pride had 
taken over.
 “I said I didn’t want more dead, I didn’t want revenge, this slaughter 
had to stop …” With her gesture, Maria, as a mother, renounced her right 
to revenge, to demand punishment exacted by the hands of her family 
members and neighbours. Her gesture surprised both friends and enemies—
especially the men—because it changed the rules that had driven the con-
flicts for years: the endless chains of blood debts that were impossible to 
collect without starting a new cycle of pain and death. “But I didn’t do it 
out of goodness, I did it for my own interests because I had another son 
and I didn’t want them to kill him too.…”
 And so the peace process began in the district. Perhaps this is also how, 
many centuries ago and in many places, a process of civilisation began that 
led to the building of a social contract and the rule of law.
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The city, pacts, and violence
Cities are houses, streets, neighbourhoods, industries, businesses, roads, 
parks, but above all they are norms. The city exists in the rules that govern 
daily coexistence, agreements that ensure the mechanisms for access to 
resources and for resolving disagreements and conflicts. That is why the 
city is the “polis”: the centre of politics, understood as the way of produ-
cing arrangements for cooperation and competition, and regulating and 
legitimising domination and subjugation. This is what reduces the use of 
violence and makes it possible for people to live together without wars and 
deaths.
 Perhaps due to their omnipresence, the rules of the city have become 
invisible. This is likely their strength; we come to live with the laws 
without needing to be reminded of them all the time. And a society is at 
peace when those rules are internalised (Habermas 1996).
 The reduction of interpersonal violence in Europe was accompanied by 
a long process of building awareness that rejected violence. In Paris, the 
Feast of St. John used to end with dropping cats into the flames of a 
bonfire; then, awareness transformed into rules and laws, and today animal 
protection societies have even been able to stop the use of animals for drug 
testing and medical studies. This historic process of heightening awareness 
and personal containment, described by Elias (1987), has controlled viol-
ence. Executions and corporal punishment, once on display, were com-
pletely prohibited or, at least, hidden from view (Foucault 2000). 
Awareness prevailed and created the social rule, and then came law.
 Societal life requires agreements and regulations, but they are needed 
even more in the city due to its population density (Wirth 1938). In the 
city, people are crowded together, and both the human closeness and the 
response to urban anonymity needed to protect individual privacy require 
more rules for coexistence. Personal ties and trust are no longer enough to 
drive social relations; general and abstract laws are required.
 Urban rules support coexistence because they pacify society by making 
the behaviour of others predictable (North, Wallis, and Weingast 2009). 
Rules regulate the reproductive mechanisms of society, through both alli-
ances and kinship, as well as through the mechanisms for the creation and 
distribution of wealth and for resolution of conflicts. Society can reproduce 
itself due to material conditions, but the trust that arises from the fact that 
each person knows what to expect from another, in a way that is under-
standable and reliable, is also needed.
 Stabilisation of the expectations of society comes about by imposing 
law or formal institutionality (Luhmann 2005), and the same goal can 
also be achieved through rules that are neither written, nor systematised, 
which I call informal institutionality. By stabilising expectations, people 
know what they should do and what they can expect from the actions of 
others. Informal institutionality therefore consists of the norms shared 
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by a population that were created, exist, and must be complied with in 
that territory, separate from what is established by formal law (Briceño-
León 2016a).
 Although informal institutionality is outside the dominant, formal legal 
system, this does not necessarily mean that it is against or in competition 
with the law, but rather that it can perform functions that complement, 
substitute, or accommodate formal institutions (Helmke and Levitsky 
2006). However, informal institutionality can also be controlled by crim-
inal gangs or illegal armed groups (guerrillas or paramilitary groups), 
which replace the state and control territories to extract profit.
 The strength of informal institutionality lies in the recognition that it is 
carried out by the stakeholders involved and their capacity to effectively 
guide the behaviour of the people, both through their voluntary willingness 
to comply as well as their expectation that not doing so would lead to the 
application of penalties for offenders (O’Donnell 2006).
 Both types of institutionality can have the same social force in steering 
behaviour towards that which is prescribed—the right thing to do—as well 
as to accept any negative consequences—the punishment—that a pro-
hibited behaviour may have (Durkheim 1996; Messner, Rosenfeld, and 
Karstedt 2013). What I highlight in this chapter is that informal institu-
tionality exists and is very strong in Latin Amer ican cities. It fills an inca-
pacity or void in formal law to regulate urban development and 
coexistence. Informal institutionality, I argue, should not necessarily be 
understood as a negative reality, nor as a shortcoming of society that must 
be resisted; rather, to the contrary, it can represent a contribution to the 
building of safe cities.
The urban structure of the city and institutionality
Urban growth has led our research team to identify five zones in Vene- 
zuelan  cities:
1. Historic City Centre
2. Private Formal Residential Development
3. Public Formal Residential Development
4. Consolidated Informal Urban Development
5. Unconsolidated Informal Urban Development.
These zones differ from each other in their physical aspect, their built 
environment, and their social and normative characterisation. Analysis of 
urban zones has a long- standing tradition in sociology, from analysis of 
the internal organisation of Amer ican cities conducted using concentric 
theories (Burgess and Locke 1953) to the theses on urban structures for 
Latin America (Yujnovsky 1971; Camacho 2016). Our five zones draw on 
this literature and are a tool for data analysis.
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 Formal institutionality is predominant in three of the five zones. The 
first is the Historic City Centre, which has a varied urban volume and 
social diversity. There, we find houses up against each other, with colonial- 
style interior patios, beside buildings ranging in height from medium to 
very tall. The checkerboard layout established by order of King Phillip II 
of Spain continues to be in use.
 In the twentieth century, under the influence of city garden concepts 
from England and following the advent of the private automobile and the 
design of North Amer ican suburbs, extensive areas of Private Formal Resi-
dential Developments, the second zone, arose and attracted the urban elite 
(Amato 1970). This type of residential development was the result of activ-
ity by private property developers and the existing urban regulations were 
adapted to these designs. Over time, and with greater demand for housing, 
these zones were densified and replaced by multi- family buildings. Con-
sequently, the elite moved to zones further away.
 Heavy demand for housing from low- income residents, who could not 
access the private formal market, led governments to establish a third zone: 
Public Formal Residential Development. In these areas, mass- market 
housing production policies were developed to serve this population. The 
programmes were of different scopes, depending on the resources available 
from governments, and had very disparate impacts on the cities. Unlike the 
first two zones, where there is private ownership of houses and land, 
ownership is very heterogeneous in Public Formal Residential Development 
zones. In some cases, the government granted ownership of the dwelling to 
residents, but not the land on which it sits. In other cases, it granted 
ownership of both; in still other cases, it granted ownership of neither.
 The other two urban zones consist of informal urban development. The 
difference between the two is that one has consolidated both physically 
and in its social cohesion and rules, even if in an informal manner, while 
the other is still in the process of consolidation. Both were built spontan-
eously by people, who invaded public or private land and developed it as 
they wished. Very often this urban development process occurred without 
planning or design, except during the construction itself and according to 
needs, technological capacity to adapt to the land, and the agreements or 
disputes that occurred during the occupation and densification process 
(Ziccardi 2008; Bolívar 2011, 2016).
 In the Consolidated Informal Urban Development zones, inhabitants 
have known each other for decades and now the second and third gener-
ations of families live there. The grandparents worked the land; the 
parents were working class; and their children or grandchildren focused 
on education, with many graduating from university. In the newer gener-
ations, some are employed, but others are unable to enter the workforce 
and are caught in networks of crime and drugs. Although there are 
exceptions, it is most common for them to own their homes but not have 
ownership of the land.
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 Because they were established more recently or due to their financial or 
physical difficulties, other urban zones are known as Unconsolidated 
Informal Urban Developments. In many cities, the creation of new 
informal urban development zones has been a continuous process of 
expansion, whether a result of the arrival of new inhabitants or of the 
housing requirements of the second or third generations (Cravino 2006). 
In these zones, there is not only a lack of consolidation of the urban struc-
ture and housing, but also of social relationships, and neither the rules nor 
the power or leadership of any group has been established. The manner of 
social integration is different because, unlike the consolidated zones, 
inhabitants do not come from a rural area or small cities, but rather were 
born and have grown up in big cities.
 In these zones of urban development and informal institutionality, there 
is a regulatory duality that results from the time they were created as their 
existence was not recognised by the state (Calderón 2005). For decades, 
the plans for Venezuelan cities showed these vast areas in green, like parks. 
Since the zones were illegal, without the necessary permits, they could not 
be recognised as residential and business areas. Frequently they did not 
comply with formal urban development requirements, such as the required 
slope of the land, location of buildings on the land, distance from other 
buildings, or compliance with sanitary regulations for drinking and waste-
water. Since they did not meet the necessary standards, they were ignored 
and considered vacant forest land or city parks.
 This caused ambivalence in the city, where the political authorities do 
not recognise informal urban development; they do not create rules and 
laws, nor adapt existing ones, to regulate the urban and social existence of 
these areas; nor are they capable of imposing the rules of the formal city 
on those urban areas (Briceño-León 2016b).
 In these two excluded zones of the city, violence and insecurity prevail. 
For example, 84 per cent of homicides occur in these areas (INE 2010). 
The victims are poor people who die at the hands of other poor people 
(Pedrazzini 2005). The population of these areas therefore faces double 
exclusion: first, physical exclusion due to the lack of integration into the 
city and, second, exclusion from regulatory integration and security.
Informal institutionality to contain violence
In Venezuela’s barrios, both consolidated and unconsolidated, people live 
in the shadow of the law. Social life in those parts of the city is not outside 
the law, nor is it in harmony with or governed by the rule of law. Cer-
tainly, barrios develop “outside” the law: they are built on land that has 
been invaded without the construction permits required in other urban 
zones. Houses were built on spaces that are not authorised for develop-
ment and on land belonging to others (the property of the state or private 
owners). As a result, the people of the barrios have survived for many 
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years under the threat of eviction and with the fear of losing the money, 
effort, and dreams they invested in them (Bolívar 2016).
 As such, the institutionality that is experienced in the barrios does not 
fully conform to the legislation of the country, nor to the urban norms of 
the city. But the barrios are there, they exist and prosper, and, in many 
cases, the authorities have supported their residents in building an urban 
life by giving them services, water, power, sewers, schools, and medical 
centres. Some national or local authorities have even granted residents 
ownership of the land. But they are still not integrated into the city in a 
spatial sense, nor in a regulatory and legal manner, and this is a source of 
conflict and violence. Exclusion is not only spatial and territorial, it is also 
social and regulatory. However, it cannot be affirmed that these are spaces 
where anomie rules. There is not a regulatory or institutional void, but 
what does exist is a distinct form of regulation, an informal institutionality 
that is in the shadow of the law.
 Informal institutionality is the practical response of urban communities 
to a lack of formal law that is applicable to and works in their social con-
texts: it ensures individual rights and constitutes a guide for preventing or 
resolving conflicts outside the law. Informal institutionality is not neces-
sarily illegal or criminal, although it can be. We can say that it is paralegal 
because it is outside, but in the shadow of formal law. It intends to copy 
both the law and the formal practices of the rule of law. This paralegalism 
can be illegal because it realises acts that are not considered or proscribed 
by law; however, it is not criminal, as it identifies with the ultimate pur-
poses of formal institutionality, but not with its methods. In this sense, 
paralegalism acts as a substitute for law (Helmke and Levitsky 2006). 
Since there is an alignment with the purposes of regulating social relation-
ships and stabilising expectations in order to reduce conflicts, I maintain 
that it operates in the shadow of formal law. For this very reason, local 
authorities often grant recognition to the rites of informal institutionality 
(acting, for example, as witnesses to the signing of lease or sale agree-
ments) despite their illegality.
 However, there is no state that enforces compliance with informal insti-
tutionality, nor punishment for those who do not comply. It is force of 
habit: the autoritas of respected and respectable individuals, the general 
will of reason, as Locke (2007) said. When this consensus and reason fail, 
and in the absence of established mechanisms for punishment, it opens the 
way for citizens to take justice into their own hands or for criminal gangs 
to take retribution. These credible threats, often more credible that those 
of the punishment provided by the formal criminal justice system, com-
bined with consensus and habit, lend recognition and functionality to 
informal institutionality.
 In our research, we found many experiences that demonstrate the func-
tioning of informal institutionality and its contribution to the containment 
of violence. Below are some examples.
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The invisible borders of crime
“I can’t accompany you any further”, the community leader exclaimed 
suddenly, guiding her down the steps to the ravine and stopping 
abruptly on the step. “And why are you stopping here, Juan?”, replied 
the researcher in surprise. There was nothing obvious to prevent him 
from continuing, no sign, no tree, not even a landing on the steps. 
“Because from here on I cannot guarantee your safety”, he responded 
regretfully, but confident in what he was saying. Then he explained 
that this area was controlled by “another” gang with whom they had 
no agreements.
(A mountainous barrio to the east of Caracas, 2014) 
Cities have invisible borders. People are afraid of being victims of crime. 
The national survey used to inform this chapter took place in 2015. Resi-
dents of 1,500 homes, selected at random, across the country were inter-
viewed. Its results demonstrated that the quality of life had diminished 
since the 2014 survey, and showed how living with violence and insecurity 
has affected the population. For example, 58 per cent were afraid of being 
victims of crime in their neighbourhood (Briceño-León and Camardiel 
2016a). These invisible borders mark the space in which criminal actors 
deal in illegal goods and protection; they are territories gained over years 
of bloody battles and building bonds of solidarity or fear with local 
inhabitants and of respect by others. In the impoverished barrios, these 
borders are accentuated, given that the presence of law enforcement and 
the rule of law is scarce or non- existent, so security and order must be pro-
vided by the inhabitants themselves (Caldeira 2000).
 The borders in the barrios, like those between countries, are a source of 
permanent tension, as any incursion could be considered a threat and vio-
lently repelled. It is a case of protecting both the market and honour. In 
one of the research zones, aggression could take the symbolic form of some 
gang members shining spotlights on the territories of another gang. In the 
darkness of night, the interjection of a ray of light from a spotlight told the 
rival gang: “I’m watching you, I can reach you with my light and also with 
my bullets”. And because of that, the response from the other gang often 
came in the form of bullets. And that is how the fight began.
 The response from community organisations was to develop agreements 
to first respect, and then overcome, these invisible borders. It was not an 
easy task. There was dialogue with gang members and with individuals 
from different areas, in an attempt to reinstate the right of free movement, 
but it was not easy as there were misgivings on both sides. The first thing 
that was done was to formalise the borders, so that no one was in doubt 
about where they could and could not go. Then some rules of mutual 
respect were established; one of them was as trivial as not using spotlights 
to threaten each other. Next, residents established a means by which 
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another area could be notified (and, in some way, request permission) to 
inform the opposing side that some people were going to pass through 
their territory, but that they were doing so in peace, not aggression, to 
reduce the risk of conflict (Zubillaga, Llorens, and Souto 2016).
 Subsequently, in some barrios of Caracas and Ciudad Guayana, resi-
dents were able to establish a “common zone”—a territory not controlled 
by any of the gangs—where community activities could take place. One of 
the activities conducted by female teachers was to organise games for chil-
dren on both sides of the border, making them equals through play. The 
intent was to create a situation in which they could grow up as friends 
rather than rivals, so that empathy could arise in daily life, and they could 
see each other as children just like themselves and not a threatening enemy 
(Pernalete 2016). It is a strategy similar to the school lunch programme in 
India, in which members of different castes were seated at the table, includ-
ing, especially, “Dalits” or untouchables, to create a space of equality and 
freedom (Sen 2009).
 A third step, more difficult and with achievements that are still precari-
ous, is to tear down the borders and build a space of citizenship in which 
all have full rights to the city.
Cease- fire agreements
“No more dead!” the mother said, shrouded in grief; but, how can this 
be achieved? The aim of the mother was to break the chain of retali-
ation and revenge that had led to the violence, rather than reproducing 
it and making it persistent.
(Near central Caracas, 2014)
Cease- fire agreements have been used in various places in Latin America, 
most notably perhaps in the case of El Salvador, where an agreement was 
reached between the two major organised gangs and the national govern-
ment in an effort to reduce homicides. In Venezuela, the so- called “peace 
zones” were established—although not in an openly official manner as an 
explanatory plan was never published—in which the national government 
gave control of a territory to criminal gangs so that they would exercise 
control and reduce violence. In order to do so, the state restricted or pre-
vented the access of law enforcement personnel to these zones. This, in 
effect, saw the state give up its sovereignty over the zones, as had been the 
case in the demilitarised zone established between the Colombian govern-
ment and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) guerrillas 
in the area of San Vicente del Caguán, from 1999 to 2002, before it was 
retaken by the army.
 The aim of the cease- fire agreements that were in operation in an area 
of the Libertador municipality of Caracas was to minimise the damage 
caused by armed violence. The intention was not for youth to give up 
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gangs or crime, much less punish offenders or killers, but rather to simply 
establish a truce, prevent the violence, and, through this action, to rebuild 
a social bond and bring peace. The interesting thing about this proposal, 
which followed years of social work by community groups from univer-
sities and the Catholic church, was that it intended to change the situation 
through words and a social norm—an agreement—rather than dissuasion 
or repression. In this sense, it meant building an institutional framework 
based on some rules of the game being backed by the moral authority of 
the mothers of the youth, along with representatives of the church.
 These rules of the game of informal institutionality had two significant 
traits. First, they did not represent a threat to other forms of crime because 
although the agreement was not authorised, it did not seek to eliminate 
other crimes such as the sale of drugs. The agreement was confined to 
resolving conflicts by methods other than weapons and gunshots. But, 
second, the agreement meant that if the youths did not comply with it, 
offenders would be reported to the police. In other words, there was a 
latent threat of formal law enforcement. These ambiguities are what allow 
me to assert that informal institutionality acts outside, but in the shadow 
of, formal law.
Social pacts rewritten
“And how am I going to live if it is prohibited, if I raised all of my 
children and even put them through university by selling beer in the 
barrio?”, Dominga protested in front of the small window of her 
house, from which, for decades, every afternoon and evening she had 
offered “very cold” beer to her customers. Venezuelan law prohibits 
the sale of beer in places that do not have the required permits. To 
receive a permit, the sales cannot be conducted from a house or occur 
close to a school. “But here everything is close to everything”, 
she said.
(A barrio in Caracas, 2014)
The sale of alcohol in the barrios is a permanent source of conflict as it 
makes friendly coexistence difficult. In these spaces, drinkers hang around 
in the street talking and listening to music until late at night, while others 
have to work early the next day. If bottles break, glass is left in the streets 
creating a hazard for children playing there the next day; and, since there 
are no toilets available and beer is a diuretic, consumers end up urinating 
anywhere, resulting in foul odours in the neighbourhood. Finally, between 
complaints and celebrations, the sale of beer sometimes ends in brawls and 
people being injured, some seriously.
 The response was to apply formal law and prohibit the sale of beer. 
This was tried in a barrio of the Chacao municipality of Caracas. To 
prevent sales, the beer distributors’ trucks were prohibited from entering 
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the area and the police stationed themselves at the barrio’s only entrance. 
Nonetheless, the measure turned out to be futile. Bottles entered in a 
variety of ways: via the ravine that crossed the barrio, through holes that 
were opened in the walls of workshops adjacent to the area, and even 
hidden in baby carriages. The conflicts between neighbours persisted and 
beer was still sold at night. The only thing that was achieved was an 
increase in its price.
 It was then that a different process began. Officials from City Hall and 
local law enforcement talked to sellers, distributors, non- drinking neighbours, 
and consumers of alcohol, and they began to establish agreements that would 
reconcile the parties in conflict (Carrillo Peraza and Espinoza 2008). In the 
end, they negotiated some agreements that were voted on and signed by all; it 
was their “social contract”. The rules agreed upon established limited hours 
for beer sales and restricted the volume of music; beer could not be sold in 
bottles, but must be served in plastic cups; and each family that wanted to sell 
beer had to allow their customers to use the toilet in their house.
 Those who agreed to the established rules could continue the illegal- 
legal sale of beer. Failure to comply with the rules could lead to penalties 
and the tolerance on the part of formal institutions toward its illegality 
could be lost. A new institutionality had been constructed, this time 
written, approved, and signed by the people; a social contract by consensus 
was created, but it was “paralegal”.
 From a legal point of view, it was a bold measure because something 
that had been prohibited was being endorsed. Like the entire barrio itself, 
with its houses, streets, families, shops, and schools, something illegal was 
being tolerated.
The grey zone of institutionality
“I only rent the second floor of my house under a written, signed con-
tract”, said Julián emphatically at the start of the meeting. His house 
had been built years ago halfway up the steps going up the mountain. 
It wasn’t the most coveted or expensive area, like the lower part, next 
to the main street along the public transport route; nor was it the 
cheapest, like the part high up, more recently built and more difficult 
to reach. Because of this, his rent was modest. 
(A mountainous barrio near Caracas, 2014)
The problem Julián faces is that under Venezuelan law none of the dwell-
ings located in informal urban development zones, consolidated or not, 
can be rented; this business is explicitly prohibited and punishable. None-
theless, the largest and most active rental market that exists in Venezuela is 
in the informal barrios, and half of those dwellings have been rented under 
written contracts that in themselves represent confession of a crime by the 
parties to the contract (Nikken et al. 2006; Briceño-León 2008).
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 In an article on the state and citizenship, O’Donnell (1993) imagines the 
maps of countries painted in three colours: blue areas where there is pres-
ence of the state with homogeneous territorial and functional control, for 
example, Norway; green areas where there is territorial but not functional 
control, as occurs in the southern United States; and brown areas where 
there is scant territorial and functional control, as occurs in large areas of 
the countries of Latin America. His metaphor was highly successful, as it 
showed the limitations of formal institutionality. However, in his analysis, 
O’Donnell omitted the substitute forms of rule of law that arise in Latin 
America. In those areas, there is not a regulatory void or transgression, but 
some social regulations that may be somewhat fragile in their legality yet 
efficient at enabling the coexistence of citizens in addition to preventing 
conflicts and reducing violence. In this sense, the rentals in the barrios 
demonstrate very clearly that there is an informal alternative of substitut-
ing and reproducing the law, with some written words that formalise 
agreements and establish rules and penalties to which the parties are 
subject. The grey zone of informality is that informal institutionality: it is 
the area of social life regulated by rules that cannot be said to be either 
legal or criminal.
 Measures taken by governments, both on the left and on the right, have 
resulted in repression of the informal mechanisms for coexistence and con-
flict resolution. What has been achieved, as occurred with the rentals, is 
greater social exclusion, placing individuals outside the law, blocking their 
access to the formal mechanisms for conflict resolution and to justice, and 
pushing them toward violence and justice at their own hands. Informal 
institutionality fills this void and converts it into a force to contain viol-
ence, but this can only be achieved—to a certain extent—when there is an 
absence of the legitimate force of the state to enforce compliance with 
agreements or to punish offenders. If this is not the case, the “natural” 
force—as described by Hobbes (1980)—of other citizens or criminals that 
substitute for the state appears to enforce compliance with agreements and 
punish offenders.
The symbolic rescue of public space
“The basketball court was built to prevent boys from going down 
the wrong path, and now it turns out that the punks are selling 
drugs there”, said the teacher from the barrio. The measure, she 
recalls, had the support of everyone: “the barrio needed a place 
where youths could practise sports rather than hanging out on the 
corner.” However, the physical construction was not accompanied 
by social control of the territory, so the gangs took over the place 
and the police could not or would not do anything to get rid 
of them.
(A barrio in Ciudad Guayana, 2014)
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The public space of cities is a privileged place to exercise freedom and 
equality: the privileged place of social interaction, it is the territory of the 
market, celebration, and politics. But in situations of violence, when 
security is reduced and fear increased, people abandon public spaces and 
hide away in their houses. In our 2015 survey using national random sam-
pling, we found that 76 per cent of people were afraid of being a victim in 
the centre of their city and 82 per cent were afraid of being attacked or 
robbed on public transport. As a result, 63 per cent had restricted the 
places and times that they did their shopping and 65 per cent had restricted 
their sports or leisure activities (Briceño-León and Camardiel 2016a). And 
if citizens abandon public space out of fear, the opportunity for cultural 
and material exchange, or of goods and ideas, is lost among the different 
and unequal citizens who make up the essence of the city.
 In the contemporary city, the street and the square have lost their 
strength as public spaces, and the substitutes that imitate them in the 
private spaces of shopping centres have gained force. Contemporary urban 
residents may escape to shopping centres for many reasons: the centrality 
of the space, an optimised artificial climate, and, without a doubt, among 
these is seeking the safety that the street no longer offers.
 Rescue of the public space is also a rescue of freedom and its value as 
being common and shared. In our research, different experiences were 
studied in which communities were competing with criminal gangs for 
control of public space in order to make them safer and more inclusive. 
Since they could not do so through force—the responsibility of the state 
and its police—they did it through community activities. In one barrio in 
Ciudad Guayana, mothers formed an alliance with the Catholic parish and 
decided to celebrate religious holidays in the street. The “processions”, a 
stroll with prayers and religious figures that had been suspended in the past 
or had avoided certain places, were now designed to occupy these terri-
tories. In a barrio in Caracas, at a place where the street widens and trans-
forms into a kind of square, drug sellers had set up their sales operations. 
Since families steered clear of that area, the solitude of the space made 
business easier for the dealers. So, the community, with support from City 
Hall, established a programme of cultural activities and youth parties to 
actively occupy the space and take it back for the community, displacing 
the delinquents.
 In another barrio in Caracas, established on a thin strip of land located 
between an area of middle- class houses and the highway that crosses the 
city from east to west, two rows of houses formed a street. Over the years, 
what started out as substandard housing, transformed into two- and three- 
storey buildings. Some people were even able to purchase a modest auto-
mobile, for work or family enjoyment. But insecurity and conflicts 
emerged, so the community organisation decided to intervene and restrict 
access to the area. The residents’ association conducted a census of owners 
and tenants and gave identification cards to each resident of the area. 
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Then, they decided to assign a parking space on the street for each family’s 
car and thus prevent abuse and conflict over parking spots (Hernández and 
Chacón 2016). All these measures reinforced security and improved 
co existence in the barrio. Paradoxically, however, although all the meas-
ures were outside formal law, they represent a valuable paralegal culture 
(Pérez Perdomo and Friedman 2003). This is the kind of innovative contri-
bution that informal institutionality can provide to make a city safer, and 
it cannot be overlooked.
Gender as a tool of peace
In Venezuela, over 90 per cent of homicide victims are men, similar to sta-
tistics for the rest of Latin America (INE 2010; UNODC 2013; Muggah 
and Alvarado 2016). An even greater percentage of murderers are also 
men. Gender studies have asked why there is such a huge gap when there 
are equal numbers of men and women. The response given by the men in 
the study is very enlightening: It is because women are cowards. They run 
away. They don’t confront. For those who understand violence to be a 
man’s affair, avoiding violence is a woman’s affair. In the poor and violent 
areas of the city there exists a macho culture that privileges a violent 
 masculinity: men who flee violence are scorned; they are treated as women.
 Use of the gender perspective in many studies has focused on showing, 
reasonably, the processes involved in the misogynistic victimisation of 
women, and the strategy of domination involved in this behaviour. 
However, in this investigation, we encounter an additional dimension and 
it is that this supposed vulnerability and cowardice of women can become 
an important tool for peace. The underestimated female values and behavi-
ours are an affront to violent male culture, and represent a countercultural 
proposal (Roszak 1969) that subverts the dominant patterns by ignoring 
or confronting them.
Female avoidance as a counterculture of violence
The culture of avoidance by women represents an opportunity for peace 
and the containment of violence. The scornful attitude of men toward 
women for avoiding violence constitutes a powerful cultural force that can 
be used to prevent violence and educate men on safe behaviour.
 This is not easy to achieve. On one hand, men, especially young men, 
consider that adopting behaviour to avoid violence can cause them prob-
lems, since they would be assuming a “wrong” gender role, putting the con-
struct of their identity in jeopardy. On the other hand, as with any cultural 
gender trait, dominant values and behaviours are shared by both sexes. 
Thus, machismo is not only a male thing, and some mothers push their boys 
to fight, so that they can learn “how to be men”; and some wives demand 
that their husbands involve themselves in violence and act “as men”.
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 However, the high rate of victimisation has led many mothers, wives, 
and girlfriends to become agents of peace. Mothers have played the most 
relevant role because they have the moral strength to stop the violence. In 
that gender pattern, the mother is outside the violence. She cannot be con-
sidered a threat, nor can her actions be considered aggressive. Men can 
inflict violence on other men, but, in their supposed masculine superiority, 
they are cautious about inflicting it on women, and much less on mothers. 
That is the reason why programmes such as the “peace- building mothers” 
of Ciudad Guayana can have more impact and operate more audaciously 
than if they were carried out by men (Pernalete 2016). The weakness of the 
gender role attributed to women has been turned into a strength.
The advantages of female teachers
As an institution, the school represents the most effective mechanism for 
socialisation and social control. But in the barrios of Venezuela, schools 
have been besieged by violence. Youths have brought violence from the 
streets into the classrooms. Conflicts that once were settled with fights after 
school became confrontations inside the school; and when teachers 
attempted to discipline these youths, they threatened their teachers with 
their violent relatives or with weapons they were able to smuggle into 
class.
 In that context, gender roles began to take on relevance. Male teachers 
represented a challenge to violent youths because they are seen first as a 
man who was punishing them, not as a teacher. This led the youths to 
understand they had to “act as a man” when interacting with another 
man. The male teachers knew this and stopped punishing their students; 
they were cautious and afraid of violence. Female teachers had to come to 
their aid. A female teacher, as a woman, had more protection than a man: 
they could talk and reprimand with a mother’s voice.
 In the face of the dominant values in the streets of the barrio, of viol-
ence, manliness, and the arbitrary power of weapons, female teachers 
represent the greatest resistance. The school represents a world governed 
by norms and subject to authority: it represents a counterculture of formal 
and informal institutionality combined, and female teachers become the 
preferred and dominant instruments of change.
The symbolic force of religion
Many of the female teachers are nuns who are part of Catholic educational 
communities. In this case, the role of woman and teacher is made even 
more powerful by the religious factor. These women are not mothers, nor 
can they be since they have taken Catholic vows of celibacy, but in 
common parlance they are called “mothers”. “Mother Teresa”, for 
example, is a nun who runs a school in a barrio. She has her role as a 
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common educator, but represents much more because, as a woman, she 
has the maternal force that identifies her with the mother of Jesus Christ 
who weeps for her murdered son. All of this symbolism makes the nuns a 
cultural force for the containment of violence.
 In the case of the Evangelists, the religious factor plays a different role as 
it affords them a gender significance that is different from peaceful or non- 
violent behaviour. As mentioned above, among the young men of the barrio, 
the attitude of avoiding violence and confrontation is associated with tradi-
tional female behaviour, as is the habit of not consuming alcohol. However, 
when the reason behind this behaviour takes on a religious tone, it loses its 
female nature. Since the majority of Evangelical preachers are men, their 
preaching of non- violence and social decency is no longer considered fem-
inine, but religious. As a result, for many pacifist young men who want to 
avoid getting involved in violence, or others who want to get out of the crim-
inal world in the barrios or in prisons, converting to the Evangelist religion 
is a way of protecting themselves while continuing to be considered “men”.
Conclusions
Cities of the future will be those that prove themselves to be safe and inclu-
sive (Sassen 2011; de Boer 2015). In order to achieve this, significant pro-
ductive transformations are required to ensure their sustainability, the 
cultural strength of their citizens that allows those who are different and 
unequal to live together, and the realistic and shared rules of the game that 
make the above possible. This study shows that informal institutionality 
can be a very powerful tool for establishing this culture of citizenship and 
the rules of coexistence as an effective means of containing violence and 
developing the well- being of cities.
 In programmes for improving the quality of life in cities, both in the 
physical aspect as well as in respect of safety, public policies have dis-
missed informal institutionality. Sometimes they have ignored it and left it 
out; at other times, they have persecuted and punished it. That is what was 
done for decades with the barrios and informal entrepreneurs (De Soto 
1987). Their existence was not accepted; they were excluded, persecuted, 
and threatened with eviction. The dominant social representation was that 
a better city was only possible if the barrios disappeared.
 Then, that changed and the barrios were recognised by society, govern-
ments, and international organisations. It was accepted that the poor had 
to have a place to live in the city and, in view of the lack of formal and 
legal opportunities to find one, millions of poor people had developed a 
solution themselves (Bolívar 2011). Acknowledging them was not only 
accepting that they existed as a social group and constructed space, but 
also recognising that there was another way of making a city.
 Something similar has occurred with the regulatory systems that govern 
the barrios. The absence of formal laws that take into account their urban 
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and social singularity, and the inability to enforce formal laws and guaran-
tee the rule of law in these areas, has excluded them from regulations. In 
the absence of formal laws that bring order to their coexistence, the 
inhabitants of the barrios have created their own rules, their own informal 
institutionality.
 Returning to the five urban zones that can be identified in the cities, in 
the two most populous zones—Consolidated Informal Urban Development 
and Unconsolidated Informal Urban Development—informal institutional-
ity is the true regulator of social processes. And, its efficiency is greater 
when cooperation and complementarity have been possible between formal 
and informal regulations. When the state retreats and gives up its capacity 
for real control in some territories, then informal institutionality may fall 
into the hands of criminal groups and be perverse. However, in 
cooperation with the state and local authorities, it can be a valuable tool 
for building coexistence and citizenship.
 This regulatory reality must not just be accepted as a rarity, an extrava-
gance of legal pluralism. On the contrary, it is about promoting the diver-
sity and wealth provided by informal institutionality to make it more 
feasible to establish the rule of law and for citizens to exercise their rights 
(Briceño-León and Camardiel 2016b). The study conducted allows us to 
conclude that informal institutionality can be a powerful tool for increas-
ing inclusion and security in the city.
 To stop the violence and build urban security in the Global South, it is 
necessary to walk in new ways. It is necessary to recognise that formal 
institutionality, as it has been applied, does not offer solutions to an 
important part of the urban population. Nor have the “hard- line” mano 
dura policies improved the situation. It is necessary to innovate and allow 
a new social pact to be built between legal formalism, anomie and the vio-
lation of human rights that cannot be exclusively formal, nor exclusively 
informal. Institutionality that can respond to social and urban diversity 
must be a combination, a mixture, a mestizo response, as these societies 
are mestizos. This new institutional framework should allow for the con-
tributions that the communities have made with their informal regulations, 
accept the multiple ways of regulating daily life that these societies have 
developed, and allow the existence of multiple mechanisms to prevent and 
resolve conflicts. Safe and inclusive cities, where the unequal and different 
coexist, require a lot of awareness, some rules, and little force. This is how 
they will become cities for citizens.
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8 Everyday violence in urban India
Is planning the driver or mitigator?
Darshini Mahadevia and Renu Desai
Context
Urban development and planning, two important pillars of India’s eco-
nomic growth and development pathway,1 were given importance in the 
‘New Urban Agenda’ adopted at the Habitat III conference in 2016 to help 
achieve Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) 11—safe, inclusive, resilient, 
and sustainable cities. This chapter is located within the urban develop-
ment dynamics of India, a country where, according to the 2011 census, 
32 per cent of the population live in urban areas, and where the urban 
population is expected to increase to 40 per cent by 2030.2 India’s urban 
development journey over the last two decades has coincided with increas-
ing marginalisation, exclusion, conflict, and everyday violence in the cities. 
This violence has gone unnoticed and unanalysed in the urban planning 
and policy- making world.
 Cities are inherently conflictual spaces due to their heterogeneity and the 
resulting different interests operating in the city space (Wirth 1938, cited in 
Rodgers 2010). Moser and Horn (2011: 8) define conflict as “situations 
where individuals and groups have incongruent interests that are contra-
dictory and potentially mutually exclusive”. They argue that conflicts tip 
over into physical violence when they remain unresolved. In scholarly and 
policy debates, the definition of violence has been expanded beyond physical 
acts that cause injury to include the exercise of power for specific gain in 
ways that lead to psychological harm, material deprivation, and symbolic 
disadvantage. The World Health Organization (WHO) defines violence as
the intentional use of physical force or power, threatened or actual, 
against oneself, another person, or against a group or community, that 
either results in or has a high likelihood of resulting in injury, death, 
psychological harm, maldevelopment, or deprivation.
 (WHO 2002: 5, cited in Moser 2004: 4)
This is closer to Galtung’s (1969) definition of indirect violence or struc-
tural violence as a form of violence through which a social structure or 
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institution harms people by preventing access to their basic needs. More 
recently, Rylko- Bauer and Farmer (2016: 1) refer to structural violence as 
“the violence of injustice and inequity” which is “embedded in ubiquitous 
social structures [and] normalised by stable institutions and regular 
experience”.
 This chapter extends the notion of structural violence, building on both 
Galtung (1969) and Rylko- Bauer and Farmer (2016), to include the 
dominant paradigms and practices of urban planning and governance which 
negatively impact the well- being, agency, and capabilities of certain groups 
in the city on one hand, and create injustice and inequity, on the other. We 
examine land management, housing provision, water supply systems, and 
public transport systems within urban planning, and their related gover-
nance processes, as drivers of structural and everyday violence, and also 
explore instances where conflicts tip over into physical violence.
Urban planning, governance, and violence
Neoliberal globalisation in the Global South has “rendered [cities] vulner-
able to new and growing forms of specifically urban risk” (Beall 2007: 5) 
that include inadequate infrastructure and housing, poor service delivery, 
and deficient and/or corrupt local government. It has put many low- income 
communities at risk of social and physical threats emanating from unregu-
lated globalised industrialisation as well as climate change (Bayat and 
Biekart 2009: 822). However, the use of the term neoliberalism indicates a 
previously existing social- democratic welfare- distributing policy regime; 
whereas, in India, in spite of the welfare pronouncements by and accom-
modativeness of the state, there was no radical change in inequality and 
power relations after Independence (Frankel 2006).
 The economic reforms of 1991 increased urban inequalities (Mahadevia 
and Sarkar 2012), which have worsened through inequitable urban plan-
ning (Mahadevia 2011, 2014). By urban planning, we mean land manage-
ment tools and practices, including the provision of infrastructure, such as 
water, sanitation, and transport; supply of housing, including its location 
in the city; and land use planning through the instrument of the Master 
Plan. City branding as “global” or “world- class” has led to the criminal-
isation of the poor, and large- scale evictions and displacements (Baviskar 
2003; Mahadevia 2011). As an instrument of planning, the Master Plan 
has also deemed many areas of the city to be illegal and, as a result, the 
Indian state has engineered the “elite capture” of urban spaces. It has also 
subverted pro- poor provisions of Master Plans (see Verma 2002; Roy 
2009). The poor thus find spaces in the cities through “occupancy urban-
ism”, a gradual process of informal land occupation under political patron-
age (Benjamin 2008), while living in fear of the constant threat of eviction. 
By being deemed “illegal”, the informal urban living spaces created by the 
poor themselves are denied the provision of basic services. Using the 
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 conceptualisations of Galtung (1969) and Rylko- Bauer and Farmer (2016), 
the urban planning paradigm has institutionalised structural violence 
within India’s cities.
 Governance is not just about what the state does in implementing plans, 
but also what the state does not do. A good example relates to the provi-
sion of basic services. The denial of essential urban services to the poor—
because governments lack the political will, capability, or capacity to meet 
the needs of low- income communities—has also led to the emergence of 
non- state providers operating as mafias (Zaidi 1998; Erman and Eken 
2004 writing about Istanbul). These informal sector entrepreneurs and 
middlemen—often with links to government functionaries and the police—
use the vulnerability and unmet needs of the poor to manipulate them. As 
Hasan (1996: 56) notes,
the inability of the State to provide services, employment, and access 
to the corridors of power for the poor also leads to a failure to provide 
justice and protection. This failure introduces and sustains a system of 
violence, coercion, and extortion in urban areas.
Such processes emanating from urban governance are not only forms of 
structural violence, but also cause non- state actors to threaten or use phys-
ical violence. The fact that the means of violence are no longer monopo-
lised by the state and that non- state actors either collude or conflict with 
the state is interlinked to urban planning and governance processes as well.
 Local design issues can also create opportunities for perpetrators of 
 violence, conditions for tensions to escalate to violence, or an environment 
that invokes fear. Paved streets with streetlights and multiple activities 
throughout the day can create safe environments. In a culture such as India’s, 
where machismo is valued, everyday conflicts can escalate into violent con-
frontations. Geographic concentrations of low- income populations can 
create ghettos where criminals can find shelter (World Bank 2010).
 Economic globalisation has brought back the state in a big way. We call 
this neo- statism, which has resulted in the elite control of ideology and 
resources, causing massive disruption in the lives of the poor as they are 
evicted from their housing and lose their livelihoods in the name of eco-
nomic growth and the building of world- class cities (Citizens’ Groups 
2009; Mahadevia 2011).
 In this chapter, we conceptualise links from urban planning and govern-
ance to violence in three ways:
•  deprivation and exclusion created through urban planning and govern-
ance as structural violence
•  conflicts embedded in existing urban planning paradigms, mechanisms, 
legislation and policies, institutions, and governance processes as struc-
tural violence
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•  structural violence resulting from urban planning and governance (as 
outlined above) leading to physical violence as well as the threat or 
fear of physical violence.
The study took place in Ahmedabad and Guwahati, India. Ahmedabad is 
the brand ambassador for the Gujarat Development Model of high growth 
accompanied by low human development (Hirway and Mahadevia 2005; 
Hirway 2014), entrenched communalised polity, and social exclusion 
(Shah 2014). Guwahati is the gateway to Northeast India and a city and 
state that expresses ethnic conflicts and conflicts with immigrants from 
Bangladesh. In 2011, Ahmedabad had a population of 6.5 million while 
Guwahati had reached one million.
Everyday violence in Ahmedabad and Guwahati
Methodology
Methodologically, we looked at the unfolding of structural violence in its 
everyday form in the two cities. The research is based on qualitative 
methods: individual interviews, focus group discussions, and key informant 
interviews. We identified the research sites through secondary and media 
reports and stakeholder consultations. We identified six drivers related to 
urban planning and governance that have led to structural and sometimes 
physical violence in both cities. These are:
1. land policies and processes
2. housing policies
3. infrastructure services: their denial, irregularity, and privatisation
4. urban design
5. elite capture of governance/decision- making
6. elitist discourse on topics such as granting of individual property 
rights, bourgeois urban environmentalism, and water as a 
consumer good.
We did not study all of the drivers in detail in both cities due to time and 
resource constraints as well as the interests of local stakeholders.
 In Ahmedabad, the focus areas and case- study locales were:
1. conflicts linked to land, housing, and basic services in urban informal 
peripheral localities, which are also religious (Muslim) ghettos (focus-
ing on one such locality populated by more than 25,000 families)
2. conflicts linked to land, housing, and basic services in slum resettle-
ment sites constructed using Jawaharlal Nehru National Urban 
Renewal Mission (JNNURM) funds (focusing on three slum resettle-
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3. women’s safety in traversing public spaces and in accessing and using 
public transport (focusing on two low- income localities).
In Guwahati, the focus areas and case- study locales were:
1. hill settlements that are experiencing conflict because of the demand 
for land rights (focusing on several neighbourhoods on two hills, 
which have larger numbers of low- income dwellers)
2. street vendors’ markets that witness conflict over space and manage-
ment (focusing on one lease market and one informal market) (see 
Figure 8.2)
3. women’s safety in accessing and using public transport (focusing on 
six low- income localities) (see Figure 8.3).
Pathways to everyday violence
Land as a driver of structural violence
In Ahmedabad’s Bombay Hotel area, located in the informal urban peri-
phery, a decade went by with the state being completely absent and resi-
dents having no political voice in the city due to the combined effects of 
living in an informal development and their identity as Muslims in a city 
and state dominated by a right- wing Hindu political party. Informal devel-
opments have grown up on agricultural land through informal land trans-
actions and devious behaviour by land developers without development 
permissions. Bombay Hotel’s development into a large and dense Muslim 
neighbourhood has a violent history. Muslims displaced due to state- 
engineered communal riots in 2002 (Concerned Citizens Tribunal – 
Gujarat 2002)3 either purchased a plot/house in the locality or were 
resettled there by charity organisations. The nuclearisation of Muslim fam-
ilies living in the old city areas also led to the search for affordable homes 
to purchase, which they found in Bombay Hotel as builders floated low- 
instalment-based housing schemes. All the land transactions are on sale 
agreements made on stamp papers, which are quasi- legal documents that 
record the monetary exchange but not the transfer of ownership. The legal 
ownership of the lands thus remains with the original farmers. Benjamin 
(2008) calls this “occupancy urbanism”. 
 In 2013, planning came to this locality through the Town Planning 
Scheme, which is a land pooling and readjustment mechanism. The mech-
anism mandates that up to 50 per cent of the original land be vested with 
the planning authority for uses categorised as ‘public purposes’ such as 
roads, water, and sanitation infrastructure; education and health facilities; 
and Socially and Economically Weaker Section (SEWS) (low- income) 
housing known in the global literature as social housing. The implementa-
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demolished about 10 per cent (2,200) of the houses in the area. Since the 
residents do not hold legal land rights, they do not qualify for compensa-
tion. This led to tensions, followed by mobilisation and protests.
This lane is supposed to be demolished under [the] TP [Town Plan-
ning] Scheme. We don’t know whether we will get a house or not. We 
have invested all our life savings in the house and have just completed 
paying our instalments and now this fear lingers above us.
(Resident of Bombay Hotel Area, Ahmedabad)
 Urban planning as a driver of structural violence would have led to a 
further spiral of counter- violence and state violence, as we see later in the 
Guwahati case. But, instead, the cycle of violence was prevented through 
the creation of a political space for the Muslim residents. In recent years, 
slight shifts in politics in the city and the state saw Ahmedabad’s right- 
wing Hindu political party attempting to woo voters from among the 
Muslim community. Demolishing such a large Muslim neighbourhood 
would have attracted bad press and therefore the demolitions under the 
Town Planning Scheme were put on hold.4 Further, the boundaries of 
electoral constituencies were changed during the 2010–2012 period, bring-
ing a change in local elected representatives. Centrist party (Indian 
National Congress) candidates won the Ahmedabad Municipal Corpora-
tion and state assembly elections for this locality, leading to pressure from 
local leaders and residents on the elected representatives to halt demoli-
tions and extend basic services to the locality. The residents were success-
ful on both counts. Significantly, the conflict over eviction was mitigated 
when the elected representatives intervened, causing the local government 
to modify the implementation of its Town Planning Scheme to address 
people’s concerns (Mahadevia, Pai, and Mahendra 2018). However, at the 
time of writing the process is incomplete, and conflict over eviction could 
arise again as the Town Planning Scheme implementation progresses. In 
the meantime, municipal services, such as drainage and water supply, are 
being extended to the locality. This has the potential to alleviate some of 
the conflicts and violence emerging from the informal provision of services 
as well as structural violence resulting from deprivation (discussed later).
 In Guwahati’s hill settlements, conflicts between the hill settlers and 
local government related to the illegal occupation of land, particularly the 
forest areas, have become endemic. While evictions had stopped by early 
2015 on account of massive political mobilisation and land rights becom-
ing a major political issue in the region, the threat from the government 
persists and occupants remain fearful. Guwahati has a land regime where 
access to land is through ‘illegal occupation’, locally called dakhal, which 
has to be legalised through an application to the state for lease rights. This 
process is both discriminatory, which itself is a form of structural violence 
as we have defined it, and expensive, creating the potential for conflict. 
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There are also conflicts about land access among various ethnic groups 
and people with allegiances to different political parties. Bengali 
Muslims, in particular, face discrimination. They are perceived as immig-
rants from Bangladesh and their practice of accessing land is politically 
charged. Their encroaching hill settlements do not have access to basic 
services, which again, following our definition, is a form of structural 
violence. Provision of basic services is arranged by the local collectives 
called Unnayan Samitis [development committees]. The state has inform-
ally passed on the responsibility for provision of services to the collec-
tives and there are potential conflict points regarding access and the 
collection of charges for managing these services; these conflicts can 
become violent at any point in time.
 In Guwahati, encroachments on eco- sensitive zones, such as hills and 
wetlands, have led the state government to demolish settlements. Residents 
of these areas have now organised as Krishak Mukti Sangram Samiti 
(KMSS) to resist the demolition. KMSS’ resistance has occasionally led to 
counter- violence against the state, which has responded with lathi- charges 
(baton- wielding) and firing weapons, leading to deaths and subsequent 
grievances against the state.
Now [the] government is claiming that due to encroachment on [the] 
hills, [a] flood situation emerges in the city. But the truth is that there 
is no scientific drainage system in the city. [The] drains are too narrow 
with respect to the rainwater that [the] city gets. But government is 
only blaming [the] hill dwellers for this.
(Hill dweller in Guwahati)
When the residents of the hill settlements and wetlands realised that the 
state government was legalising encroachments by commercial establish-
ments while denying them land rights, the fight became even more bitter 
(Rajkhowa 2014). In one such episode in 2014, the KMSS called for self- 
immolation as a method of protest, leading one man to burn himself to 
death. The cycle of violence ended with this self- inflicted brutality; the 
KMSS leadership was arrested and agitation was temporarily suspended, 
but without an end to the conflict. The battle lines between the state and 
the land rights movement were drawn at the time we completed our field-
work (Mahadevia, Mishra, and Joseph 2017). In the Guwahati case, we 
see the existence of discrimination—and thus structural violence—in the 
application of rules, leading to inequality of rights. Resistance against such 
discrimination has had the potential to turn violent. When this happened, 
the counter- violence by residents of informal settlements triggered violence 
by the state, and finally self- inflicted violence, creating a web of violence.
 Land access is also a driver of conflict in Guwahati’s street markets. 
The national Street Vendors (Protection of Livelihood and Regulation of 
Street Vending) Act 2014 mandates that cities provide about 2 per cent 
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of their land in the Master Plan and in any local plans for vending pur-
poses. As a result, the “natural markets” do not get disturbed. Natural 
markets are those which spring up on their own due to demand from 
consumers. In spite of this legislation, Guwahati Municipal Corporation 
(GMC) had not allocated land for street markets. Instead, the GMC 
changed its governance system and leased the markets to certain bidders 
for an annual rent, allowing the lessee to recover this rent from the occu-
pying vendors. However, the lessees recover the rent, but do not organise 
space for vendors, leading to multiple conflicts. There is competition and 
conflict among vendors to occupy space on a first- come, first- served basis. 
The conflict is also gendered, as the male vendors tend to occupy more 
space than their female counterparts. Ethnic and religious dimensions 
also exist. In particular, Muslim vendors face the ire of tribal vendors 
due to historic conflicts between them over land issues (Mahadevia, 
Mishra, and Joseph 2017).
 As the lessee collects rents from the vendors without the oversight of the 
GMC, they often extract arbitrary and exorbitant rents, frequently through 
the use of musclemen who resort to verbal abuse and the threat and even 
use of physical violence. The vendors have no recourse in the face of these 
threats. The peculiarity of this system of governance, euphemistically called 
a ‘PPP’ or public–private partnership, is nothing less than the withdrawal 
of the state by outsourcing its responsibilities to generally unaccountable 
private sector actors. Lastly, there are local musclemen and youth club 
members who also extort money from vendors at informal markets. In 
these situations, the vendors have no avenues of redress from the state. 
Together, these dynamics feed a pervasive sense of fear in the two markets 
we studied, Beltola and Ulubari.
Once, we reached Beltola market at 2 a.m. and were unloading our 
goods from the truck. Some drunken local goons [thugs] asked for 
INR [Indian rupee] 1,000. When we refused to pay, they beat us. Only 
[the] police can help us in this kind of situation. In Beltola market, 
[the] lessee and local goons beat us; no one comes forward to 
rescue us.
(Male vendor in Beltola market, Guwahati)
 In the case of street vendors in Guwahati, we see a case of structural 
violence emerging from non- implementation of existing legislation and the 
denial of rights to access land for the purpose of earning a livelihood. This 
form of structural violence emanates from an urban planning mechanism, 
which then transforms into multiple points of conflict some of which result 
in interpersonal violence. A situation in which governance functions are 
handed over to non- state actors has created the conditions for everyday 
threats and violence by those given the power to act on the state’s behalf. 
Finally, the lack of any mediation in these multiple points of conflict 
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 perpetuates inequalities and a cycle of structural violence that is converted 
into everyday violence.
Housing as a driver of structural violence
The lack of an affordable housing policy and related schemes led to the 
development of informal housing. Low- income households prefer to live in 
locations where they can easily access a livelihood and do not have to incur 
commuting costs. If the formal housing is expensive in such locations, they 
tend to live in informal housing. In Ahmedabad, for example, informal 
housing emerged on lands in central areas of the city close to opportunities 
for work, such as on the banks of the Sabarmati River that divides 
Ahmedabad. The riverfront development project displaced between 12,000 
and 15,000 households of which approximately 11,000 were resettled at 
various JNNURM housing sites (Mahadevia 2014). Many were resettled 
at the Vatwa resettlement sites on the urban periphery, along with evictees 
from other infrastructure projects. The Vatwa sites comprise 9,200 dwell-
ing units across seven sites that were selected due to their low land prices. 
We selected three of these sites, Sadbhavnanagar, Kusha Bhau Thakre 
(KBT) nagar,5 and Vasant Gajendra Gadkar (VGG) nagar for our research. 
Here, we found that urban planning has been used as a tool to displace 
low- income households from core areas of the city to the underdeveloped 
periphery, rather than bringing them into the urban mainstream and pro-
viding them with a wider set of opportunities. This is a typical case of 
reproducing and, in many cases, deepening inequalities through the urban 
planning process and further entrenching structural violence.
 The constrained mobility and stressed livelihoods faced as a result of 
relocation have deepened the structural violence in the lives of the majority 
of residents. The resettled residents, uprooted from their former homes 
from which they could walk or cycle to work, are now forced to use 
motorised transport and pay for their travel to work. Specifically, women’s 
livelihoods were extremely constrained due to the fear of harassment and 
violence in commuting longer distances. Many dropped out of the labour 
market or began to work from their homes. At home, they produce goods 
on a piece- rate basis, resulting in a decline in their income (see Desai, 
Parmar, and Mahadevia 2017 for details). All of these factors together 
have increased housing and transport costs for the residents and have 
pushed them below the poverty line. Residents reported spending between 
one- third and one- quarter of their income on commuting, while also indi-
cating increased housing costs.
 This deepening of structural violence, through induced poverty, has led 
to thefts of private and common property. Robberies and burglaries 
became widespread at the Vatwa resettlement sites. Petrol from bikes; the 
tyres of rickshaws, motorbikes, and even bicycles; lids of overhead water 
tanks; tubing covering electric wires; and water pipes have all been stolen. 
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Many residents have been robbed, sometimes at knife- point, while moving 
in and around the sites. Residential burglaries have taken place where cash, 
jewellery, mobile phones, and other items have been stolen. Residents try 
not to leave their houses unoccupied for long.
 Residents described how they felt insecure; women, in particular, did 
not step out of their homes after dark, which was not the case where they 
used to live. Communities that used to be close knit have been dispersed 
across different sites and randomly situated within those sites due to the 
house allotment process. This haphazard approach to resettlement has led 
to social disruption and resulted in the loss of moral authority that local 
leaders, elders, and residents in general were able to exercise previously. 
Overall, internal informal social control is now lacking at the resettlement 
sites, creating a “mahol” or environment in which crime is committed with 
impunity and youth, in particular, easily stray towards theft, gambling, 
and illicit activities such as selling/consuming drugs. This latter situation is 
exacerbated by the absence of feasible livelihood options.
When there are no jobs, the youngsters get spoilt. They get into wrong 
activities [sic]. They do not have money for the transport fare … when 
a person goes hungry then he will steal; he will get into bad businesses.
(Female resident at the Vatwa resettlement site)
If [a child’s] mother is not at home the whole day and they are hungry 
then they might steal. If I leave my shop unattended just now and if a 
child who has not eaten since morning comes by, he might pick up 
something.… Today he might pick up something costing INR5; tomor-
row he will steal something more.
(Female resident at the Vatwa resettlement site)
 The built environment at the resettlement sites has also enhanced 
crime. Some stretches of the main road have few activities. The lack of 
‘eyes on the street’ has created opportunities for robberies and the har-
assment of women. Within the sites, large sections do not have function-
ing streetlights and, where they are present, those who engage in crime 
break the lights whenever they are repaired. The common passageways in 
most buildings do not have functioning lights due to disputes about elec-
tricity bill payments. Overall, the physical environment is intimidating, 
especially for women. Thus, we see structural violence leading to 
increased crime. Emanating from it is everyday fear of crime and violence 
among the residents. Lack of proper policing, due to the overall failure of 
local security governance at the site, has deepened these fears among resi-
dents, which have a strong gender dimension.
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Water supply systems as a driver of structural violence
Conflicts related to water are primarily due to the lack of a formal water 
supply in informal settlements. This is an urban planning issue. However, 
conflicts have emerged: in Bombay Hotel, these are due to the supply by 
informal water providers; in the Vatwa resettlement sites, they are due to 
the local government’s approach to the design and governance of water 
infrastructure.
 In Bombay Hotel, the absence of a municipal water supply has led to 
the emergence of many different kinds of informal water supply arrange-
ments, such as builders or better- off residents providing water from private 
bore- wells and residents fetching water from surrounding factories. Some 
of these arrangements mitigate extreme deprivation and conflicts around 
water, but many lead to a variety of conflicts:
•  among residents of a neighbourhood
•  between residents of different neighbourhoods
•  between residents and water suppliers
•  between residents and the local government (see Desai and Sanghvi 
2017 for details).
 The conflicts often involve verbal and low- intensity physical fights on a 
daily basis. The informal water suppliers are motivated purely by profit; 
their approach to supplying water reflects this, with fixed territories of 
supply to protect profits and coercive practices. They collect monthly 
charges whether or not they are able to supply adequate water. Residents 
are unable to oppose this due to a lack of alternative sources and the high- 
handedness and threats from the suppliers. In fact, residents cannot even 
complain about these operators without raising their ire. Multiple types of 
everyday conflicts emerge from the coercive management of water supply 
systems by these non- state actors. All conflicts have the potential to result 
in violence between residents and the water suppliers as well as among the 
residents themselves.
In one of the societies [a community], a local leader complained to a 
politician about the poor quality of water being supplied by the bore- 
well operator. This angered the operator who then stopped supplying 
water to the residents which in turn led to an argument between the 
residents and [the] local leader as the former felt that the latter should 
not have complained to the politician as this had totally cut off their 
access to water.
(Resident of the Bombay Hotel area)
 Municipal officials have been aware of unregulated groundwater extrac-
tion, its sale in the area, and the consumption of this contaminated water 
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by residents. These facts point to the local government’s complicity in the 
situation. In recent years, the local government has started to send water 
tankers into the locality. However, this method of supply is wholly inad-
equate, leading to violence at the tankers, frequently among women who 
usually bear the family responsibility for water collection:
Sometimes, these fights are bad. A few days ago, two women physic-
ally attacked each other and pulled each other’s hair. We had to call 
the police. One woman was sent to the hospital and the police arrested 
the other woman. Women fight with each other because only one 
tanker comes here for so many people and we cannot be certain that 
each of us will get water.
(Woman from Bombay Hotel)
In a couple of rare instances, residents have managed to collectively dig 
bore- wells to make arrangements for water, freeing them from the water 
suppliers and associated conflicts. This collective effort is an important 
bottom- up practice, but it still does not ensure good quality water and 
does not totally address the issue of deprivation and structural violence.
 At the Vatwa resettlement sites, water provision was arranged without 
sufficiently resolving outstanding governance questions. This led to a lack 
of potable water and inadequate running water due to leaking and blocked 
water pipes. The structural violence created by resettlement on the urban 
periphery through socially disruptive processes has made the possibility of 
residents managing, maintaining, and sustaining the water supply 
extremely rare, thereby perpetuating structural violence. Municipal offi-
cials sometimes intervene, either out of benevolence or due to political 
pressure, but this generally results in uneven and inadequate interventions, 
furthering micro- local inequalities. Some officials are also unsympathetic 
towards residents because they consider resettlement to be an act of 
charity. As a consequence of insulting them in this way, residents have 
retaliated by vandalising public property at the municipal office, exhibiting 
counter- violence against the state. Here, despite residents’ protests, the 
local government has remained unresponsive and has withdrawn the low 
level support that it was providing to keep the water supply system 
working. Residents have almost completely stopped making demands on 
the government in the face of its increasingly uncompromising stance. But 
with access to water not resolved, the point of conflict has shifted to con-
flicts among the marginalised: among residents and between residents and 
water operators over maintenance and repairs (see Desai 2018 for details). 
Furthermore, inequities are also reproduced as women and children regu-
larly bear the brunt of gathering adequate amounts of water for the 
household.
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Public transport as a driver of women’s insecurity
Ahmedabad has good public transport coverage through buses operated by 
Ahmedabad Municipal Transport Services (AMTS) and the Bus Rapid 
Transit System (BRTS). However, there are issues related to frequency, 
connectivity, and affordability of public transport in Bombay Hotel and 
the Vatwa resettlement sites. Women were forced to commute using para- 
transit vehicles such as ‘shuttles’ (three- wheeled auto- rickshaws that 
operate on a shared basis). Many women perceived the shuttles to be 
unsafe when sharing them with male passengers or when they had to take 
them alone because they feared the male driver.
She used to go from here to the BRTS road in a shuttle and then from 
there to Dani Limda in another shuttle and then walk from there to 
school. The driver would keep a watch on her and would not take any 
other passenger when she was in his rickshaw; he would tease her and 
take her through different routes every day. Out of fear, she stopped 
going to school.
(Resident of Bombay Hotel regarding her niece’s experience)
In Bombay Hotel and Vatwa, walking to public transport stops was also 
challenging for women. They often face insecurity and harassment in 
public spaces. There are multiple drivers of this insecurity, many of which 
stem from the built environment: poor lighting; uneven roads and the 
absence of footpaths; and vacant spaces and structures along access roads 
that can be used by goons for illicit activities such as manufacturing, 
selling, and/or using alcohol and drugs or gambling. Multiple causes, 
including a lack of good employment opportunities, draw many male 
youths into illicit activities, which then lead them to harass girls and young 
women. As such, women in Bombay Hotel and Vatwa will only undertake 
a trip if it is a necessity.
 Our research on public transport and women’s safety in Guwahati 
reveals that the city does not have adequate public transport systems to 
facilitate women’s mobility. Women are forced to depend on para- transit 
vehicles called ‘trekkers’ (open jeeps), where they sit in close proximity to 
men and are often sexually harassed. The virtual absence of the state from 
the provision of public transport, and the resulting over- dependence on 
para- transit, was found to both create and aggravate conditions for con-
flicts between various actors, including women and transport operators. As 
a result, women were not able to access or engage in the public realm in a 
manner equivalent to their male counterparts. Furthermore, there are other 
conditions that contribute to women’s insecurity: poor lighting on the 
streets; a lack of footpaths or sufficiently wide footpaths; unsafe areas such 
as alcohol dens on the roadsides; and the absence of assistance from law 
enforcement agencies for women in distress. The women living on the hills 
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do not come out after dark because there are no streetlights on the paths 
leading to and from the hills. These paths are also slippery, particularly 
during the monsoon season, which creates further safety concerns.
Since women are nowadays advancing so much in every field, even sur-
passing men in some, the men probably feel that the patriarchal system 
of the society needs to be maintained under any circumstances and, 
hence, to balance the power equation—or rather to assert their own 
power—they try to dominate women in every possible way, one of 
which is crime against women … scaring the women into restricting 
their mobility so that they stay put in their “traditional” place in their 
homes and [do] not venture into the world outside.
(Elder woman leader of a women’s committee during a focus group 
discussion, Guwahati)
 On the periphery of the city, women’s safety and security is a structural 
issue that has emerged either through land markets that have forced low- 
income households to seek housing on low- priced land or through urban 
planning that has created resettlement housing. In both situations, land 
markets have influenced location choices, as peripheral locations mean low 
land values that are affordable for low- income households. They purchase 
housing directly from the market or the state. The other structural issue is 
the lack of affordable public transport facilities and, worse still, the scar-
city of last- leg connectivity from public transport to the users’ housing 
locations. The last- leg connectivity to and from public transport is pro-
vided by para- transit operators, who are entirely male and completely 
unregulated. This creates safety and security concerns. The lack of a built 
environment that establishes safe conditions further exacerbates fear. Both 
urban planning and the lack of urban governance have created conditions 
of structural violence that results in an everyday fear of harassment and 
violence against women.
Discussion and conclusions
These case studies, with the exception of the Vatwa resettlement site, 
narrate the everyday experiences of living in informal spaces, working in 
informal spaces, and travelling using informal transport modes. The 
informal sector has provided space and opportunities to cope with urban 
living and improve the lives of the urban poor. However, dependence on 
the informal sector also means that there is inherent conflict with the 
state’s urban planning legislation and rules, leading to state crackdowns 
through evictions and demolitions in the name of ‘legality’ and ‘urban 
planning’. For situations such as those in Bombay Hotel (Ahmedabad) and 
the hill settlements (Guwahati), the existing urban planning paradigm, 
tools, and practices offer, respectively, a limited solution or do not provide 
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a solution. Also, the planning approach does not create affordable space 
allocations for petty commercial activities such as street vending. Street 
vendors then end up as part of the informal sector, with a solution pro-
posed in the form of the national legislation enacted in 2014, as mentioned 
above, but which is not adequately implemented. Thus, the main driver of 
structural violence emanates from the urban planning paradigm and 
related tools in Indian cities.
 In the case of Bombay Hotel, we believe that urban planning has pro-
vided a limited solution to its challenges because the process of implement-
ing the Town Planning Scheme has resulted in partially halting evictions 
and in providing basic services. The political negotiations, through the 
mediation of elected representatives, have resulted in fewer conflicts; fewer 
conflicts resulting in violence (as we see in Guwahati); even less depriva-
tion; and, therefore, less structural violence. The negotiations, predictably, 
have resulted in a series of trade- offs that provided some improvement in 
local living conditions. But, given the nature of planning regimes that are 
intolerant of informality, the threat of eviction may return.
 Connected to these dynamics is the lack of a housing policy for the 
urban poor. They cannot afford housing in the legal market and are forced 
to seek solutions in the informal market. Housing policy, therefore, is the 
second driver of structural violence in the cities we studied. Attempts 
to address informal settlements through urban planning demonstrate 
 insensitivity—or even hostility—toward slum dwellers. This takes the form 
of: (1) considering them to be encroachers and hence illegitimate occupiers 
of urban land, leading to evictions; and/or (2) considering slums/informal 
settlements as unsuitable to occupy precious urban land, offering their resi-
dents housing only on low- value property. Both approaches have the 
potential to cause displacement, which, if contested, has further potential 
to generate violence and counter- violence as seen in Guwahati.
 Further, the local governments also tend to depend on the logic of com-
mercial markets to find land on which to construct public housing for the 
urban poor. This results in low- income residents in the city centre being 
pushed to its periphery. This is the case in Ahmedabad, where the displaced 
families’ opportunities for a livelihood declined and transportation to and 
from work was compromised (particularly for women), pushing some people 
(mainly young men) to crime. The resettlement sites then become sites of 
violence and perpetual fear that threatens to engulf women and reduce their 
opportunities. Private land ownership regimes may hold a limited solution to 
the need to find land for the urban poor. Through mechanisms such as a 
Town Planning Scheme—like that in practice in Ahmedabad (see Mahade-
via, Pai, and Mahendra 2018)—or the former Urban Land Ceiling and 
Regulation Act 1976 (now abolished), private lands could potentially be 
acquired for public purposes such as social housing.
 Deprivation of public services also leads to structural violence. For 
example, a deficit in the public water supply and weak public governance 
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allows non- state actors to manage the water supply, charge for poor 
quality services, and extort payments, all with the implicit support of 
municipal leaders. In resettlement sites, the approach toward the design 
and governance of water infrastructure, without giving thought to the 
socioeconomic background and capacities of the residents, is layered on 
top of the social and economic tensions caused by resettlement. This results 
in water deprivation as well as everyday conflict among residents and 
between residents and water supply operators over issues of repair and 
maintenance.
 In order to have access to equal opportunities, public transport is 
extremely important. But in Ahmedabad, the BRTS has been unaffordable 
for low- income households and particularly the women among them 
(Mahadevia, Joshi, and Datey 2012), while at the same time the AMTS 
bus services are not dependable. In Guwahati, a public transport system 
within the city is virtually absent. Wherever public transport is available, 
women require safe access free of sexual harassment or the threat thereof. 
Women forced to use shared and congested para- transit, such as shuttles 
and trekkers, face harassment from male co- passengers and sometimes 
from the drivers; this must also be rectified.
 The absence of the state, evidenced by a lack of planning and the provi-
sion of public goods, as well as the related creation of an institutional void, 
has resulted in the involvement of various profit- oriented and unregulated 
non- state actors, often creating fear and situations of conflict and violence. 
In addition, the absence of state or institutional mechanisms to mediate 
potential conflict- causing conditions results in everyday conflicts and occa-
sional violence. Many of these non- state actors have political links and 
operate with the support of local ‘goondas’ (thugs/musclemen). These mus-
cular service providers govern through the threat of violence and abuse.
 In India, low- income groups have been left on their own to find housing 
and employment, negotiate their citizenship rights, and incrementally make 
their lives (Mahadevia 2015). The state enters the picture later through 
various patronage linkages, accommodating residents’ needs only under 
the compulsion of electoral politics. Low- income households are able to 
gradually improve their lives, but this process is not sustainable nor trans-
formative, and the poor tend to live in a perpetual state of vulnerability 
where access to their rights depends on the situation. The state exists in an 
‘instrumental form’, supporting capital accumulation by the people with 
means; but, it has left the poor to gradually improve their lives largely 
unassisted. This neo- statism, experienced mainly in large cities, has resulted 
in urban planning becoming a tool, a decision- making process controlled 
by the elite, to evict the poor from urban spaces. The resulting conflicts can 
lead to violence and/or crime. There are multiple routes through which this 
happens as demonstrated in the case studies.
 This elite capture of land has brought protests by those whose life 
spaces are eroded by real estate- and big finance- led urban development. 
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These protests have the potential to turn violent, inviting the state’s wrath 
and crackdown, leading to counter- violence from those adversely affected 
by this development model. The stage is set for perpetual conflict, violence, 
and crime. This is particularly so in the localities inhabited by the poor, 
where they become both the victims and the perpetrators of violence and 
crime.
 India is on the cusp of rapid urbanisation. But, unlike the cities in Latin 
America and Africa, national statistics do not show a high incidence of 
crime and violence. But, structural violence as well as everyday, low- key, 
or petty violence is experienced in most cities as illustrated through our 
case studies in Ahmedabad and Guwahati. Urban planning and governance 
have become tools for one group to oppress another through the mediation 
of, or the deliberate avoidance of mediation by, the state. At the same time, 
accommodative state and flexible planning, under the pressure of electoral 
politics, creates spaces for negotiation as seen in Bombay Hotel. But, 
overall, violence is embedded within the mainstream and technocratic 
urban planning paradigm and its practices.
 How will there be redemption from the structural violence that eman-
ates from structural inequalities, which are unfortunately on the rise, in 
India’s cities? This chapter points to a need to change the approach to 
bring about the democracy and equity voiced in the protests, and evid-
enced by the struggles, of low- income urban communities in a broad sense. 
More specifically, it calls for urban planning that comes from the bottom 
up and is based on consultative processes, recognising peoples’ own efforts 
in creating their lives in cities. Urbanisation is a continuous process 
without end; therefore, urban planning must also be a continuous process 
with open- ended outcomes. Urban planning needs to be more participa-
tory, not a product bound to legalities. But, for this to happen, urban 
development pathways must be created, through planning and governance, 
that prevent webs of violence, structural violence slipping into everyday 
violence, and conflicts tipping into episodes of violence, as well as path-
ways of negotiation that reduce violence and conflict.
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Notes
1 The importance of this is expressed in numerous programmes, including Pradhan 
Mantri Awas Yojana- Housing for All (Urban) (PMAY), Smart Cities Mission, 
and Atal Mission for Rejuvenation and Urban Transformation (AMRUT).
2 Calculated from the McKinsey report on India that projects that the country’s 
urban population will be 590 million in 2030 (MGI 2010).
3 In 2002, starting from the end February continuing through to May, Hindu 
right-wing groups attacked Muslim neighbourhoods and economic activities in 
the state of Gujarat. Ahmedabad was the most affected city. Muslim households 
from mixed neighbourhoods migrated to Muslim-dominated neighbourhoods 
such as Bombay Hotel for safety in numbers.
4 Authors’ discussion with the Chief Town Planner of Ahmedabad.
5 Nagar is a local term for a housing settlement.
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9 Pathways to inclusive urban 
development
Contrasting experiences of relocated 
men and women in Colombo 
and Kochi
Rajith W. D. Lakshman and S. Irudaya Rajan
Introduction
Planned urban growth processes often forcibly displace and relocate people 
within cities and towns, affecting their livelihoods, access to jobs, and 
social integration. They pose a major challenge to achieving the inclusion 
in cities that is emphasised in the New Urban Agenda (United Nations 
2017). Known as the silent companion of urban growth (Cernea 1993), 
development- forced displacement and relocation (DFDR) can become a 
violent process subjecting the affected urban neighbourhoods to abuses of 
their rights at different points of the displacement–relocation cycle. This is 
particularly true for DFDR communities in low or lower- middle income 
groups in rapidly urbanising cities (Jayatilaka, Lakshman, and Lakshman 
2018). Moreover, it is generally accepted that the burden of displacement 
is not equal among all members of a family: it is far greater for vulnerable 
members who are often women, children, the old, and the sick (Carpenter 
2005, 2016). This chapter recognises DFDR in cities as a form of urban 
violence and seeks to measure and quantify some of its effects and costs on 
those groups that are affected through a gendered lens. It adopts a com-
parative approach covering two South Asian cities: Colombo in post- war 
Sri Lanka and Kochi in South India.
 Recent debates on the link between rapid urbanisation and violence in 
cities commonly conceptualise urban violence as criminal in nature and 
measure it through national crime records (Bhide, Maringanti, and Mahadevia 
2017). These “direct” forms of violence, resulting in physical and psycho-
logical harm, are aptly covered in the World Health Organization’s (2002: 5) 
definition of violence, which sees the issue as a public health concern:
The intentional use of physical force or power, threatened or actual, 
against oneself, another person, or against a group or community, that 
either results in or has a high likelihood of resulting in injury, death, 
psychological harm, maldevelopment or deprivation.
Pathways to inclusive urban development  201
Other definitions of violence are much broader and more specifically 
include material deprivations as a form of “structural violence” (Galtung 
1969) or symbolic disadvantage (Schröder and Schmidt 2001; Fox 2015). 
As Kasper et al. (2017) point out, urban violence can have a range of 
motivations (e.g. economic, political, or criminal), victims (gender- based, 
youth, etc.), and perpetrators (e.g. a mob, or even the state, as in this 
chapter). These broader, more nuanced definitions can be particularly 
useful for studying low- intensity violence such as reported in the South 
Asia region (Muggah 2012: 46; Bhide, Maringanti, and Mahadevia 
2017). Following this, we see benefit in using a broad definition such as 
that proposed by Fox (2015: 31): “force, coercion, or psychological 
manipulation of any kind, used in a harmful or destructive way against 
some being that has an interest in not being harmed or destroyed.” Doing 
so helps to articulate the “direct” violence involved in the forced dis-
placement phase of DFDR processes while also accommodating the more 
nuanced experiences of structural violence as encountered by folk on the 
margins of the city (Winton 2004).
 Violence and exclusion are closely linked in urban settings across the 
world (Winton 2004; Moser and McIlwaine 2006; Umaña 2018). This is 
one reason why the ideal of the inclusive city seeks more equal and fair 
treatment for marginalised groups in cities, such as migrants, children, 
women, minority groups, and the urban poor (United Nations 2015, 
2017). The growing inequality in income and wealth experienced in urban 
areas across the globe is a major barrier to addressing urban inequality in 
specific places. State- sanctioned DFDR processes in cities, as we examine, 
directly speak to these topics. For example, Kasper et al.’s (2017: 11) pro-
posed measures to strengthen inclusiveness in cities include several that are 
routinely discussed in DFDR contexts: promoting access to urban services 
such as housing and education; increasing urban accessibility; increasing 
government accountability; and ensuring basic land tenure (Brown 2017; 
Herath, Lakshman, and Ekanayaka 2017). DFDR in cities—which is often 
(but not always) part of a government- led process of urban planning—can 
either exacerbate the divisions within cities or act as a catalyst through 
which exclusion and violence can be addressed (Brown 2017).
 This chapter engages with the notion of inclusive cities by differentiat-
ing between the experiences of DFDR- affected women and men. This focus 
is important for three reasons. First, DFDR- affected women are known to 
have particular protection and assistance needs that are different from 
those of men (Thukral 1996; Ahmad and Lahiri- Dutt 2006). The studies 
that examine this phenomenon comprise a subset of the broader literature 
that highlights men and women as having differentiated experiences in 
situations of conflict, upheaval, and displacement (Alsaba and Kapilas-
hrami 2016; te Lintelo, Lakshman, et al. 2018). Second, the evidence 
shows that displaced women can more effectively assist in households’ 
coping and recovery compared to men (Momsen 2004: 130). It is critical 
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to note that even when replacement housing is ensured—which is often not 
the case, although it is true for the DFDR cases we examine—household- 
level coping remains an important element in how those affected reinforce 
their livelihood strategies. Third, the gendered characteristics of DFDR—
the distinctiveness of women’s needs and the importance of their coping 
mechanisms—have critical policy implications for relocation (Desmond 
2012; UN- Habitat 2013).
 The differentiated experience of women affected by DFDR in cities is 
better understood by using gender theory to frame the subject. For 
example, at the broadest level, the use of a gender and development 
approach is critical as it examines how women’s socially constructed roles, 
in relation to those of men, determine their experiences of systematic sub-
ordination (Moser 2012). Despite evidence to the contrary, cities in general 
provide women with better opportunities to escape some of these effects 
reinforced by gender (Chant and McIlwaine 2016). Though urbanisation is 
often linked to women having better access to services and employment 
opportunities, in addition to lower fertility rates, these positive aspects of 
city living often fail to reach the urban poor. Migrant women in cities are 
particularly disadvantaged in this regard as migration depletes their social 
networks and isolates them (Hilfinger Messias 2011). DFDR as a form of 
(forced) migration has similar effects. Anwar et al.’s (2014) take on the 
mobility–gender intersection and urban violence also helps to shed light on 
our findings.
 Our research sought to compare and contrast displacement and resettle-
ment experiences in a post- war context compared with a regular city: 
Colombo, Sri Lanka and Kochi, India, respectively. Both are examples of 
South Asian cities that are planning to achieve high rates of economic 
growth under conditions of rapid urban population growth. Though the 
two cities are in different countries, they are quite similar in their history 
and socioeconomic profiles. For example, post- independence Kerala state 
and Sri Lanka have travelled similar socioeconomic trajectories with social 
development given precedence over economic growth (Bhat and Rajan 
1990; Zachariah and Rajan 1997; Lakshman and Tisdell 2000; Sen 2013). 
As a result, both cities currently share similar levels of human development 
as measured by the United Nations Development Programme’s (UNDP) 
Human Development Index (see Kundu 2015; UNDP 2015). In fact, all 
relocation projects examined here (in both cities), with their high- quality 
replacement housing and/or attractive compensation packages, are testi-
mony to this.
 We contend that the main distinction between the two cities arises from 
Colombo’s post- war legacy. The choice of two case- study cities offers a 
chance to compare how post- war (Colombo) and more typical (Kochi) 
governance structures negotiate development- driven relocation in cities. 
Yet, a more interesting anchor for this comparative study is the contrast 
between the natures of the DFDR projects considered in these two cities. 
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In Colombo, the projects sought to relocate urban dwellers from multiple 
informal settlements into high- rise flats.1 In Kochi, the projects sought to 
relocate people from the then periphery of the city (that has since been 
engulfed by the sprawling city) to areas further away from the city centre. 
In Colombo, the specific development activity that spurred relocation is 
either city beautification or slum upgrading, whereas in Kochi the drivers 
of relocation were specific urban development (construction) activities.
 The chapter is organised as follows: the next section briefly outlines the 
methodology used. The following two sections present the findings of a 
cross- sectional analysis of the household survey. The penultimate section 
cross- examines the findings in relation to those of other researchers. The 
final section provides some concluding remarks.
Methodology and data
This chapter is based on data from a three- year (2013–2016) research 
study.2 While the researchers have collected other data including key 
informant interviews, community profiles, and in- depth household inter-
views, the main focus of this chapter is the second wave of a longitudinal 
household survey which was conducted in 2015 and 2016. The research 
locations of relocated and resettled communities within each city were 
selected purposively. While our research interests guided the selection, we 
also had to take certain practical limitations into consideration. For 
example, in Colombo, at the time of the research, more recent relocation 
sites were very difficult to access for research purposes. In addition to 
urban populations affected by DFDR, comparable control groups who had 
not experienced relocation were also included in the survey. The control 
groups and sites were selected based on how relevant they were as control 
cases for the selected resettlement and relocation sites. From within each 
site, individual households were randomly selected for inclusion in the 
survey.3 Pre- interview screening questions were used to ensure that the 
households matched the categories of interest. For instance, some house-
holds had moved into the relocation sites as private buyers and had not, 
therefore, experienced relocation; these households were excluded.
 In each of the two cities, a team of enumerators collected data under 
the supervision of researchers. The enumerators visited households in 
gender- balanced pairs to ensure that women were always interviewed in 
the presence of a female enumerator. In Colombo, the DFDR group con-
sisted of households relocated from an informal settlement into high- rise 
buildings and the control group consisted of households who continued to 
live in similar informal settlements. The DFDR households from Kochi 
were surveyed in their replacement houses in relocation sites. The control 
group in Kochi consisted of households from settlements adjacent to the 
ones that were displaced. In Kochi, the control groups were, to a certain 
degree, affected by the development projects that displaced their erstwhile 
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neighbours: the development of neighbouring land had increased the value 
of their land. In this way, the group was a control in the sense that they 
were never relocated, but not in the sense that they were not affected by 
the development projects which led to the relocation of their neighbours.
 The study uses a material quality of house index (MQHI) that combines 
11 variables related to the built quality of a house.4 The MQHI has a 
minimum possible value of 0 and maximum of 11; a value of 0 indicates 
the worst quality of housing and 11, the best.
 Table 9.1 outlines summary statistics for the survey data that includes 
1,217 households (totalling 5,570 individual residents) from the two cities 
combined. While the sampling was done at the household level, we col-
lected some data about all the individuals in the surveyed households. For 
example, demographic details for all individuals were collected from the 
main respondent. The household level statistics in Table 9.1 show that a 
larger proportion of main respondents in Colombo were female (approxi-
mately 70 per cent) while in Kochi, there was a greater balance between 
male and female respondents. A higher proportion of respondents in 
Colombo identified theirs as female- headed households (approximately 30 
per cent in Colombo compared with about 12 per cent in Kochi).
 The survey employed a five- point Likert Scale—response options of very 
happy, happy, neither happy nor unhappy, unhappy, and very unhappy—
to collect self- reported data on happiness from all the individuals in a 
house during the time enumerators visited them. Additionally, individuals 
from the DFDR groups were asked to recall their happiness “before reloca-
tion”; the individuals among the control groups, of course, had no reloca-
tion experience, so only reported on their current happiness. This approach 
meant that only those individuals present at the time enumerators visited 
the house were able to respond to the question about happiness. Table 9.1 
shows that 642 male respondents (41 per cent of total respondents to the 
happiness question) and 917 female respondents (59 per cent of total 
respondents) were questioned regarding happiness. A higher proportion of 
female respondents answered these questions in Colombo than in Kochi.
Quality of replacement housing: the perspective of relocated 
men and women
A strong argument in favour of DFDR is that the relocated or resettled 
people will live in a better house. Figure 9.1 plots the distribution of 
MQHI scores according to city—Colombo or Kochi—DFDR or control 
group, and whether the MQHI measurement relates to the current period 
(i.e. the time of the survey, the 2015–2016 period) or to a period before 
relocation/resettlement. The current/before division is relevant only to the 
DFDR group as the control group was not relocated/resettled.
 Figure 9.1 captures the effect that the relocation had on the MQHI 


























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 9.1  Effects of the relocation on the MQHI scores of relocated households 
and control groups in the two cities—Colombo and Kochi.
Source: Authors’ data and calculations.
Note
The top two rows compare the “before” displacement and “current” distributions of MQHI 
scores of the sample of DFDR communities from the two cities while the last row shows the 
distribution of MQHI scores for the control groups.
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 distribution of MQHI scores had shifted rightwards—i.e. indicating an 
improvement—after the relocation; this shift is statistically significant. This 
suggests that the MQHI scores improved unequivocally following reloca-
tion, which is consistent with the aim of DFDR programmes to improve 
the quality of housing of the relocated households in both cities. Figure 9.1 
also suggests that the DFDR group in Colombo has better quality housing 
than the control group. In contrast, the average “current” MQHI score for 
the relocated households in Kochi is similar to that of the control group. 
This can be interpreted as evidence that the MQHI scores of households 
that were not relocated also improved after the projects were imple-
mented.5 Such an improvement may well be a reflection of the ex- post real 
estate price increases enjoyed by the control group in Kochi. This is 
unequivocal evidence that resettled/relocated households did receive better 
quality housing compared to what they had before. But, was that a suffi-
cient condition to ensure their well- being and happiness?
 Figure 9.2 presents an analysis of respondents’ self- reported “current” 
and “before” happiness data, where the height of a bar corresponds with 
the average happiness score for a given group. The figure uses three panels 
to illustrate the results for male respondents, for female respondents, and 
for all respondents. The “current” and “before” bars for the DFDR com-
munity in Colombo indicate that both male and female respondents have 
marginally improved happiness levels following relocation. In Kochi, the 
same comparison yields clear evidence of the collapse of happiness after 
relocation. One might be tempted to attribute this to nostalgia, which 
could potentially inflate the self- assessed “before” happiness levels. While 
nostalgia could certainly be an element, the control group responses give 
us faith in the recalled happiness data: recalled happiness levels (grey bars 
in Figure 9.2) relating to the time the DFDR populations were in informal 
settlements look strikingly similar to the current happiness levels of the 
control group. The control group’s assessment of their current level of 
happiness is not subject to recall bias or nostalgia.
 Figure 9.2 also reveals preliminary findings regarding the gendered 
well- being effects of development- driven relocation in cities. For example, 
gender differences can be noted when comparing happiness outcomes 
between the DFDR and control groups in Kochi: while female respond-
ents in the control group in Kochi are happier (average happiness score 
of 4 vs. 3.5 for male respondents), the difference is negligible in the 
DFDR group. Our point is that, while the gender- neutral collapse of 
happiness in Kochi following relocation attracts much attention—as it 
should—these gendered impacts also need scrutiny. Male/female compar-
ison for Colombo in Figure 9.2 suggests that the relocation experience in 
that city is ostensibly without any gender undertones: the average male 
and female happiness levels are all but identical in Colombo. The visible 
absence of gendered effects in happiness data is itself an interesting 
finding worthy of further examination.
Figure 9.2  Average happiness levels among DFDR and control groups in Colombo 
and Kochi.
Source: Authors’ data and calculations.
Note
The relevant average happiness scores are provided inside the bars.
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 To further examine and perhaps corroborate or refute the findings pre-
sented in Figure 9.2, we must use multivariate techniques; we chose a regres-
sion approach. Given our main interest is in measuring the gendered impacts 
on the probability of being “happy” or “very happy” with relocation/resettle-
ment, we recoded the 5 point Likert scale as a binary scale (1 if “happy” or 
“very happy” and 0 otherwise). We then applied a binary logistic statistical 
regression to these data. The regression results give a more accurate assess-
ment of the effect of relocation/resettlement on happiness because they are 
able to control for multiple confounding effects that the graphical approach 
could not achieve. The results are presented in Table 9.2, separately for each 
city. Each model predicts the probability of being happy in the “current” 
period.6 They measure the effect that relocation may have had on the happi-
ness of individuals from each city while also emphasising the impact of:
•  gender
•  being a member of a female- headed household
•  the individual’s education level
•  “current” level of household MQHI score
•  whether the individual belonged to the DFDR or the control group.
Table 9.2 Logistic regressions to explain current happiness levels
Colombo Kochi





































Pseudo R2 0.0154 0.1491
Prob > chi2 0.0127 0.0000
Source: Authors’ data and calculations.
Notes
Coefficients are proportional odds ratios and figures in parentheses refer to standard errors.
* p < 0;
** p < 0.05;
*** p < 0.01.
210  Lakshman and Irudaya Rajan
By including information on household headship and on individuals’ 
education levels, the regressions add further layers of complexity to the 
picture in Figure 9.2. The regression results broadly confirm the results 
presented in Figure 9.2, and more clearly quantify gender nuances.
 In Table 9.2, the results are presented as odds ratios. For example, in 
both models “Male- headed household” estimators suggest that, if all other 
variables in the models are held constant, individuals in male- headed 
households (compared to those in female- headed households), are likely to 
be happier compared to individuals in female- headed households. Both 
these parameters are significant at the 10 per cent level. The analysis sug-
gests that an individual from a male- headed household in Colombo is 
1.465 times (or 46.5 per cent) more likely to be happy than an individual 
from a female- headed household in the same city. In Kochi, an individual 
from a male- headed household is 51.2 per cent more likely to be happy 
than an individual from a female- headed household. This is not news as 
female- headed households tend to have lower incomes than their male- 
headed counterparts; it is proof that the regression findings are congruent 
with the wider literature. Though female- headed households are faring 
poorly compared to the male- headed ones, women seem to be happier or 
more content with life than the menfolk, irrespective of the headship status 
of their households: in Colombo women are 37.5 per cent more likely to 
be happy compared to men, and in Kochi the figure is 43.5 per cent.
 In addition to information on headship and gender, we also included 
“current” MQHI levels in the analyses to test whether the material 
quality of the house mattered to current happiness. Even though the 
estimated values of these parameters suggest that improved MQHI scores 
are associated with higher levels of happiness, these estimates are not sta-
tistically significant. Thus, in confirmation of what was suggested in the 
earlier graphical analysis, the regression results also affirm that higher 
material quality of housing is not a significant factor in predicting happi-
ness. Related to this is the parameter estimate of being in the “Control 
group”. The estimated value from Colombo suggests that individuals 
from the control group are less (0.827 times or 17.3 per cent) likely to be 
happy compared to the DFDR group but, again, this value is not statisti-
cally significant. However, in Kochi, the result is strongly significant at 
the 1 per cent level and suggests that an individual from the control 
group is 6.248 times more likely to be happy compared to someone who 
was relocated.
 These results are intriguing precisely because the MQHI—a prime 
focus of experts involved in relocation—seems unable to explain self- 
reported happiness. The next section attempts to shed more light on this 
by looking at other impacts that relocation has had on the affected urban 
dwellers.
Pathways to inclusive urban development  211
It is not only about shelter: sociocultural impact of 
relocation within cities
In this section, we look at some of the ways the relocation may have 
changed a given population’s sociocultural parameters. Doing this helps to 
check whether these changes could explain some of the peculiar happiness 
results/outcomes revealed earlier, particularly the result where the MQHI 
scores (a key focus of best case DFDR practitioners) were not a significant 
predictor of happiness. We do this by comparing an assessment of socio-
cultural parameters according to whether the assessment was made by a 
male respondent or by a female respondent. The comparison is also dis-
aggregated by city7 and the results are summarised in Figure 9.3.
 Following te Lintelo and Lakshman (2015), Figure 9.3 compares the 
average levels of 25 sociocultural indicators between the two comparator 
groups (DFDR and control) with a view to exposing the different effects 
the relocation/resettlement has had on men and women. The 25 indicators 
Figure 9.3  Empirical characterisation of the impact of development-forced reloca-
tion on affected men and women in Colombo and Kochi.
Source: Authors’ data and calculations.
Note
Average scores for 25 indicators are compared using arrows where the arrowheads point 
from average “current” score for the DFDR group (baseline) to average “current” score for 
the control group. In addition to comparing the averages (using arrows) the figure also illus-
trates whether the estimated differences in average scores are statistically significant. Signi-
ficant independent sample T-test results are indicated by dots against the relevant question. 
The dots are uniformly colour coded where white (○) indicates significance at 10 per cent 
level; grey (●) at 5 per cent level; and black (●) at 1 per cent level.
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are explained in Table 9.3 and are divided into four groups: perceived 
security (seven questions), freedoms (four questions), civic activity (six 
questions), and social networks (eight questions). The first column in 
Figure 9.3, for example, contrasts the average score assigned to each of 
these indicators by male respondents in the Colombo DFDR group with 
those assigned by male respondents in the Colombo control group.8 The 
two averages are linked with an arrow; arrowheads that point to the left 
suggest that the average score for the DFDR group was higher than that 
for the control group and arrow length indicates the difference between the 
Table 9.3 Household survey indicator groups and specific indicators
Indicator group Indicators
Perceived security Perceive neighbourhood to be safe in general
Perceive neighbourhood to be safe at night
Neighbourhood squabbles/tensions exist
Women can move around freely in this neighbourhood after 
8 p.m. 
Sexual harassment exists in the neighbourhood
Publicly visible social miscreants (alcoholism/gambling/drugs) 
in the neighbourhood
Domestic violence (physical) exists
Freedoms Organising and/or following religious activities
Participating in community groups
Membership in political parties
Voting
Civic activity Self-help groups
Clubs (arts, sports, etc.)
Religious organisations
Farming/fishermen groups
School/hospital development committees, PTAs, etc.
Other groups
Social networks Do you think people here would contribute to the safety of 
the locality by alerting others if any suspicious activity is 
observed?
Do you have neighbours who may help you in an emergency 
like sickness, death, etc?
Do you have neighbours who may help you in a financial 
emergency by offering a loan?
Do you have neighbours who may help if you or a family 
member wants to find a job?
Do you have neighbours with whom your children can stay 
while you attend to an emergency?
Do you have a neighbour to look after your property while 
you are away for a week?
Do you think most people in your locality can be trusted?
Do you think most people in your locality contribute to 
keeping the environment clean?
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two averages.9 Right pointing arrows, on the other hand, indicate that the 
average score in the control group is higher: for example, in the first 
column, this may be interpreted as evidence that men in the Colombo 
control group are inclined to think that their sociocultural environment is 
better than their counterparts in the Colombo DFDR group. The second 
column in Figure 9.3 shows the same analysis using the male respondents 
from Kochi while the third and fourth columns analyse responses from 
female respondents. The black, grey, and white dots in each row indicate 
whether the difference captured in a left- or right- pointing arrow is statisti-
cally significant.
 The analysis presented in Figure 9.3 can be interpreted as evidence that 
sociocultural conditions in the DFDR sites are weaker than those in the 
control sites: 61/100 comparisons in Figure 9.3 (where the arrowheads 
point to right) support this assertion while 39/100 comparisons (with left 
pointing arrows) contradict it. Out of these, only a few (23/100) are signi-
ficant at the 10 per cent level (see T- tests reported by dots in Figure 9.3). 
The bulk of these significant T- test results (16/23) suggest that the control 
group is faring better in comparison to the DFDR group. In contrast, only 
seven left pointing arrows are significant. Thus, the smaller set of statisti-
cally significant differences in Figure 9.3 also confirms that the sociocul-
tural environment is a weaker influence in the DFDR sites.
 While the situation that the contrast between DFDR and control groups 
brought out in Figure 9.3 is useful, what is perhaps more relevant for the 
present chapter is the gendered view about the respective situations that 
seems to jump out: men and women seem to have strikingly contrasting 
views. As noted above, there are 23 instances of statistically significant 
differences highlighted in Figure 9.3. Thirteen of these compare the views 
of men in the DFDR and control groups; ten compare those of women. 
What is interesting is that in nine out of these ten issues/outcomes are iden-
tified as significantly different by women, suggesting that the situation in 
the control group is better for women, particularly in Kochi. The analysis 
of responses by men contrasts with the above because results from the men 
do not clearly favour the control group. While men rank the control case 
better than the DFDR case on eight indicators, they also rank the DFDR 
case better than the control case on six indicators.
 The results suggest that “perceived security” is the thematic area in 
Figure 9.3 that reports the highest number (13) of significant differences 
between the DFDR and control groups, while most of these (11 out of 13) 
suggest that perceived security is higher in the control group. For example, 
the two indicators on safety within the neighbourhood (in general and at 
night) confirm that safety is significantly lower in the DFDR setting. Both 
men and women in Kochi are of this opinion, while only women in 
Colombo seem to have this perception. Moreover, while the assessment by 
DFDR men in Colombo on whether women can move about freely after 
8 p.m. is statistically higher than that of the men from the control group, 
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women from the same locations in Colombo did not see it this way: the 
difference between DFDR and control group women in Colombo is not 
statistically significant. In Kochi, women seem to think that sexual harass-
ment in public spaces and domestic violence is higher in DFDR settings 
vis- à-vis the control setting, though men’s experiences do not seem to 
reflect this. In addition to the DFDR/control comparison, Figure 9.3 also 
suggests strong differences between Colombo and Kochi: most arrows for 
Kochi are placed close to 1, which is the best outcome, while correspond-
ing arrows for Colombo are further away from 1. In fact, in some cases, 
the arrow is quite close to 0, which is the worst possible outcome. Take for 
example, the indicator of domestic violence, which is assessed very close to 
1 by both men and women in Kochi but as less than 0.5 in Colombo.10
 Other thematic areas covered in Figure 9.3 do not seem to suggest as 
strong a distinction between DFDR and control settings, at least not as 
poignantly as in the case of “perceived security”. For example, men in both 
cities seem to think that few indicators of “social networks” are signifi-
cantly different between the DFDR and control settings. According to the 
views of the men, the control setting in Colombo had better social net-
works than the DFDR setting—see indicators on being alert to safety 
threats and the availability of financial help (Table 9.3)—while the reverse 
was true in Kochi.
 The above results can be summarised thus:
•  Overall,  the  evidence  is  strongly  consistent with  a  scenario  in which 
the sociocultural environment of the DFDR respondents had deterior-
ated following relocation.
•  The  instances of  evidence  to  the contrary are  sparse and visible only 
when men’s perceptions are considered.
•  An inferior sociocultural environment  in the DFDR sites vis- à-vis  the 
control sites seems to explain much of the puzzle relating to why 
ensuring the quality of replacement housing given to the those relo-
cated/resettled had not led to a significant improvement in the happi-
ness of the DFDR- affected communities in Colombo and Kochi.
•  Indicators of “perceived security” are the worst performing indicators, 
which may have contributed to the poor happiness scores among the 
DFDR- affected men and women, especially the latter.
Discussion and conclusion
The case studies from Colombo and Kochi suggest that the provision of 
better quality housing for the urban dwellers faced with DFDR, while 
crucial, is unlikely on its own to ensure that the well- being of the affected 
communities/neighbourhoods is safeguarded. The evidence presented here 
confirms that, despite ensuring a higher material quality of shelter—which 
was significantly better than the quality of housing in informal settlements 
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in post- war Colombo or in low- cost formal settlements in Kochi—the 
DFDR populations studied reported lower levels of happiness compared to 
the levels reported in the control groups. While, in this chapter, we focused 
exclusively on survey data and quantitative analysis, qualitative data from 
the same research project complements these findings: for example, 
Collyer, Amirthalingam, and Jayatilaka (2017); Herath, Lakshman, and 
Ekanayaka (2017); and Lakshman, Herath et al. (2016) use qualitative 
data to outline the contours of community- level social impacts that have 
impacted men and women differently. George and Rajan (2015) is a 
similar study focusing on DFDR experiences in Kochi.
 The results are compatible with the findings of other studies that have 
looked at relocation in cities where improvement in housing conditions 
failed to improve relocatee well- being. Bender (2008: 37), in relation to 
relocations in London to make way for the 2012 Olympics, points out that 
73 per cent of the affected people were happy about the new houses, yet 
51 per cent reported that their circumstances had not improved following 
the relocation.11 The author shows that poor well- being outcomes came 
about because the city developers had subordinated the relocatees’ rights 
to information and the cost of housing had increased or became more 
regu larised for most relocatees. Perlman (2004) contrasts the conditions in 
the favelas of Rio de Janeiro between 1969 and 2002 to show that, while 
there have been considerable physical improvements, other dimensions of 
life in the favela, including security and health, have drastically worsened.
 The gendered perspectives on relocation/resettlement examined here res-
onate well with the broader literature on women’s experiences post- 
relocation. It is the gendered lens that explains why housing—while a 
major component—is insufficient, in particular for women, due to specific 
factors such as safety issues, social network disruptions, etc. These non- 
material elements are crucial to well- being and happiness in urban settings 
(te Lintelo, Gupte et al. 2018). A community’s social capital is closely 
linked to its members’ perceptions of liveability, their sense of belonging, 
and the trust they place in their neighbours (Hutchinson et al. 2009). 
Women in particular, but also other vulnerable groups, benefit from such 
social connections (Meleis, Birch, and Wachter 2011). In fact, the deple-
tion of perceived safety by women is largely to do with a loss of com-
munity after relocation/resettlement and an inability to rebuild the same 
feeling amid the strangers with whom they are forced to live (George and 
Rajan 2015; Lakshman, Ekanayaka, and Lakshman 2016).
 It is possible that planned DFDR in cities, as profiled here, also trans-
forms the role of the urban neighbourhood, as documented in other cities 
(Forrest and Kearns 2001). The neighbourhood of informal settlements 
plays a primary role as an arena for what Forrest and Kearns (2001) 
describe as “extended domestic activities”. For example, it is common for 
domestic activities, such as accessing water (shared public tap), clothes 
washing, and even using the (shared) toilet, to happen in the public space 
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of the neighbourhood in informal settlements.12 When the capacity to 
perform these activities moved from the “neighbourhood space” of 
informal settlements to the “home space” of relocated/regenerated formal 
settlements, the need to do them in public became redundant. Forrest and 
Kearns (2001) also characterise a distinction between “neighbourhood” 
and “neighbouring”: in disadvantaged neighbourhoods, the quality of 
“neighbouring” is an important element in peoples’ ability to cope, 
whereas in more affluent areas the “neighbourhood” may be more 
important than interacting with one’s neighbours to create a community.
 While we are not suggesting that the disadvantaged/marginalised com-
munities that were relocated had become affluent after the relocation, it is 
quite possible that the substantial increase in the quality of housing caused 
a change in the role of the neighbourhood from the perspective of the 
affected households. Perhaps this explains why women perceived this 
change in ways that differed from the men. Some of the stresses experi-
enced by urban women (see Meleis, Birch, and Wachter 2011), such as 
changed work status, safety concerns, lack of convenient transportation, 
etc., are likely to multiply following forced resettlement. In Colombo, for 
example, women were disproportionately affected by loss of livelihood and 
constraints on children’s education due to resettlement and associated 
transportation problems and disruption of social networks (Lakshman, 
Ekanayaka, and Lakshman 2016), something that is made all the more 
challenging by the fact that women in urban areas frequently work in 
informal sector enterprises connected to the neighbourhood (Moser 2012). 
In Kochi, women were additionally stressed by having to enter into new 
waged labour and by the threat of state violence (George and Rajan 2015).
 This chapter looked at household- level impacts of development reloca-
tion in two medium- sized, yet fast- growing cities in South Asia, to ascer-
tain the burden of relocation from the perspective of the affected women 
and men. It turned out that the projects we studied had—to a large 
extent—secured materially improved post- relocation housing outcomes for 
the relocated populations, a possibility that had to a large part, if not com-
pletely, been ignored in the literature. This study was therefore able to 
identify sociocultural concerns that could not be addressed by looking at 
urban relocation purely as a problem of housing, though clearly the latter 
is indeed a hugely important element. Our research findings lead us to 
recommend that those designing DFDR policies consider adopting a more 
holistic view of housing, that can provide much more than higher material 
quality in replacement housing.13 Moreover, policymakers who adopt a 
gender- mainstreamed approach to DFDR policy are likely to make 
powerful inroads into addressing some of the neglected areas of DFDR, 
such as safety issues and social network disruptions, thus making DFDR a 
more positive experience for relocated women and men.
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Notes
 1 The high- rise flats in Colombo were built on the site of a former informal settle-
ment. So, there was an element of in situ resettlement, at least for the original 
dwellers from that site.
 2 The study also included Jaffna in Sri Lanka; data from that site are not used in 
this chapter.
 3 On- site randomisation was used.
 4 The variables were min- max normalised and additively combined to construct 
the index.
 5 Here we assume that the MQHI of the control group about the time relocation 
happened was similar to that of the relocated group.
 6 The data on the status “before” relocation are not included in the regression 
because those data are only available for the DFDR group.
 7 The assessment scores were normalised using the min- max method before aver-
aging across various comparator categories.
 8 The respondents referred to here are the main respondents who answered the 
survey questions and who comprise a sub- sample of the individuals who 
answered the happiness questions. Table 9.1 outlines the male/female break-
down of respondents. For example, the main respondents in the survey of the 
DFDR group in Colombo were 69 per cent female and 31 per cent male.
 9 Some of the differences are negligible, in which case the body of the arrow is 
not visible at the present scale of the figure. In these cases, only the head (tip) of 
the arrows is visible.
10 Our coding is as follows: 1 means no domestic violence exists; 0.5 means domestic 
violence exists “to some degree”; and 0 means domestic violence “definitely” exists.
11 39 per cent felt worse off and 12 per cent saw no difference.
12 The data show that dwellers in the informal settlements studied here have 
reported a significantly higher proportion of residents using shared water and/
or sanitation facilities.
13 See Collyer, Amirthalingam, and Jayatilaka (2017) for a discussion of how the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (1966), for 
example, provides a definition of “adequate housing” that describes such a 
holistic view.
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Conclusion
Reflections on how to make cities safer 
and more inclusive
Jennifer Erin Salahub and Mayssam D. Zaaroura
Introduction
The violence that exists in and is catalysed by cities comes in myriad forms 
that are created and recreated in urban spaces across the globe, as the 
chapters in this volume document. These different types of violence can be 
public or private, structural, environmental, physical, or psychological. 
They can disproportionately affect women or men, ethnic groups, the 
poor, or the middle class. They can be catastrophic such as the demolition 
of informal housing or commonplace like the street harassment women in 
every city face daily. They can be interwoven with poverty, social exclu-
sion, and the failure of the state to provide sufficient or appropriate ser-
vices, including safety and security.
 While the chapters in this book are grouped geographically, the chal-
lenges our co- authors describe often transcend borders. Yet as multiple 
forms of violence are ubiquitous, so is resistance and resilience to them. 
Our co- authors have documented both the types of violence city dwellers 
are facing and the strategies they implement in coping with them, in addi-
tion to the actions urban residents take to respond to violence and prevent 
its resurgence. Specifically, our co- authors have addressed:
•  gendered acts of violence
•  social cohesion and social exclusion
•  manifestations  of  structural  and  infrastructural  violence,  including 
forced displacement
•  interpersonal violence.
 In this chapter, we review the different types of violence documented 
through the Safe and Inclusive Cities (SAIC) initiative, including those 
written about in this volume and its sister book, Social Theories of Urban 
Violence in the Global South: Towards Safe and Inclusive Cities (Salahub, 
Gottsbacher, and de Boer 2018), as well as those identified by SAIC 
research documented in other works. Through that discussion, we identify 
interventions and approaches that have worked to reduce violence and 
222  Salahub and Zaaroura
consider how they could be applied to different contexts. We focus 
throughout on the agency of individuals and communities as they demon-
strate their resilience in coping with and responding to the varied mani-
festations of violence in their urban environments.
Forms of violence and resilience
Manifestations of gendered violence
We challenged our co- authors and other SAIC researchers1 to consider and 
make visible the gendered dimensions of their investigations. The results 
were frequently compelling and sometimes unexpected. They showed the 
importance of an intersectional gender analysis, as rarely were women’s 
experiences homogenous, be it within a neighbourhood, community, city, 
or country. More often, we saw similarities among women’s and men’s 
experiences based on shared socioeconomic characteristics rather than 
their gendered differences, though there are important exceptions.
 Young men working their way up through the hierarchy of Abidjan’s 
informal transport hubs (Kouamé Walter Kra, Chapter 1) share experi-
ences of violence with their counterparts in South Africa’s townships 
(Richard Matzopoulos, Kim Bloch, Sam Lloyd, Chris Berens, Jonny Myers, 
and Mary Lou Thompson, Chapter 3) and Brazil’s favelas (Taylor et al. 
2016), and—in fact—look to their Brazilian brothers as role models 
(Akindès 2017). Women fighting against discrimination and (infra)struc-
tural violence in India (Darshini Mahadevia and Renu Desai, Chapter 8) 
share experiences of victimisation with their sisters in Zimbabwe (Stewart, 
Katsande, and Chisango 2016; Stewart et al. 2018), but their coping mech-
anisms and approaches to resistance differ.
 Experiences of harassment of women in public spaces and physical viol-
ence in domestic spheres were—unsurprisingly—near ubiquitous across the 
cities we studied. While the evidence from all cases confirms the need for 
further action and feminist activism, it also reveals inspiring and compel-
ling stories of individual and community agency in the face of discouraging 
odds. Take, for example, the solidarity and resistance against violence 
exhibited by the members of Territorios Seguros (Secure Territories) in 
Costa Rica, as described by Juan Pablo Pérez Sáinz, Mario Zetino Duarte, 
and Florencio Ceballos Schaulsohn in Chapter 6. These community organ-
isers, led by women, refused to allow their social citizenship to be win-
nowed away by social violence (e.g. conflict among neighbours) or 
profit- seeking violence (e.g. narco- trafficking). Instead, they worked with 
their neighbours to build and secure their homes and communities, and 
promote capacity building through non- violent conflict resolution.
 This grassroots- led initiative in Central America contrasts with the 
success that a state- led programme in South Africa is having in empower-
ing women and reducing violence. The Community Work Programme 
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(CWP) is a community- centred poverty- reduction initiative that is having—
mainly positive—gendered impacts on the communities in which it oper-
ates (Malose Langa, Themba Masuku, and Hugo van der Merwe, Chapter 
4). Most CWP employees are women over 35 years of age and the modest 
income they receive through the programme, combined with other govern-
ment grants, is helping lift them and their families above the poverty line. 
The work they do is largely unskilled, but is helping to make their com-
munities safer, especially when work such as safety patrols and clearing 
vegetation that impedes night- time visibility on footpaths is prioritised. 
The study found that there is a risk of increased domestic tension, poten-
tially spilling over into violence, as women gain more relative power in the 
household via their increased income. However, the authors argue that the 
benefits outweigh the risks and other programmes in South Africa are 
working to reduce domestic violence writ large.
 This opens the issue to a broader discussion on the need for initiatives 
that focus on economic empowerment of women and that can work more 
holistically by combining them with efforts to end violence against women. 
Whether focusing on the gendered dimensions of this issue or when 
working to prevent youth violence, economic incentives and empowerment 
initiatives have to address immaterial components such as social inclusion 
and efforts to look at social norms that prevent or emerge as a result. The 
reverse is also true: violence reduction initiatives need to address the chal-
lenges of economic exclusion, something that a more holistic approach to 
these issues would incorporate.
 Other countries could learn from these examples. In Ghana, the SAIC 
research team documented the disproportionate burden of violent crime 
borne by women, but noted that reporting to state authorities was low 
among female survivors, likely due to a lack of trust that they will see 
justice (Adobea Yaa Owusu, Martin Oteng- Ababio, George Owusu, Char-
lotte Wrigley- Asante, and Martin Wiredu Agyekum, Chapter 2). Owusu 
and colleagues call for reform within the police service to help women (and 
men) have more confidence in the police and the wider criminal justice 
system. We echo this recommendation and point out that approaches such 
as those in Costa Rica and South Africa, tailored for the Ghanaian context, 
could yield positive results.
 Optimistically, these successes—or pieces of these successful pro-
grammes—could even be applied in the most challenging situations. Redu-
cing poverty through gainful and meaningful employment, or creating a 
modicum of security in concert with neighbours, could go a long way 
towards addressing the multifaceted challenges that youth in Côte d’Ivoire 
(Kra, Chapter 1; Akindès 2018) and their counterparts in the Democratic 
Republic of Congo (DRC) (IDRC 2016) face. That said, more holistic 
approaches will also be needed to address the interlinking political crisis, 
poverty, social exclusion, addiction, violence, psychological trauma, and 
toxic masculinities that characterise their precarious lives.
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Social cohesion and social exclusion
Several of the SAIC research teams set out to test the validity and utility of 
violence reduction theories, developed in the Global North and applied in 
the Global South.2 Others approached their research questions via different 
entry points—evaluating an intervention or unpacking a situation that goes 
against the trend, for example—and identified social cohesion as a key 
factor in understanding the phenomenon they were studying. Regardless of 
how they approached the question of social inclusion, exclusion, or cohe-
sion, all of our co- authors pushed our understanding of the nature of social 
cohesion and exclusion a bit further and helped all of us to better under-
stand how the ties that bind communities together influence the violence 
and exclusion that different segments of those communities experience. 
Moreover, they did this using a variety of methods—qualitative, quant-
itative, participatory, and ethnographic—that complement each other, pro-
viding a more robust picture of the situations they investigated.
 In South Africa, three research teams came to the idea of social cohesion 
from very different perspectives. Two of those teams examined the same 
intervention, Violence Prevention through Urban Upgrading (VPUU).3 One 
team took a public health approach to understanding the impact of the 
intervention on violence and other factors, including social cohesion in a 
suburb of Cape Town. The other saw this as an opportunity to look at 
how different violence prevention/reduction interventions impact social 
cohesion and collective efficacy4 in communities by comparing VPUU with 
Brazil’s Police Pacifying Units (UPP, using its Portuguese acronym) in Rio 
de Janeiro. Using different approaches to researching the question, Matzo-
poulos et al. (Chapter 3) and Vanessa Barolsky and Doriam Borges 
(Chapter 5) come to different conclusions about how VPUU influences 
social cohesion in Khayelitsha.
 From our perspective, these are complementary rather than contra-
dictory results. Matzopoulos et al. (Chapter 3) take a narrow definition of 
social cohesion and statistically measure it across a random and represent-
ative sample, showing that VPUU has a slightly positive impact on those 
measures of social cohesion. In short, their results tell us that, overall, 
VPUU is supporting social cohesion. Barolsky and Borges (Chapter 5), on 
the other hand, approach the question from an ethnographer’s lens to 
unpack the social networks of the community, including key individuals 
and groups, in the context of post- colonial, post- Apartheid South Africa. 
They find that VPUU has not been universally positive when it comes to 
community experiences of social cohesion and offer suggestions for how it 
could better integrate into existing social structures to improve its impact 
and broaden its positive influence.
 But VPUU is not the only programme in South Africa influencing social 
cohesion in urban communities. The CWP also seems to be supporting 
positive manifestations thereof, for example by helping participants get to 
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know other neighbourhood residents and build trust, work in teams, and 
meet weekly to discuss priorities for upcoming work (Langa, Masuku, and 
van der Merwe, Chapter 4). With this newfound camaraderie, CWP parti-
cipants seem to demonstrate high levels of commitment to improving their 
communities. Our co- authors also identify the potential for programmes 
similar to CWP to foster social cohesion in other communities through an 
inclusive and participatory approach.
 While results from SAIC research in South Africa are uplifting, those 
further north on the continent are less so. In Côte d’Ivoire and the DRC, 
social exclusion is driving many youths to find the sense of community 
every human needs in pernicious gangs fuelled by competition, drug abuse, 
and physical violence (Kra, Chapter 1; IDRC 2016). As Kra traces the tra-
jectory of a young man known as “Z” through the structure that controls 
Abidjan’s informal transport hub, we gain crucial insight into his unenvi-
able position characterised by limited options for formal or licit employ-
ment, minimal schooling, and a trajectory of increasingly violent 
behaviour.
 Outside of the licit market, Z’s skills help him advance in the transport 
hubs network in and around Cote d’Ivoire’s capital, extorting money from 
those who transit through it and battling with rival groups. Rather than 
the profit- seeking violence that Pérez Sáinz, Zetino Duarte, and Ceballos 
Schaulsohn (Chapter 6) identify in Costa Rica and El Salvador, Z’s experi-
ence is presented as a coping mechanism against the structural violence, 
lack of options, and abandonment by the state that he experiences: this is 
how he makes a living, in the absence of other options and a social safety 
net (Kra, Chapter 1). Similarly, Congolese youth have been observed to 
form family structures within youth gangs in an apparent attempt to regain 
the social connections they have lost (IDRC 2016).
 Quick fixes to reduce these different manifestations of violence and 
reintegrate youth into safer, healthier communities are few and far 
between. As the root of Z’s path to violence is structural—a lack of 
employment opportunities linked to poverty, limited educational oppor-
tunities, and a weak social safety net—so must be the cure: functional 
national and local governance institutions, job creation, education, psycho-
social support, and the like. All of these take considerable time, money, 
political will, and community buy- in to effect change. Researching these 
topics in locations where research is difficult to conduct—such as these 
studies in Côte d’Ivoire and DRC—are important first steps to developing 
durable solutions.
 On a slightly more promising note, there are encouraging signs from 
SAIC research in Latin America, notwithstanding the democratic deficit 
that Venezuelans are facing at the time of writing (2018–2019). In six 
urban spaces in Costa Rica and El Salvador where social exclusion is high, 
three initiatives are helping to build the community and, in turn, reduce 
violence and insecurity. In Costa Rica, Territorios Seguros and a state- led 
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Community Security Programme are having positive impacts, with some 
variation in outcomes in the locations where the latter is implemented. In 
El Salvador, a programme led by the United Nations Development Pro-
gramme, the Municipal Citizen Security Plans, is yielding promising results 
in some parts of the country—building the capacity of the community to 
tackle the dynamics of  violence—whereas in others, it is having less of an 
impact (Pérez Sáinz, Zetino Duarte, and Ceballos Schaulsohn, Chapter 6).
 Given the crisis in Venezuela at the time of writing, there is little hope 
of positive state intervention to reduce violence; indeed, reports point to 
the state as the perpetrator of considerable violence against its people (see, 
for example, Amnesty International 2017). However, grassroots activism, 
particularly that led by women, is helping to pacify even the most violent 
urban barrios of the country (Roberto Briceño-León, Chapter 7). Through 
the establishment of norms, pacts, and other types of social institutions, 
mothers, nuns, female teachers, and others are helping to end the violence 
that has so negatively impacted them and their families. As the Venezuelan 
state continues to weaken, these forms of informal social institutionality 
will become increasingly important as sites of resistance, agency, activism, 
and hope.
Manifestations of structural and infrastructural violence, 
including forced displacement
Whether it is due to development or conflict, being forced to leave one’s 
home brings with it moments of violence. In many cities, efforts to apply a 
layer of urban planning over the existing organic, but informal, growth of 
the city can put residents in conflict with the state and with developers. 
These processes can exhibit both structural and physical violence, with 
different results depending on how they are implemented. In Kochi, India 
and Colombo, Sri Lanka (Rajith W. D. Lakshman and S. Irudaya Rajan, 
Chapter 9), we see gendered differences in satisfaction among those 
 relocated from informal urban settlements—slums—to apartment towers. 
Generally, women seem to be more content with their new situation. At 
the same time, both men and women express frustration with where and 
how they have been moved, including grievances related to a decline in the 
quality of their social and cultural lives that is not mitigated by an increase 
in the material quality of their new housing. These findings suggest that 
governments and developers need to think as carefully about the social 
implications of urban design as they do about engineering; in other words, 
they need to consider the immaterial to the same extent as the material 
when it comes to reducing urban violence. Moving people from single- 
storey dwellings with permeable lines between public and private spaces 
into tower blocks of single- unit apartments where neighbours rarely cross 
paths and social interaction is mainly transactional can backfire, even if the 
new accommodation represents a move up the property ladder.
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 Elsewhere in India, Mahadevia and Desai (Chapter 8) explored how the 
capture of the state by private interests is leaving residents displaced, disap-
pointed, and in danger. Informality is a means for coping with the pressures 
of urban life: distances travelled for work or school, a lack of affordable 
housing, and pressures from developers and the state to gentrify parts of the 
city deemed undesirable. People living in informal settlements, often the 
result of being displaced—or “invisiblized”, as other Safe and Inclusive 
Cities researchers in India characterise it (Burte, Kamath, and Joshi 2016: 
48)—by state policies that prioritise the profits of developers and fail to 
provide basic public services such as public lighting, potable water supply, 
and reliable public transport. Already living on the margins of the city, these 
people are pushed to the margins of society to eke out their livelihoods. This 
situation often puts them in competition with other city dwellers and in con-
flict with the law. Though these conflicts rarely turn physically violent, this 
structural violence grinds away at individuals and communities and demon-
strates a failure of the state to fulfil its obligations, whether in national law 
or as part of the social contract. The solution to these challenges lies in local 
action leading to improved governance: it is not that the Indian state or local 
municipalities lack the capacity to deliver services and treat their citizens 
humanely; it is that they lack the political will to do so.
 This situation is not unique to South Asia. In Zimbabwe (Stewart, Kat-
sande, and Chisango 2016; Stewart et al. 2018), residents displaced from the 
immediate periphery of the city to suburbs much further away by politically 
motivated evictions such as Operation Murambatsvina, and sold on the idea 
of free land in exchange for owner- led development, are learning the hard 
way that structural violence is iterative and can endure for decades. These 
mostly female residents, once centrally located, albeit in accommodation 
designed for single men rather than families, find themselves living on the 
outskirts of Harare. In their new location, they face rising debt for municipal 
services they cannot access, legal action for not paying their bills, and threats 
of eviction because they have not been able to develop an appropriate struc-
ture on the land they have been granted. The result is a catastrophic failure 
of the state to appropriately and humanely implement the country’s basic 
law. This negligence puts women and the families they often head in precari-
ous living conditions without access to the rudimentary, but reliable, muni-
cipal services they previously had. In this case, only governance reform and a 
political recommitment to apply the resources of the state to the service of its 
citizens, and with respect for their constitutional rights, will bring about 
wholesale change. In the meantime, legal professionals and activist groups 
do what they can to minimise the impact on their clients.
Interpersonal violence
The constellation of categories of violence that we and our co- authors 
present intersect with one another in dynamic and often catalytic ways. 
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But what about the type of violence that typically comes to mind when we 
think of “violence”? So far, we have focused on types of violence that 
connect with urbanisation and the city. Interpersonal violence is one of 
those and, while it is not uniquely urban, the ways in which it is linked to 
other urban forms of violence makes it, we think, different from interper-
sonal violence in rural settings. Rare are the cases where structural violence 
in cities does not boil over, at some point, into physical violence between 
individuals. Equally rare are the moments when domestic violence exists in 
an urban space free from other types of violence. We see interpersonal viol-
ence in, for example:
•  the crime  tracked and analysed  in Ghana and South Africa: assaults, 
rapes, and homicides (Owusu et al., Chapter 2; Matzopoulos et al., 
Chapter 3)
•  the  fights  between  neighbours  in  communities  in  Costa  Rica  (Pérez 
Sáinz, Zetino Duarte, and Ceballos Schaulsohn, Chapter 6)
•  the  tactics of  control,  intimidation, and extortion used by gangs and 
narco- traffickers in the urban spaces of El Salvador (Pérez Sáinz, 
Zetino Duarte, and Ceballos Schaulsohn, Chapter 6), Venezuela 
(Briceño-León, Chapter 7), and Brazil (Taylor et al. 2016)
•  the  attacks  and  counter- attacks  of  the  unionist and gnambro youth 
who control Abidjan’s informal transport hubs (Kra, Chapter 1)
•  the  violent  crime,  including  sex  crimes,  committed  by  Shegué and 
Kuluna youth gangs in the slums of Kinshasa, DRC (IDRC 2016)
•  the  repressive  approach  of  the  state  in  Venezuela  (Briceño-León, 
Chapter 7; Briceño-León 2018) and the militarised approach to pacifi-
cation in Brazil (Barolsky and Borges, Chapter 5)
•  the  gendered  violence  that  sees women  disproportionately  victimised 
in their homes and by their intimate partners, and men disproportion-
ately the victims of homicide (see, for example, Anwar et al. 2016; 
Taylor et al. 2016).
 These examples are joined by multiple instances of violence around the 
world that urban dwellers cope with on a daily basis and that have become 
so commonplace as to be banal. We argue that because this interpersonal 
physical violence is inextricable from the other types of urban mani-
festations of violence described in this volume, the solution lies in address-
ing the root causes that push conflict over into physical violence, as 
identified above. At the same time, investments in more immediate solu-
tions are necessary to prevent people from getting hurt. Examples are 
urban upgrading, poverty- reduction initiatives such as the CWP, non- 
violent conflict resolution, feminist activism leading to the full empower-
ment of women and other marginalised groups, and other immediate, 
on- the-ground interventions that support people in finding alternatives to 
paths that will lead them to violence.
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Conclusions and policy recommendations
Resolving the urban dilemma?
In his literature review for the SAIC initiative, Muggah (2012) identifies 
robust separate literature on three topics—urbanisation, poverty, and 
 violence—but a paucity of analysis at the nexus of them. He identifies an 
“urban dilemma”: the challenge of rapid urbanisation fuelling economic 
growth while at the same time creating sprawling cities, sites of different 
types of violence and deprivation as governance structures are unable to 
keep pace. As the International Development Research Centre (Canada) 
and the Department for International Development (UK) were developing 
the SAIC initiative, Muggah’s (2012) report reinforced the need for a 
cross- regional, cross- disciplinary approach to researching—and, hopefully, 
resolving—the urban dilemma.
 Bringing together teams working within and across countries in Latin 
America, South Asia, and sub- Saharan Africa, the initiative took an inter-
disciplinary approach to unpacking the linked challenges of rapid urbani-
sation, poverty, and violence. Looking across the deep dives that each 
research team took into the dynamics of the cases they studied, we see a 
number of points that stretch across many, if not all, cases.
 First, social cohesion and social inclusion are crucial pieces of the inequality–
poverty–urban violence nexus. Violence reduction programmes in the Global 
South, imported from the North, that fail to take local cultural specificities 
into consideration miss opportunities to address the roots of violence and 
different types of inequalities. Crime prevention through environmental 
design or that seeks to alter physical spaces without also addressing how 
people, as social beings, interact with that space and with each other in that 
space likewise offer important but only superficial solutions. SAIC research in 
West Africa (IDRC 2016; Akindès 2018; Kra, Chapter 1) demonstrates that 
social exclusion and marginalisation—more than economic poverty—are 
driving an increase in violent youth gangs, many of which see themselves as 
“socially dead” (IDRC 2016: 2). As Muggah (2012: 57) notes, policymakers 
tend to assume “that urban violence is in some ways a failure of youth inte-
gration into labor markets and persistent unemployment”. SAIC research tells 
us that employment opportunities are important, but that the social aspects 
of feeling emotionally attached to, included in, and having a stake in the 
future of society are equally significant.
 Beyond youth gangs, the importance of social cohesion is echoed in 
places such as Ghana, where Owusu et al. (Chapter 2) show that the 
strong social ties within communities of low socioeconomic status pro-
vided a protective effect against crime, including violent crime, when com-
pared with those of middle socioeconomic status. (High status 
communities, though low on social cohesion are able to afford physical 
protection in ways that their low- and middle- status counterparts cannot.) 
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Similarly, Langa, Masuku, and van der Merwe (Chapter 4) discuss the 
ways in which the CWP facilitates the development of (positive mani-
festations of ) social cohesion among participants in South Africa and 
thereby helps to prevent violence. In the same country, Barolsky and 
Borges (Chapter 5) discuss how interventions can disrupt existing social 
networks, leaving some community members, who previously felt included, 
feeling like they are outside of the community. In other work, Barolsky 
(2016: 21–22) explains the negative manifestations of social cohesion: 
public violence, gang- imposed social order, and—we would suggest—the 
performance of toxic masculinity.
 Likewise, in Costa Rica, the experience of the members of Territorios 
Seguros shows the profound effect of communities coming together to 
work toward a shared objective (Salazar Sanchez and Pérez Sáinz 2015). 
Elsewhere in Latin America, Briceño-Léon (2018 and Chapter 7, this 
volume) shows how the institutionalisation of social norms is helping 
reduce violence in the barrios of Caracas and other Venezuelan cities. 
Meanwhile, in Bogotá, Lima, and Santiago, Arias and Tocornal Montt 
(2018) show that differing migration patterns impact community cohesion 
and, consequently, tension, conflict, and violence in these cities.
 Second, the role of eviction, forced displacement, and physical exclusion 
as drivers of urban violence cannot be underestimated. As Lakshman and 
Rajan (Chapter 9) and their co- investigators, Jayatilaka, Lakshman, and 
Lakshman (2018), describe, forced resettlement, whether due to war or 
urban development, has lasting consequences for urban residents. In some 
cases, these can be positive: many development- displaced residents in 
Colombo report being happier with their current accommodation than 
they were before relocation (Lakshman and Rajan, Chapter 9). However, 
the stresses on social ties sometimes outweigh the material benefits of 
improved housing. These feelings are reflected by the residents of Rio de 
Janeiro, displaced by the development of their favela to create facilities for 
the 2016 Olympic Games (IDRC 2017a).
 Experiences in Zimbabwe present even poorer outcomes, particularly for 
women displaced by the state from the peri- urban area to much further 
suburbs (Stewart, Katsande, and Chisango 2016; Stewart et al. 2018). Find-
ings in India connect with experiences in Sri Lanka and Zimbabwe. In 
Mumbai, Ahmedabad, and Guwahati, those excluded from the urban centre 
by the collusion of the state and private interests find themselves discon-
nected from crucial social networks, far from their places of employment or 
education without access to reliable and efficient public transport, and often 
in spaces that are poorly lit and maintained. These locations create oppor-
tunities for miscreants to prey upon the vulnerable, particularly women and 
girls (Burte, Kamath, and Joshi 2016; Mahadevia and Desai, Chapter 8).
 Finally, SAIC research has made major contributions to understanding 
gendered violence in cities of the Global South, building on the ground- 
breaking work of Chant and McIlwaine (2016), identifying it as an 
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 additional risk factor for urban violence in addition to those that Muggah 
(2012: 39) identifies across the literature: “urbanization, urban density, 
poverty and inequality, and youth bulges”. Three SAIC projects focused 
specifically on the gendered dimensions of urban violence: in Rio de 
Janeiro (Brazil) and Maputo (Mozambique); Karachi and Rawalpindi- 
Islamabad (Pakistan); and Harare, Bulawayo, and Kadoma (Zimbabwe). 
Yet, many more have incorporated gendered analyses in their research, 
yielding important insights into how women’s and men’s experiences of 
urban violence, poverty, and inequality differ.
 Unpacking the pervasive and violently toxic masculinities that con-
tribute to the high rate of male homicides in Rio de Janeiro and Maputo, 
Taylor et al. (2016) and Mariano, Slegh, and Roque (2018) describe, for 
the first time, the specific pressures that low- income men and boys in par-
ticular experience in a context of pervasive urban violence. In Rio de 
Janeiro, the state, non- state armed groups, and drug traffickers perpetuate 
this violence. In post- conflict Maputo, men and boys face violence where 
employment opportunities are scarce and the social safety net is weak. 
These findings suggest that programmes to help men and women to better 
understand and deconstruct unhealthy masculinities and femininities can 
enable them to rebuild healthy ideas of what it means to be a man or 
woman in all their social roles—protector, breadwinner, caregiver, loving 
partner. They can also assist in breaking the cycles of violence that see men 
and women reinforce these unhealthy images and, ultimately, die, albeit in 
different ways.
 In Pakistan, SAIC researchers focused on the access that women and 
some, largely marginalised, men have to public spaces and their mobility in 
that space, particularly via public transport. Their research provides new 
insights into the spaces women can and cannot occupy freely and how 
control of women in the public and private spheres blurs because of pre-
vailing gender roles in Pakistan (Anwar et al. 2016; Anwar, Viqar, and 
Mustafa 2018). Similar constraints on women’s and girls’ movements are 
documented in India by Mahadevia et al. (2014). There, as in Pakistan, 
women are often subject to the profit- maximising incentives of minibus 
and auto- rickshaw drivers who offer a public service but work in the 
private sector. In both cases, insufficient and/or poorly managed publicly 
run transport, combined with women’s need to move about the city, results 
in women falling victim to harassment, groping, and worse as they move 
around the urban space.
 In Zimbabwe (Stewart, Katsande, and Chisango 2016; Stewart et al. 
2018), as in Sri Lanka, India, and many other contexts, SAIC researchers 
describe the gendered nature of exclusion, deprivation, predation by the 
state, and displacement, as described above. Their contributions provide 
unique insights into the gendered micro- dynamics of exclusion as different 
agents of the Zimbabwean state—municipal and national, and mainly 
men—use women’s lives and shelters as pawns in a political power game 
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at the macro level. The state’s failure to fulfil its constitutional duty to the 
residents of Hatcliffe and Mbare (suburbs of Harare from which residents 
were displaced) could be attributed to institutional weakness. However, 
the fact that these women continue to be charged for municipal services 
that they do not receive and are pursued through legal means for their 
debts speaks to a more targeted and conscious use of them and their situ-
ation to achieve a political end—regardless of the state’s failure to uphold 
its end of the bargain or its constitutional obligations to protect them.
Options for policy and practice
While each SAIC research team sought to document, understand, and 
explain the manifestations of violence and inequalities around them, they 
also aimed to identify ways to prevent them and strategies to end the 
 violence and exclusion that already exist. Four key entry points emerged 
that could have positive impacts on very different places (IDRC 2017c). 
These promising practices are:
•  Community- owned public employment programmes: As Langa, 
Masuku, and van der Merwe (Chapter 4) discuss, the CWP has 
enormous potential to leverage a cash- for-work poverty- reduction 
scheme into an initiative that will build positive manifestations of 
social cohesion, provide important community services to prevent viol-
ence, and address financial stresses that can boil over into interper-
sonal violence.
•  Urban upgrading that targets the root causes of violence: Improved 
public spaces, transit routes, and community infrastructure, as described 
by Matzopoulos et al. (Chapter 3), can have a significant positive impact 
on urban violence. But such initiatives must also take into consideration 
the impact that urban upgrading, and the processes surrounding it, can 
have on existing social networks and social cohesion (Barolsky and 
Borges, Chapter 5; Barolsky 2016). Equally important to note is that 
research is ongoing as to whether the positive impact of VPUU, in this 
case, is net or if some or all of the reduction in Khayelitsha’s violence 
has been the result of displacement to surrounding neighbourhoods.
•  Fostering non- violent masculinities that will make both men and 
women safer in their urban environments: Through programmes that 
break down the oppressive gender roles that put both men and women 
at risk, and using participation to recast masculinities and femininities 
in ways that are healthier for all (Stewart, Katsande, and Chisango 
2016; Taylor et al. 2016; IDRC 2017b; Anwar, Viqar, and Mustafa 
2018; Mariano, Slegh, and Roque 2018; Stewart et al. 2018).
•  Pursuing research and programming that can be gender transforma-
tive: Moser (2017) identifies urban safety in public spaces as one of 
several promising practices that can create space for a renegotiation of 
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gendered power relations, through which women can claim more 
power or create new power of their own. Drawing on the SAIC 
research presented above, our co- authors and partners have identified 
multiple entry points to initiate the structural changes that are needed 
within society to bring about a transformation in gender relations, 
resulting in true equality and the end of patriarchal social structures. 
These include opportunities to recast violent masculinities, initiatives 
such as Territorios Seguros in Costa Rica, women’s agency in creating 
safe spaces in Venezuela, and initiatives in Zimbabwe to support sub-
urban women in claiming their constitutional rights and holding a gov-
ernment in transition to account.
 Additionally, at least three themes surfaced where the evidence suggests 
that more work needs to be done to understand how we can help make 
cities safer. Areas where more evidence and consideration are needed 
include:
•  Socially inclusive urban planning: Insight into how to create inclusion 
through urban planning processes. This would, we believe, require a 
move beyond consultation to involve marginalised groups unfamiliar 
with planning processes in decision- making about how their cities are 
built and rebuilt.
•  Education, employment, and civic engagement for youth: Youth, both 
young men and young women, present particular challenges for the 
urban violence–poverty–inequality nexus, especially in countries 
experiencing a youth bulge. We see combined efforts to improve edu-
cation, create meaningful employment opportunities, and show youth 
that they have a stake in society’s future as crucial to developing the 
social cohesion and inclusion that SAIC research suggests will prevent 
violence in cities (IDRC 2017d).
•  How urbanisation and efforts to prevent and reduce urban violence 
can contribute to gender transformation: We should be able to lever-
age the rapid pace of change in urban centres—including social 
change—to create gender transformative spaces. Research is needed to 
identify examples of where this has already happened and what lessons 
can be learned to help initiate/replicate it in other spaces and more 
broadly.
 Although the SAIC initiative has concluded, our co- authors and other 
research partners continue to study these issues, along with many counter-
parts. With their dedication, knowledge, and global network, we are confi-
dent that the contribution of SAIC research will help overcome the urban 
dilemma, making cities safer and more inclusive for all.
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Notes
1 SAIC brought together a network of more than 75 researchers based in 19 coun-
tries, who investigated different aspects of urban violence, poverty, and inequal-
ities in more than 40 cities in 16 countries. For more information on the 
initiative, specific research projects, research teams, and the outputs and out-
comes of their research, visit www.idrc.ca/cities.
2 For further insight into the theories tested and refined by SAIC researchers, see 
Salahub, Gottsbacher, and de Boer (2018).
3 Violence Prevention through Urban Upgrading is an urban community develop-
ment programme, based in South Africa, that seeks to increase safety through a 
variety of physical improvements and social interventions.
4 Collective efficacy is a community’s social cohesion combined with its willing-
ness to take action for the common good (see, for instance, Barolsky 2016 or 
Arias and Tocornal Montt 2018).
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